The Expectations Of Oil Companies On Future Oil Prices

This paper develops a methodology to assess the expectations of oil companies managers regarding future oil prices implied in the acquisition of reserves. The method is applied to a sample of farm-ins and farm-outs of developed onshore oil fields in the US from 1979 to 2004, where we make assumptions on expectations of oil production and decline over time. The main findings point out that the determinants of the purchase price of reserves has not changed significantly over these 25 years and that oil companies (or their managers) generally believe in a mean-reverting process for the price of oil in the process of bidding and accepting offers for reserves, which means that they expect the price of oil to increase when it is below historical average and to decrease when it is above average. We also find that major oil companies are either more conservative than independent firms in estimating future oil prices or strategically decide to focus mainly on large capital-intensive oil prospects.

The sharp drop in oil prices is one of the most important global economic developments over the past year. The SDN finds that (i) supply factors have played a somewhat larger role than demand factors in driving the oil price drop, (ii) a substantial part of the price decline is expected to persist into the medium term, although there is large uncertainty, (iii) lower oil prices will support global growth, (iv) the sharp oil price drop could still trigger financial strains, and (v) policy responses should depend on the terms-of-trade impact, fiscal and external vulnerabilities, and domestic cyclical position.

As OPEC has loosened its grip over the past ten years, the oil market has been rocked by wild price swings, the likes of which haven't been seen for eight decades. Crafting an engrossing journey from the gushing Pennsylvania oil fields of the 1860s to today's fraught and fractious Middle East, Crude Volatility explains how past periods of stability and volatility in oil prices help us understand the new boom-bust era. Oil's notorious volatility has always been considered a scourge afflicting not only the oil industry but also the broader economy and geopolitical landscape; Robert McNally makes sense of how oil became so central to our world and why it is subject to such extreme price fluctuations. Tracing a history marked by conflict, intrigue, and extreme uncertainty, McNally shows how—even from the oil industry's first years—wild and harmful price volatility prompted industry leaders and officials to undertake extraordinary efforts to stabilize oil prices by controlling production. Herculean market interventions—first, by Rockefeller's Standard Oil, then, by U.S. state regulators in partnership with major international oil companies, and, finally, by OPEC—succeeded to varying degrees in taming the beast. McNally, a veteran oil market and policy expert, explains the consequences of the ebbing of OPEC's power, debunking myths and offering recommendations—including mistakes to avoid—as we confront the unwelcome return of boom and bust oil prices.

How much does speculation contribute to oil price volatility? We revisit this contentious question by estimating a sign-restricted structural vector autoregression (SVAR). First, using a simple storage model, we show that revisions to expectations regarding oil market fundamentals and the effect of mispricing in oil derivative markets can be observationally equivalent in a SVAR model of the world oil market à la Kilian and Murphy (2013), since both imply a positive co-movement of oil prices and inventories. Second, we impose additional restrictions on the set of admissible models embodying the assumption that the impact from noise trading shocks in oil derivative markets is temporary. Our additional restrictions effectively put a bound on the contribution of speculation to short-term oil price volatility (lying between 3 and 22 percent). This estimated short-run impact is smaller than that of flow demand shocks but possibly larger than that of flow supply shocks.

This paper undertakes an investigation into the efficiency of the crude oil futures market and the forecasting accuracy of futures prices. Efficiency of the market is analysed in terms of the expected excess returns to speculation in the futures market. Accuracy of futures prices is compared with that of forecasts using alternative techniques, including time series and econometric models, as well as judgemental forecasts. The paper also explores the predictive power of futures prices by comparing the forecasting accuracy of end-of-month prices with weekly and monthly averages, using a variety of different weighting schemes. Finally, the paper investigates whether the forecasts from using futures prices can be improved by incorporating information from other forecasting techniques.

This paper presents a simple macroeconomic model of the oil market. The model incorporates features of oil supply such as depletion, endogenous oil exploration and extraction, as well as features of oil demand such as the secular increase in demand from emerging-market economies, usage efficiency, and endogenous demand responses. The model provides, inter alia, a useful analytical framework to explore the effects of: a change in world GDP growth; a change in the efficiency of oil usage; and a change in the supply of oil. Notwithstanding that shale oil production today is more responsive to prices than conventional oil, our analysis suggests that an era of prolonged low oil prices is likely to be followed by a period where oil prices overshoot their long-term upward trend.

Following record low interest rates and fast depreciating U.S. dollar, crude oil prices became under rising pressure and seemed boundless. Oil price process parameters changed drastically in 2003M5-2007M10 toward consistently rising prices. Short-term forecasting would imply persistence of observed trends, as market fundamentals and underlying monetary policies were supportive of these trends. Market expectations derived from option prices anticipated further surge in oil prices and allowed significant probability for right tail events. Given explosive trends in other commodities prices, depreciating currencies, and weakening financial conditions, recent trends in oil prices might not persist further without triggering world economic recession, regressive oil supply, as oil producers became wary about inflation. Restoring stable oil markets, through restraining monetary policy, is essential for durable growth and price stability.

The scale of the socio-economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the global economy has not been witnessed since the Great Depression. Isolation measures, implemented across the globe to contain the virus, confined hundreds of millions of people into their homes, bringing economic activities to a standstill. This crisis has impacted the oil and gas industry in an unprecedented manner. A massive decline in oil demand and a large oversupply, intensified by the price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia, has sent oil prices to levels unseen in decades. While the oil industry has faced several crises that have pushed it to find new ways to conduct business and adapt to changing conditions, the Covid-induced crisis has come when the industry is dealing with increased shareholder activism and intense pressure on the environmental front. Since this is a new phase for the industry, it could also become the catalyst that accelerates the transformation it has started to go through. Oil will continue to play an essential role in the energy mix for many decades. However, oil companies will have to navigate and manage an uncertain future as oil and gas projects will be riskier to develop and consequently require a higher rate of return. They will have to diversify their portfolios and continue shifting toward an integrated business model that embraces the changes caused by the energy transition and the growth in renewable and new technologies.

We discuss and reconcile two diametrically opposed views concerning the future of world oil production and prices. The geological view expects that physical constraints will dominate the future evolution of oil output and prices. It is supported by the fact that world oil production has plateaued since 2005 despite historically high prices, and that spare capacity has been near historic lows. The technological view of oil expects that higher oil prices must eventually have a decisive effect on oil output, by encouraging technological solutions. It is supported by the fact that high prices have, since 2003, led to upward revisions in production forecasts based on a purely geological view. We present a nonlinear econometric model of the world oil market that encompasses both views. The model performs far better than existing empirical models in forecasting oil prices and oil output out of sample. Its point forecast is for a near doubling of the real price of oil over the coming decade. The error bands are wide, and reflect sharply differing judgments on ultimately recoverable reserves, and on future price elasticities of oil demand and supply.