The Theory Of Public Utility Pricing

Debate about deregulation has focused considerable attention on the pricing policies of public utilities. Much work has been done by economists on this subject, and in this book the results of that research are presented and made accessible to students of economics. The main subject is the policy to be followed by a regulated monopoly, but the analysis is broadened to take account of a fringe of competitive suppliers, making it relevant to electric utilities and local telephone companies in the US, to PTT's in Europe, to the possible privatisatibn of telecommunications in Australia, and to the telecommunications structure in the UK where the dominant supplier has recently been privatised. The book gives a unified and simplified exposition of the modern theory of efficient pricing which is not available elsewhere. The theoretical discussion is supplemented by numerical simulation comparing Fully Distributed Cost Pricing, Ramsey Pricing, and Optimal Non-uniform Pricing.

Grasp regulatory issues and the principles of public utility pricing...Start with basic theory; learn what multiple functions public utility rates are designed to perform; understand the four primary functions rate regulations must perform; examine what constitutes fairness of rates; and wrap it all up with the criteria for judging a sound rate structure.

This clear, precisely written text presents an important branch of the modern, micro-economically based theory of industrial organization and of public finance, utilizing calculus only. Answers are provided to some pertinent economic questions, such as the pricing policies of vote-seeking politicians, of empire-building bureaucrats and of out-put-maximizing and energy-saving public utilities. These policies are compared with the welfare economic benchmark rules e.g. on marginal cost pricing and Ramsey pricing. Great significance is attached to price regulation. The book elucidates the recent replacement of rate of return regulation by price-cap regulation. It also explains why many simple rules like yardstick regulation fail to achieve optimal prices, which shows how complicated it is to induce managers to truthfully reveal their private information. How this can be achieved properly is shown in various principal-agent models on regulation with uncertain costs, uncertain demand and with soft budget constraints.