Nuclear Deterrence In South Asia An Assessment Of Deterrence And Stability In The India Pakistan Conflict

This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional—and possibly nuclear—war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.

This important and topical book examines the triangular relationship of China, India and Pakistan through the prism of nuclear deterrence. The author highlights the interplay and role of strategic culture, nuclear weaponisation and deployment, command and control, arms control, non-state actors and foreign policy issues which affect relations between the three countries. With two main purposes—a conceptual investigation into the notion of deterrence, and a study of the theory and practice of limited war—this book: - addresses the strategic, political and military dimensions of the role of nuclear weapons through examples of the only cases of nuclear weapon states having gone into armed conflict—the Cuban missile crisis, the Ussuri river clashes, and the Kargil conflict. - discusses the various pressures exerted on decision makers in the context of the notions of deterrence, the rational deterrence model, and a limited war under a nuclear umbrella. - evaluates all three countries with regard to their strategic culture, the role of nuclear weapons in their military strategy, the nature of public opinion and political rhetoric, responses to the various arms control treaties, and foreign policy choices. Based on a variety of sources, including interviews with key individuals in various sector, this is the first book-length study of the triangular relationship between China, India and Pakistan.

This book explores evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence, the impact of new technologies, and changing deterrent force postures in the South Asian region to assess future challenges for sustainable peace and stability. Under the core principles of the security dilemma, this book analyzes the prevailing security environment in South Asia and offers unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks to stabilize peace and ensure deterrence stability in the South Asian region. Moreover, contending patterns of deterrence dynamics in the South Asian region are further elaborated as becoming inextricably interlinked with the broader security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the interactions with the United States and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As India and Pakistan are increasingly becoming part of the competing strategies exercised by the United States and China, the authors analyze how strategic uncertainty and fear faced by these rival states cause the introduction of new technologies which could gradually drift these competing states into more serious crises and military conflicts. Presenting innovative solutions to emerging South Asian challenges and offering new security mechanisms for sustainable peace and stability, this book will be of interest to academics and policymakers working on Asian Security studies, Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations.

Conflict resolution and promotion of regional cooperation in South Asia has assumed a new urgency in the aftermath of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, and underlined by the outbreak of fighting in Kargil in 1999, full mobilization on the border during most of 2002, and continued low-intensity warfare and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The stability of nuclear deterrence between the two countries is therefore a matter of great urgency and has found a place on the scholarly agenda of security studies in South Asia. Several books have been written on India’s nuclear programme, but these have been mostly analytical histories. The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship is a new departure in that it is the first time that a group of scholars from the South Asian subcontinent have collectively tried to apply deterrence theory and international relations theory to South Asia.

Argues that, while nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles cast a shadow over Indo-Pakistani relations, they do not create strategic stability. He asserts that the development of command and control mechanisms would enhance stability, but that diplomatic steps focused on missiles must also be considered. Improved command and control and diplomatic engagement will provide some insurance that nuclear weapons are not used in any future conflict.

South Asia is often viewed as a potential nuclear flashpoint and a probable source of nuclear terrorism. But, how valid are such perceptions? This book seeks to address this question and assesses the region’s nuclear security from two principal standpoints. First, it evaluates the robustness of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence by analysing the strength and weaknesses of the competing arguments regarding the issue. It also analyses the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the nature of deterrence structure in the region and the challenges of confidence building and arms control between the two countries in order to assess the robustness of South Asia’s nuclear deterrence. Second, it assesses the safety and security of the nuclear assets and nuclear infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The author holds that the debate on South Asia’s nuclear security is largely misplaced because the optimists tend to overemphasise the stabilising effects of nuclear weapons and the pessimists are too alarmists. It is argued that while the risks of nuclear weapons are significant, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. Therefore, what needs to happen is that while nuclear elimination should be the long-term goal, in the interim years the two countries need to pursue minimum deterrence policies to reduce the likelihood of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining fissile materials by non-state actors.

"In May 1998, India and Pakistan put to rest years of speculation about whether they possessed nuclear technology and openly tested their weapons. Some believed nuclearization would stabilize South Asia; others prophesized disaster. Authors of two of the most comprehensive books on South Asia's new nuclear era, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, offer competing theories on the transformation of the region and what these patterns mean for the world's next proliferators." "With these two major interpretations, Ganguly and Kapur tackle all sides of an urgent issue that has profound regional and global consequences. Sure to spark discussion and debate, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb thoroughly maps the potential impact of nuclear proliferation."--Cubierta.

The study found that India and Pakistan both assume that outside powers, mainly the United States, will intervene to stop any major war on the subcontinent within two weeks after it begins.