The Us Supreme Court And The Centralization Of Federal Authority

Traces the US Supreme Court’s effect on federal government growth from the founding era forward. This book explores the US Supreme Court’s impact on the constitutional development of the federal government from the founding era forward. The author’s research is based on an original database of several hundred landmark decisions compiled from constitutional law casebooks and treatises published between 1822 and 2010. By rigorously and systematically interpreting these decisions, he determines the extent to which the court advanced and consolidated national governing authority. The result is a portrait of how the high court, regardless of constitutional issue and ideology, persistently expanded the reach and scope of the federal government. “Dichio takes a fairly unique approach to thinking about the relationship between the US Supreme Court and the development of the American state. Scholars interested in American political development and historical work on the law and the courts should grapple with the evidence on offer here.” — Keith E. Whittington, coauthor of American Constitutionalism, Second Edition

At a time of unprecedented national power, why do so many Americans believe that our nationhood is fragile and precarious? Why the talk--among politicians, academics, and jurists--of "coups d'etat," of culture wars, of confederation, of constitutional breakdown? In this wide-ranging book, Robert Nagel proposes a surprising znswer: that anxiety about national unity is caused by centralization itself. Moreover, he proposes that this anxiety has dangerous cultural consequences that are, in an implosive cycle, pushing the country toward ever greater centralization. Carefully examining recent landmark Supreme Court cases that protect states' rights, Nagel argues that the federal judiciary is not leading and is not likely to lead a revival of the complex system called federalism. A robust version of federalism requires appreciation for political conflict and respect for disagreement about constitutional meaning, both values that are deeply antithetical to the Court's function. That so many believe this most centralized of our Nation's institutions is protecting, even overprotecting, state power is itself a sign of the depletion of those understandings necessary to sustain the federal system. Instead of a support for federalism, Nagel finds a commitment to radical nationalism throughout the constitutional law establishment. He traces this commitment to traditionally American traits like perfectionism, optimism, individualism, and legalism. Under modern conditions of centralization, these attractive traits are leading to unattractive social consequences, including tolerance, fearfulness, utopianism, and deceptiveness. They are degrading our political discourse. All this encourages further centralization and further cultural deterioration. This book puts the major federalism decisions within the framework of the Court's overall record, including its record on individual rights in areas like abortion, homosexuality, and school desegregation. And, giving special attention to public debate over privacy and impeachment, it places modern constitutional law in the context of political discourse more generally.

Constitutional scholars Christopher P. Banks and John C. Blakeman offer the most current and the first book-length study of the U.S. Supreme Court's "new federalism" begun by the Rehnquist Court and now flourishing under Chief Justice John Roberts. While the Rehnquist Court reinvorgorated new federalism by protecting state sovereignty and set new constitutional limits on federal power, Banks and Blakeman show that in the Roberts Court new federalism continues to evolve in a docket increasingly attentive to statutory construction, preemption, and business litigation

The relative scope of federal and state power under the U.S. Constitution has been a major bone of contention for over 200 years. Courts have sometimes enforced substantial limits on federal authority by striking down federal laws deemed to be outside the scope of Congress' enumerated powers under Article I of the Constitution. Very often, the judiciary has also constrained state power by invalidating state laws as violations of constitutional rights. While judicial review has therefore promoted both centralization and state autonomy at different times, on balance it has strengthened the former at the expense of the latter. This pattern has been especially prevalent since the 1930s, as the Supreme Court largely abandoned earlier efforts to police limits on congressional power, while simultaneously enforcing a growing array of individual rights against state and local governments. This chapter examines the impact of judicial review on American federalism without attempting a normative judgment. It briefly outlines the structure of American federalism and judicial review, and then describes the history of judicial review of structural limits on federal power. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court engaged in limited, but significant efforts to constrain congressional power. These efforts were to a large extent abandoned after the constitutional revolution of the New Deal period in the 1930s. The Supreme Court has recently attempted to revive judicial enforcement of limits on federal power. But so far these efforts have had only a limited effect. The chapter then summarizes the history of judicial review of state laws. The range of issues on which federal courts have invalidated state laws is extremely broad. Overall, the impact of these rulings in curbing state autonomy significantly exceeds the effects of the courts' more limited efforts to constrain federal power. The last part of the chapter briefly explains why the latter result was not accidental. Because federal judges are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, the chance that they will resist the political agenda of the dominant political coalition in the federal government is reduced. Even when federal judges do want to invalidate federal legislation, they may hesitate to do so when the result might create a political confrontation that the courts are likely to lose. Federal judges face fewer political risks when they strike down state legislation.

Courts are key players in the dynamics of federal countries since their rulings have a direct impact on the ability of governments to centralize and decentralize power. Courts in Federal Countries examines the role high courts play in thirteen countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Nigeria, Spain, and the United States. The volume’s contributors analyse the centralizing or decentralizing forces at play following a court’s ruling on issues such as individual rights, economic affairs, social issues, and other matters. The thirteen substantive chapters have been written to facilitate comparability between the countries. Each chapter outlines a country’s federal system, explains the constitutional and institutional status of the court system, and discusses the high court’s jurisprudence in light of these features. Courts in Federal Countries offers insightful explanations of judicial behaviour in the world’s leading federations.

"Consists ... of the four Chichele lectures delivered at Oxford University under the auspices of All Souls College early in 1975"--Preface

In analyzing the Supreme Court's powers in federal-state relations, the author demonstrates that the framers of the constitution clearly intended that the Court should be the federal umpire, thus disproving a charge by modern states' righters of usurpation of power by the Supreme Court. In each historical period the effect of the Court interpretations on the autonomy of the state governments and on the acceleration of federal centralization is considered. Originally published in 1958. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

This book argues that the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, should embrace an interpretive framework that promotes equal participation in the democratic process, fosters accountability, and facilitates robust public discourse among citizens of all backgrounds. The authors propose a solution that strives to restore integrity to the Court’s decision-making process by eschewing ideology and a focus on the utility of outcomes in favor of an intellectually honest jurisprudence that gives all citizens a meaningful voice in governance. The work is divided into seven parts. Parts I–V identify the worst decisions in the Court history and the common themes that helped produce them. The chapters within each part are dedicated to a single Supreme Court decision, in which the authors analyze the Court’s reasoning and explain why it undermined federalism, separation of powers, and democratic governance. Additionally, the authors explain why these decisions compromised the relationship between the Court and coordinate branches, the federal government and the states, and citizens and their elected representatives. Part VI identifies several of the best Supreme Court decisions, and explains why they provide a principled framework that can be applied in other cases and result in a pro-democracy jurisprudence. Finally, in Part VII the authors propose a comprehensive solution that should inform the Justices’ judicial philosophies, regardless of ideology, and strive to promote an equal and participatory democracy. The final chapter offers concluding thoughts and argues that a healthy democracy is the foundation upon which equality rests, and that a collective view of rights is the path by which to restore liberty for all citizens.