Understanding Vietnams Foreign Policy Choices Amid Sino Us Rivalry

Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China and the United States (US) involves a delicate process of reconciling and balancing competing perceptions, goals and interests within the country. This leads to foreign policy decisions that may respectively lean towards either China or the US, depending on specific circumstances and issues, while trying to maintain an overall equilibrium between the two powers. Vietnam’s foreign policy adopts the paradigm of “cooperation” and “struggle” in its relations with major powers, and defines “national security” as encompassing both national sovereignty and regime security. Given the common ideology and imperative of preserving political control of their respective communist parties, China may be a critical partner for Vietnam in terms of regime security but is often an “object of struggle” on national sovereignty. On the other hand, the US is Vietnam’s partner in the South China Sea but an “object of struggle” when it comes to regime security. The Vietnamese public’s favourable sentiments towards the US, contrasted with their distrust towards China, pose a challenge for the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in mobilizing public opinion to bolster its legitimacy while preventing any potential threat to its political authority. A friendly relationship with China is essential for Vietnam’s favourable external environment, warranting Hanoi’s accommodation and deference to Beijing on non-critical issues. However, it has meticulously avoided dependencies and vulnerabilities to China through diversifying economic ties and engaging in “soft balancing” with other powers and through ASEAN. Party-to-party links provide China with powerful access to Vietnamese leaders, but the US is catching up by giving assurances to respect Vietnam’s political system, and strengthening “party diplomacy” with the CPV. In its relationship with the US, Vietnam prioritizes economic ties, addressing war legacy issues, leveraging US support to build capacities in traditional and non-traditional security, and avoiding geopolitical posturing that could provoke China. Vietnam-US relations are characterized by pragmatism, with both sides prioritizing shared geopolitical and economic interests over ideological differences. The sustainability of this approach is uncertain, given the CPV’s tightening of domestic control and the “securitization of the Vietnamese state” in the anti-corruption campaign. Vietnam has thus far benefited from the US-China rivalry but it faces substantial challenges ahead, including heightened vulnerabilities to an assertive China in the South China Sea and Lower Mekong, potential trade tensions if Donald Trump is re-elected as US president, and risks in balancing its ideological ties with Beijing while maintaining its strategic alignment with the US.

This book studies Vietnam's emergence as a major actor in Southeast Asian and global affairs. It focuses its analysis primarily on the period since 1995 when Vietnam became the seventh member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The analysis considers the impact of the Asian financial crisis on Vietnam. The contributors explore the sea change in Vietnamese foreign policy that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as Vietnam moved from dependency on the Soviet Union to a more balanced and multilateral set of external relations.

In East Asia, the United States is often acknowledged as a key determinant of stability given its military presence and role as a security guarantor. In the post-Cold War period, regional uncertainties about the potential dangers attending a rising China have led some analysts to conclude that almost all Southeast Asian states now see the United States as the critical balancing force. In contrast, based on case studies of Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam, this study argues that key states in the region do not perceive themselves as having the stark choices of either balancing against or bandwagoning with China. Instead, they pursue hedging strategies that comprise three elements: indirect balancing, which mainly involves persuading the United States to act as counterweight to Chinese regional influence; complex engagement of China at the political, economic, and strategic levels, with the hope that Chinese leaders may be socialized into conduct that abides by international norms; and a more general policy of enmeshing a number of regional great powers in order to give them a stake in a stable regional order. The study also investigates each state?s perceptions of the American role in regional security and discusses how they operationalize their hedging policies against a potential U.S. drawdown in the region, as well as the different degrees to which they use their relationships with the United States as a hedge against potential Chinese domination. Finally, it discusses these states? expectations of what the United States should do to help in their hedging strategies toward China, suggesting a range of policies that span the military as well as political, diplomatic, and economic realms. This is the sixteenth publication in Policy Studies, a peer-reviewed East-West Center Washington series that presents scholarly analysis of key contemporary domestic and international political, economic, and strategic issues affecting Asia in a policy relevant manner.

Vietnamese nationalism has a strong undercurrent of anti-China sentiments, and Vietnam's leaders have regularly tapped into such sentiments to shore up their legitimacy and boost Vietnamese nationalism.Over the last decade, the helter-skelter growth of social media has bred new popular actors in Vietnamese cybersphere, who are deeply nationalistic but who pursue entirely different political and social agendas. In sum, they give rise to a new nationalistic narrative, one that paints the Vietnam Communist Party as being often too meek and subservient to China, and calls for drastic reforms to th.

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.

The year 2021 marks the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Cambodian Peace Agreements which ended the Cambodian conflict and the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Communism was a perennial concern in Singapore and Malaya (later Malaysia) from 1948 into the 1980s -- a concern which younger generations may not appreciate. The threat came largely from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) supported by China, and from Vietnam. The CPM waged a guerrilla war in Malaya. They were defeated by 1960 but tried to revive the insurgency in the 1970s. In Singapore, they attempted to attain political power through a united front with the People’s Action Party during the 1950s. The victory of the communists in the Vietnam War in 1975 alarmed non-communist Southeast Asia. The concern was aggravated by Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978. ASEAN states strongly opposed Vietnam’s action on the grounds that the invasion and occupation of a sovereign country violated a fundamental principle of international law. Successive UN General Assembly resolutions supported the ASEAN position with significant majorities. Thailand was pivotal to the security of the rest of non-communist Southeast Asia. Had it succumbed to Vietnam’s pressures and reached an accommodation with Hanoi, the security of the rest of Southeast Asia would have been endangered. Thailand stood firm. Had it not done so, the people of Southeast Asia would be living in a different world today.

Non-Traditional Security in Asia examines the critical security challenges faced by states and societies in Asia including health, food, water, natural disasters, internal conflict, forced migration, energy, transnational crime, and cyber security. Through the development of a comprehensive analytical framework that establishes the key ingredients to policy evaluation, the editors draw on a wide variety of experts to collaborate in investigating these crucial issues. This inclusive framework ensures that all voices are heard including those oftentimes under-represented and marginalized in society to ensure that academic and policy debates are well informed about the often complex and nuanced nature of these non-traditional security challenges. Through an investigation into these specific non-traditional security threats, Non-Traditional Security in Asia documents and evaluates many of the most pressing challenges faced by Asia today. The authors analyse the ways in which particular issues are addressed by the many stakeholders involved in the policy-making process, both within governments and across societies. The question of how these challenges are addressed across and between the different levels of global governance highlights the strengths and weakness that are directly attributable to policy successes and failures. It is through this layered and comprehensive approach, together with an evaluation of the role of stakeholders, which binds together the chapter contributions to this collection. The book undertakes an issue-specific chapter study of how Asian states and societies address these non-traditional security concerns from environmental adaptation and mitigation measures to conflict resolution. For each issue area, it identifies and explains the concerns of various policy communities, identifying the motivations behind some of the key decisions made to affect change or stabilize the status quo. Essentially it questions not only what a security issue is but also for whom the issue is important and the interaction this has with policy outcomes. With a focus on regional and global institutions as well as national and local ones, this collection illustrates the variety of stakeholders involved in non-traditional security concerns, and reflects on their relative importance in the decision-making process. Through a systematic evaluation of these non-traditional security issues by employing a comprehensive analytical framework, critical appreciation of the dynamics of the policy-making process surrounding issues of crucial national, regional and international significance in Asia are made. As a result of sharing these insights, the contributors provide the tools as well as a selection of issue-specific stakeholders to illuminate the key but complex characteristics of non-traditional security in Asia.

This book examines how the interaction between political and economic factors under Doi Moi has shaped Vietnam’s China policy and bilateral relations since the late 1980s. After providing a historical background, the book examines the conflicting effects that Doi Moi has generated on bilateral relations. It demonstrates that Vietnam’s economic considerations following the adoption of Doi Moi contributed decidedly to the Sino-Vietnamese normalization in 1991 as well as the continuous improvements in bilateral ties ever since. At the same time, Vietnam’s economic activities in the South China Sea and China’s responses have intensified bilateral rivalry and put their ties under considerable strains. The book goes on to argue that Doi Moi has indeed brought Vietnam newfound opportunities to develop a multi-level omni-directional hedging strategy against China. Finally, the book concludes by looking at the prospects of democratization in both countries and assessing the future trajectory of their relations under such circumstances. As the most comprehensive and up-to-date survey of Vietnam’s relations with China over the past thirty years, the book is a useful reference source for academics, policymakers, students, and anyone interested in contemporary Vietnam foreign policy in general and Vietnam–China relations in particular.

"The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic marks the most significant, singular global disruption since World War II, with health, economic, political, and security implications that will ripple for years to come." -Global Trends 2040 (2021) Global Trends 2040-A More Contested World (2021), released by the US National Intelligence Council, is the latest report in its series of reports starting in 1997 about megatrends and the world's future. This report, strongly influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, paints a bleak picture of the future and describes a contested, fragmented and turbulent world. It specifically discusses the four main trends that will shape tomorrow's world: - Demographics-by 2040, 1.4 billion people will be added mostly in Africa and South Asia. - Economics-increased government debt and concentrated economic power will escalate problems for the poor and middleclass. - Climate-a hotter world will increase water, food, and health insecurity. - Technology-the emergence of new technologies could both solve and cause problems for human life. Students of trends, policymakers, entrepreneurs, academics, journalists and anyone eager for a glimpse into the next decades, will find this report, with colored graphs, essential reading.