The Transition To Economic And Monetary Union

Providing a detailed overview of the financial implications of European Monetary Union, this collection contains contributions by leading academics, politicians and professional financial specialists from a number of European countries.

The Road to Monetary Union analyses in non-technical language the process leading to adoption of a common currency for the European Union. The monetary union process involved different issues at different times and the contemporary global background mattered. The Element explains why monetary union was attempted and failed in the 1970s, and why the process was restarted in 1979, accelerated after 1992 and completed for a core group of EU members in 1999. It analyzes connections between eurozone membership and Greece's sovereign debt crisis. It concludes with analysis of how the eurozone works today and with discussion of its prospects for the 2020s. The approach is primarily economic, while acknowledging the role of politics (timing) and history (path dependence). A theme is to challenge simplistic ideas (e.g. that the euro has failed) with fuller analysis of competing pressures to shape the nature of monetary union.

The EU is heading towards a monetary union which has both benefits and risks for the Community but will also affect countries outside of Europe. Crucial transition problems, economic adjustment in financial markets and labor markets as well as theoretical and empirical issues of monetary integration are analyzed. The book also focuses on interest rate effects, the role of volatility of money supply growth and exchange rate instability. Issues of monetary and fiscal policy and the political economy of monetary integration are evaluated.

1.The origins of EMU -- 2.The design of EMU -- 3.Monetary policy in Stage Three -- 4.Fiscal policy and EMU -- 5.EMU and the outside world -- 6.The transition to EMU -- 7.Reconsidering the transition -- 8.Getting on with EMU.

Europe’s financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro’s invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar’s privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany’s persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community’s Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.

The Heads of State and Government at the European Council meeting in Maastricht definitely decided to embark upon the creation of Economic and Monetary Union by, at the latest, the beginning of 1999, and in doing so opted for a relatively short but difficult journey that should bring the European Community all the benefits one could expect from such an undertaking. However, the question still remains of how Economic and Monetary Union will really affect the day-to-day policymaking of the national civil servants involved, particularly in the areas of monetary and fiscal policies. Can national policymakers adopt a `sit-and-wait' policy or does Economic and Monetary Union really entail a dangerous voyage between Scylla and Charybdis? Will Economic and Monetary Union undermine the sovereignty of national governments because the Maastricht Treaty will give the EC the competence to dictate its own will? Are the benefits of Economic and Monetary Union for the Member States really as great as expected? These and other issues are assessed in this book which, after an assessment of the achievements of the Maastricht European Council, will cover the main implications of a European monetary policy and closer economic cooperation for the relevant policies of the Member States, the division of the competences between Community and member countries and the forthcoming prospects for new EC policies (e.g. regional policy, the EC budget, fiscal union, etc.)

This Report examines the monetary unification of Europe and the creation of a European Central Bank. It deals first with the macroeconomics of monetary union and highlights four issues. What monetary constitution is required to deliver price stability, and do the draft statutes of the European Central Bank (ECB) meet these conditions? Are fiscal rules a necessary adjunct to such a constitution? Is convergence of inflation rates a precondition for embarking on monetary union? Finally, how should the transition be managed?

This paper discusses key issues relating to the design and implementation of monetary policy in an emerging European economic and monetary union. Specific institutional proposals for transition to EMU are neither endorsed nor dismissed. In examining the goals of monetary policy, the paper explores the interrelationships among price stability, current account equilibrium, and exchange rate stability. Turning to the implementation of monetary policy, the issues addressed are: coordination versus autonomy, rules versus discretion, and the role of sterilized official intervention. Finally, the last part of the paper emphasizes the importance of fiscal discipline, and evaluates several alternative mechanisms for encouraging it.