The Challenges Of Command

“A must for those who aspire to follow the profession of arms.”—Maj. Gen. George S. Patton Here is a unique book that emphasizes the attainment of military excellence through reading and field experience. Written to help men and women prepare for positions of command in the American Armed Forces, it is a product of the author’s years of discussions with military commanders about their roles as decision-makers, moral standard bearers, and energizers of military organizations. In his commentary on the problems of the commander as tactician, strategist, warrior, trainer, mentor, disciplinarian, and moral leader, the author analyzes and recommends both classical and current readings that are available for those who seek an expanded vision of their potential as commanders. This book is designed to raise new challenges to conventional thinking about the art of military command.

In the period leading up to the First World War Britain's naval supremacy was challenged by an arms race with Germany, fuelled not only by military and geo-strategic rivalries, but an onrush of technological developments. As this book demonstrates, steam turbines, bigger guns, mechanical computing devices and ever increasing tonnage meant that the Royal Navy was forced to confront many long-cherished beliefs and sensitive social and political issues. By looking at key continuities over the period of 1880-1919 the study explores how the service and its officers attempted to deal with fundamental changes in professional requirements, and how cultural and social values underwent a transformation in the run up to the First World War. In particular the book looks at how the executive officer corps was presented with a revolution in naval affairs. As the Navy was transformed into an industrialized workplace, officers were challenged by an alteration in the 'culture of command' as arrangements carried over from the days of sail began to breakdown under the practical requirements of a steam and steel fleet. The book charts the ebb and flow of the debate and the various ideas put forward to deal with the structural challenges faced by the Royal Navy. The writings of reformers and commentators such as Fisher, Beresford, Corbett, Laughton and Mahan provide the background to the specific problems faced, and are analysed both in relation to the nature of the reforms implemented, and more crucially, the performance of the 'Senior Service' during the First World War.

Leadership receives a tremendous amount of attention, but what about the day-to-day command challenges that confront O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s in today's war zones? What has command entailed over the past decade and a half for special operations force (SOF) commanders who have deployed to Afghanistan (and Iraq) either to lead or to work under Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) or Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces (CJSOTFs)? In both theaters, officers have had to contend with various competing hierarchies and significant churn. What then might the Army and military do to obviate or mitigate these and other problems? The contours of a potential solution are described and its benefits discussed.

Dr. Richard Sommers’ Challenges of Command in the Civil War distills six decades of studying the Civil War into two succinct, thought-provoking volumes. This first installment focuses on “Civil War Generals and Generalship.” The subsequent volume will explore “Civil War Strategy, Operations, and Organization.” Each chapter is a free-standing essay that can be appreciated in its own right without reading the entire book. Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee stand out in Volume I as Dr. Sommers analyzes their generalship throughout the Civil War. Their exercise of command in the decisive Virginia Campaign from May 1864 to April 1865 receives particular attention—especially during the great Siege of Petersburg, about which the author has long ranked as the pioneering and pre-eminent historian. Five chapters evaluating Grant and Lee are followed by five more on “Civil War Generals and Generalship.” One of those essays, “American Cincinnatus,” explores twenty citizen-soldiers who commanded mobile army corps in the Union Army and explains why such officers were selected for senior command. Antietam, Gettysburg, and Petersburg are central to three essays on Northern corps and wing commanders. Both Federals and Confederates are featured in “Founding Fathers: Renowned Revolutionary War Relatives of Significant Civil War Soldiers and Statesmen.” The ground-breaking original research underlying that chapter identifies scores of connections between the “Greatest Generations” of the 18th and 19th Centuries—far more than just the well-known link of “Light Horse Harry” Lee to his son, Robert E. Lee. From original research in Chapter 10 to new ways of looking at familiar facts in Chapters 6-9 to distilled judgments from a lifetime of study in Chapters 1-5, Challenges of Command invites readers to think—and rethink—about the generalship of Grant, Lee, and senior commanders of the Civil War. This book is an essential part of every Civil War library.

Many books have been written about strategy, tactics, and great commanders. This is the first book to deal exclusively with the nature of command itself, and to trace its development over two thousand years from ancient Greece to Vietnam. It treats historically the whole variety of problems involved in commanding armies, including staff organization and administration, communications methods and technologies, weaponry, and logistics. And it analyzes the relationship between these problems and military strategy. In vivid descriptions of key battles and campaigns—among others, Napoleon at Jena, Moltke’s Königgrätz campaign, the Arab–Israeli war of 1973, and the Americans in Vietnam—Martin van Creveld focuses on the means of command and shows how those means worked in practice. He finds that technological advances such as the railroad, breech-loading rifles, the telegraph and later the radio, tanks, and helicopters all brought commanders not only new tactical possibilities but also new limitations. Although vast changes have occurred in military thinking and technology, the one constant has been an endless search for certainty—certainty about the state and intentions of the enemy’s forces; certainty about the manifold factors that together constitute the environment in which war is fought, from the weather and terrain to radioactivity and the presence of chemical warfare agents; and certainty about the state, intentions, and activities of one’s own forces. The book concludes that progress in command has usually been achieved less by employing more advanced technologies than by finding ways to transcend the limitations of existing ones.

Annotation. Our nation faces the distinct possibility of a catastrophic terrorist attack using an improvised nuclear device (IND), according to international and U.S. intelligence. Detonation of an IND in a major U.S. city would result in tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of victims and would overwhelm public health, emergency response, and health care systems, not to mention creating unprecedented social and economic challenges. While preparing for an IND may seem futile at first glance, thousands of lives can be saved by informed planning and decision making prior to and following an attack. In 2009, the Institute of Medicine published the proceedings of a workshop assessing the health and medical preparedness for responding to an IND detonation. Since that time, multiple federal and other publications have added layers of detail to this conceptual framework, resulting in a significant body of literature and guidance. However, there has been only limited planning effort at the local level as much of the federal guidance has not been translated into action for states, cities and counties. According to an informal survey of community preparedness by the National Association of City and County Health Officials (NACCHO), planning for a radiation incident ranked lowest in priority among other hazards by 2,800 local health departments. The focus of Nationwide Response Issues After an Improvised Nuclear Device Attack: Medical and Public Health Considerations for Neighboring Jurisdictions: Workshop Summary is on key response requirements faced by public health and health care systems in response to an IND detonation, especially those planning needs of outlying state and local jurisdictions from the detonation site. The specific meeting objectives were as follows:- Understand the differences between types of radiation incidents and implications of an IND attack on outlying communities.-Highlight current planning efforts at the federal, state, and local level as well as challenges to the implementation of operational plans.-Examine gaps in planning efforts and possible challenges and solutions.-Identify considerations for public health reception centers: how public health and health care interface with functions and staffing and how radiological assessments and triage be handled.-Discuss the possibilities and benefits of integration of disaster transport systems.-Explore roles of regional health care coalitions in coordination of health care response.

The command and control of military operations is a difficult art. The Challenges of High Command explores British ideas of how this should be done and, with the guidance of some of Britain's leading military historians, looks at the practicalities of British experience in the First and Second World Wars. The contributors cast new light on themes as diverse as the trench warfare of the First World War, the conduct of the Gallipoli and Norway campaigns, and the command performance of Bomber Harris and Bill Slim. The Challenges of High Command concludes with a major review of how military operations should be conducted in the new political and technological conditions of today and includes an informal and frank commentary by General Sir Mike Jackson on his experience in Bosnia and Kosovo.

"Though he has traditionally been saddled with much of the blame for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg, Lt. Gen. James Longstreet was a capable, resourceful, and brave commander. Lee referred to Longstreet as his "Old Warhorse," and Longstreet's men gave him the sobriquet "Bull of the Woods" for his aggressive tactics at Chickamauga." "Now, historian Alexander Mendoza offers a comprehensive analysis of Longstreet's leadership during his seven-month assignment in the Tennessee theater of operations. He concludes that the obstacles to effective command faced by Longstreet during his sojourn in the west had at least as much to do with longstanding grievances and politically motivated prejudices as they did with any personal or military shortcomings of Longstreet himself."--BOOK JACKET.

Textbook for Air Command and Staff College course.