The Mayaguez Incident

"Investigates the four-day international crisis after the 1975 seizure of the SS Mayaguez, which involved both American and Cambodian forces during the Vietnam War. Documents intelligence failures that took place during the Mayaguez incident and reveals how these failures were overcome. Utilizes previously unavailable primary sources"--Provided by publisher.

Examines the final military contest of the Vietnam War, relating the hijacking of the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez, the deadly marine raid on a remote Cambodian island to free the ship and its crew, and the fate of three marines left behind after the battle.

The final battle of the Vietnam War left three forgotten marines on a Cambodian beach, a fact the Pentagon didn't admit for 20 years. The Last Battle recounts their story.

Preface -- Abbreviations -- Key figures in the Mayaguez Crisis -- Introduction -- Day one: Monday, May 12 -- Day two: Tuesday, May 13 -- Day three: Wednesday, May 14 -- Day four: Thursday, May 15 -- Critical crisis decisions -- Explaining decisions, behaviors and outcomes -- Refining the explanation: rationality, bureaucracy and beliefs -- Findings, issues, prescriptions -- Conclusion.

On May 12, 1975, less than two weeks after the fall of Saigon, Khmer Rouge naval forces seized the S.S. Mayaguez, an American container ship, off the Cambodian coast in the Gulf of Siam. The swift military response ordered by President Gerald Ford was designed to recapture the Mayaguez, held at anchor off the island of Koh Tang, to liberate her crew, and to demonstrate U.S. strength and resolve in the immediate aftermath of America's most humiliating defeat. Guilmartin, a former air rescue helicopter pilot stationed in Thailand, provides a unique and compelling account of the Mayaguez–Koh Tang crisis, shedding new light on the politics, the tactics, the orders, the high-level decision makers, and the fighting men entangled in a crucial military action that nearly ended in disaster for U.S. forces. ". . . a brilliant and exceptionally clear tactical study that offers a point of departure for broader reflections on the nature of contingency and uncertainty in all military operations."--Foreign Affairs "This is an exceptional book. . . [Guilmartin's] work transcends the events themselves, illustrating numerous aspects of men in war. His insights and observations are compelling."--Journal of Military History ". . . written with the flair and excitement of an adventure novel. Even those who know the outcome and the lessons of the Mayaguez incident will find this book hard to put down until finished."--Proceedings

Just two weeks after the close of the Vietnam War, communist Cambodian Khmer Rouge elements seized the S.S. Mayaguez in international waters. Believing they had to act quickly, United States Marines boarded the ship, only to find the crew had been removed. They then launched an assault on a nearby island where they believed the crew had been taken. Instead of a quick strike against a limited foe, the Marines encountered major opposition and were quickly pinned down. With large numbers of Cambodians closing in all around, the a desperate firefight developed as US forces tried to extract the Marines. This book recounts the bloody struggle on Koh Tang island, as a badly botched hostage rescue turned into a desperate evacuation.

In the nuclear era, the use of even low levels of force risks catastrophe for all mankind. Yet military force remains an important element of political strategy, and control and coordination of its use with other instruments of national power is of vital importance. The authors of this book, examining two crises that occurred during the Ford admini

SOS and then stopped the ship. Seven Khmer Rouge soldiers boarded the Mayaguez and their leader, Battalion Commander Sa Mean, pointed at a map indicating that the ship should proceed to the east of Poulo Wai. One of the crew members broadcast a Mayday which was picked up by an Australian vessel. The Mayaguez arrived off Poulo Wai at approximately 4pm and a further 20 Khmer Rouge boarded the vessel. At 12:05 EST (21:05 Cambodia), a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) was convened to discuss the situation. The members of the NSC were determined to end the crisis decisively, believing that the fall of South Vietnam less than two weeks before and the forced withdrawal of the United States from Cambodia, (Operation Eagle Pull) and South Vietnam (Operation Frequent Wind) had severely damaged the U.S.'s reputation. They also wished to avoid comparisons to the Pueblo incident of 1968, where the failure to promptly use military force to halt the hijacking of a US intelligence ship by North Korea led to an eleven-month hostage situation.