American Foreign Policy And Forced Regime Change Since World War Ii

This book explores the motivations behind American military interventions in the Post-World War II era that purported to replace autocratic regimes with democratic ones. It delves into the Forced Democracy (FD) phenomenon, focusing on its intellectual roots and previous attempts to study it in the academic literature. The author examines five American interventions that attempted to replace autocratic regimes with democratic ones—The Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Each chapter includes a history of the intervention and an assessment of whether America’s intentions and actions toward that particular country were actually focused on delivering a democratic outcome.

States seldom resort to war to overthrow their adversaries. They are more likely to attempt to covertly change the opposing regime, by assassinating a foreign leader, sponsoring a coup d’état, meddling in a democratic election, or secretly aiding foreign dissident groups. In Covert Regime Change, Lindsey A. O’Rourke shows us how states really act when trying to overthrow another state. She argues that conventional focus on overt cases misses the basic causes of regime change. O’Rourke provides substantive evidence of types of security interests that drive states to intervene. Offensive operations aim to overthrow a current military rival or break up a rival alliance. Preventive operations seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival alliance, that may make them a future security threat. Hegemonic operations try to maintain a hierarchical relationship between the intervening state and the target government. Despite the prevalence of covert attempts at regime change, most operations fail to remain covert and spark blowback in unanticipated ways. Covert Regime Change assembles an original dataset of all American regime change operations during the Cold War. This fund of information shows the United States was ten times more likely to try covert rather than overt regime change during the Cold War. Her dataset allows O’Rourke to address three foundational questions: What motivates states to attempt foreign regime change? Why do states prefer to conduct these operations covertly rather than overtly? How successful are such missions in achieving their foreign policy goals?

Foreign Affairs Best of Books of 2021 "Book of the Week" on Fareed Zakaria GPS Financial Times Best Books of 2020 The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades—and why it always seems to go wrong. "It's a first-rate work, intelligently analyzing a complex issue, and learning the right lessons from history." —Fareed Zakaria Since the end of World War II, the United States has set out to oust governments in the Middle East on an average of once per decade—in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, and the methods by which the United States pursued regime change have likewise been highly varied, ranging from diplomatic pressure alone to outright military invasion and occupation. What is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before. Philip H. Gordon's Losing the Long Game is a thorough and riveting look at the U.S. experience with regime change over the past seventy years, and an insider’s view on U.S. policymaking in the region at the highest levels. It is the story of repeated U.S. interventions in the region that always started out with high hopes and often the best of intentions, but never turned out well. No future discussion of U.S. policy in the Middle East will be complete without taking into account the lessons of the past, especially at a time of intense domestic polarization and reckoning with America's standing in world.

The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in American global hegemony in world affairs. In the post-Cold War period, both Democrat and Republican governments intervened, fought insurgencies, and changed regimes. In America's Wars, Thomas Henriksen explores how America tried to remake the world by militarily invading a host of nations beset with civil wars, ethnic cleansing, brutal dictators, and devastating humanitarian conditions. The immediate post-Cold War years saw the United States carrying out interventions in the name of Western-style democracy, humanitarianism, and liberal internationalism in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. Later, the 9/11 terrorist attacks led America into larger-scale military incursions to defend itself from further assaults by al Qaeda in Afghanistan and from perceived nuclear arms in Iraq, while fighting small-footprint conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Arabia. This era is coming to an end with the resurgence of great power rivalry and rising threats from China and Russia.

This book analyses the recent and on-going regime changes, their internal causes and the external factors that either stimulate or obstruct political reforms. Comparing today’s political reforms with the evolution of the political systems in the Western world, and especially with the sequencing of and congruence between the development of civil institutions and economic and political systems then and there, permits to reveal serious problems with the current attempts at regime change. A comparison of the processes started by Gorbachev in Russia and the Chinese reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping, and the current situation in these countries and their respective positions in the world, highlights both the benefits and dangers of radical reforms. The second part of the book is devoted to the study of moral, legal and political aspects of various forms of external interference with the aim of influencing change.

An award-winning author tells the stories of the audacious American politicians, military commanders, and business executives who took it upon themselves to depose monarchs, presidents, and prime ministers of other countries with disastrous long-term consequences.

This book examines the use of military force as a coercive tool by the United States, using lessons drawn from the post-Cold War era (1991–2018). The volume reveals that despite its status as sole superpower during the post-Cold War period, US efforts to coerce other states failed as often as they succeeded. In the coming decades, the United States will face states that are more capable and creative, willing to challenge its interests and able to take advantage of missteps and vulnerabilities. By using lessons derived from in-depth case studies and statistical analysis of an original dataset of more than 100 coercive incidents in the post-Cold War era, this book generates insight into how the US military can be used to achieve policy goals. Specifically, it provides guidance about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, the US armed forces can work in concert with economic and diplomatic elements of US power to create effective coercive strategies. This book will be of interest to students of US national security, US foreign policy, strategic studies and International Relations in general.

Haass, chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, writes a brilliant, optimistic analysis of the opportunity that current global politics present to the USA.

Why has the United States repeatedly engaged in the overthrow of foreign leaders and regimes? Although most regime change interventions have neither furthered US national security nor improved the fate of targeted states, the US has turned to this foreign policy instrument in at least sixteen cases from 1906 to 2011. In The Origins of Overthrow, Payam Ghalehdar explains US-imposed regime change by focusing on its emotional underpinnings. Based on a thorough analysis of the emotional state of five US presidents, he shows how "emotional frustration"-an emotional syndrome that combines hegemonic expectations, perceptions of hatred in target state obstructions, and negative affect-has repeatedly influenced US regime change decisions. When US presidents have been gripped by this emotion, Ghalehdar argues, they have turned to the use of force and targeted perceived sources of obstruction in order to ameliorate their emotional state and discharge frustration. Examining five US regime change episodes in two world regions (Cuba 1906, Nicaragua 1909-12, and the Dominican Republic 1963-65 in the Western hemisphere, and Iran 1979-80, and Iraq 2001-03 in the Middle East), he empirically illustrates the emotional sources of US intervention decisions. A novel explanation for a puzzling phenomenon in US foreign policy, The Origins of Overthrow sheds light on how emotions play a previously overlooked role in US regime change decisions.