What Explains The Surge In Euro Area Sovereign Spreads During The Financial Crisis Of 2007 09

While the use of public resources is critical to cushion the impact of the financial crisis on the euro-area economy, it is key that the entailed fiscal costs not be seen by markets as undermining fiscal sustainability. From this perspective, to what extent do movements in euro area sovereign spreads reflect country-specific solvency concerns? In line with previous studies, the paper suggests that euro area sovereign risk premium differentials tend to comove over time and are mainly driven by a common time-varying factor, mimicking global risk repricing. Since October 2008, however, there is evidence that markets have become progressively more concerned about the potential fiscal implications of national financial sectors' frailty and future debt dynamics. The liquidity of sovereign bond markets still seems to play a significant (albeit fairly limited) role in explaining changes in euro area spreads.

Several recent contributions on the euro crisis have highlighted the presence of discontinuity points in the link between sovereign spreads and economic fundamentals. The most puzzling evidence is the relatively stable environment that has characterized the sovereign bond market despite growing macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area. The abrupt surge in yields has been interpreted as an expression of various form of “contagion” that led the financial market to reassess the risk profile of sovereign bonds. On the ground of the theory of sovereign crisis we propose an empirical model that explains the outbreak of the crisis and brings new evidence on the role played by debt sustainability in the contagion to other peripheral bond markets. The empirical evidence broadly confirms the role played by various form of contagion but hands back the responsibility of the euro crisis mainly in the hands of the policy makers both at domestic and at the European level. Fiscal sustainability presides over the switching between regimes characterized by different sensitivities of the financial markets to economic news. The deterioration of the fiscal outlook caused by fiscal profligacy and the recapitalization of ailing banks together with the lack of growth-enhancing structural reforms and the wrongly timed ECB's rate hikes in 2011 seem to be the ultimate causes of the near collapse of the Euro area.

By analysing data from January 2007 to December 2012 in a panel GLS error correction framework we find that European countries’ sovereign CDS spreads are largely driven by global investor sentiment, macroeconomic fundamentals and liquidity conditions in the CDS market. But the relative importance of these factors changes over time. While during the 2008/09 crisis weak economic fundamentals (such as high current account decifit, worsening underlying fiscal balances, credit boom), a drop in liquidity and a spike in risk aversion contributed to high spreads in Central and Eastern and South-Eastern European (CESEE) countries, a marked improvement in fundamentals (e.g. reduction in fiscal deficit, narrowing of current balances, gradual economic recovery) explains the region’s resilience to financial market spillovers during the euro area crisis. Our generalised variance decomposition analyisis does not suggest strong direct spillovers from the euro area periphery. The significant drop in the CDS spreads between July 2012 and December 2012 was mainly driven by a decline in risk aversion as suggested by the model’s out of sample forecasts.

This paper proposes a stochastic volatility model to measure sovereign financial distress. It examines how key European sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads affect each other; specifically, the paper analyses the volatility structure of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal. The stability of Germany is a close proxy for the resilience of the euro area as markets use Germany’s sovereign CDS as a hedge for systemic risk. Although most of the CDS changes for Germany during 2009–12 were due to idiosyncratic factors, market developments in Italy and Spain contributed significantly, likely due to their relative importance in the region. Changes in Greece’s sovereign CDS had no significant effect on Germany’s sovereign CDS despite initial widespread concerns about such linkages. Spain and Italy show a notable co-dependence in explaining each other’s volatility while Germany also plays an important role. It is found that extreme bad news led to persistent and nearly permanent effects on the stochastic volatility of European sovereign CDS spreads.

This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.

This paper attempts to explain the recent rise and differentiation of sovereign spreads across the countries of the eurozone. Following the onset of the subprime crisis in July 2007, spreads rose but mainly on account of common global factors. The rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008 marked a turning point. Countries thereafter were increasingly differentiated. Sovereign spreads of a eurozone country tended to rise when the prospects of its domestic financial sector worsened. It appears, therefore, that the rescue of Bear Stearns created a link between financial sector vulnerabilities and a larger contingent liability on public finances. Following the failure of Lehman Brothers, spreads also rose faster for countries with higher ratios of public debt-to-GDP. These transitional dynamics appear to have concluded with the nationalization of Anglo Irish: sovereign spreads throughout the eurozone jumped, with the jump emphasizing the differentiation by financial sector vulnerability and public debt levels. The results imply that, to varying degrees, countries may have moved to a new regime of weak economic outlook, financial sector fragilities, and strains on public finances.

Analyses the European Union's constitutional transformation during the euro crisis, especially the interaction between politics and the ECJ in its materialization.

Sovereign risk premia in several euro area countries have risen markedly since 2008, driving up credit spreads in the private sector as well. We propose a New Keynesian model of a two-region monetary union that accounts for this “sovereign risk channel.” The model is calibrated to the euro area as of mid-2012. We show that a combination of sovereign risk in one region and strongly procyclical fiscal policy at the aggregate level exacerbates the risk of belief-driven deflationary downturns. The model provides an argument in favor of coordinated, asymmetric fiscal stances as a way to prevent selffulfilling debt crises.

This Selected Issues paper estimates Ecuador’s potential growth in the range of 1 3/4 to 3 percent. The lower estimate corresponds to an extrapolation of recent trends while the higher estimate could be achievable through the implementation of a reform agenda that addresses fiscal and competitiveness challenges of Ecuador. The paper also develops models to nowcast and forecast GDP to improve the accuracy of growth projections. The oil sector remains an important driver of economic activity; however, it is not as important as it once was. A simple growth accounting exercise is used to decompose Ecuador’s growth between production factors accumulation; capital and labor, and total factor productivity. The study shows that low total factor productivity is the reason behind Ecuador’s recent economic decline and has been a negative contributor to long-term growth. The paper also explores different vector autoregression models to identify the best one to forecast real GDP in Ecuador.