Stabilizing Iraq

Discuses some of the systemic conditions in Iraq that contribute to the fraud, waste, or abuse of U.S.-provided funds. Since 2003, the Dept. of Defense (DoD) has reported total costs of about $257.5 billion for military operations in Iraq; these have increased from about $38.8 billion in FY2003 to about $83.4 in FY2006. The largest increase has been in operation & maintenance expenses. This report focuses on: (1) security; (2) management & reporting of the program to train & equip Iraqi security forces; (3) contracting & contract management activities; & (4) Iraqi capacity & commitment to manage & fund reconstruction & security efforts. Charts & tables.

In Nov. 2005, the the Nat. Strategy for Victory in Iraq was issued to clarify the Pres. strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, & economic goals in Iraq. The strategy articulated the desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, & secure Iraq, integrated into the internat. community, & a partner in the war on terrorism. To achieve this, the U.S. is, among other things, developing Iraqi military & police forces. The U.S. goal is to transfer security respon. from the Multinational Force-Iraq to Iraqi security forces & the Iraqi gov¿t. as their capability & the security situation improve. This testimony discusses the results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces, & factors that affect the development of effective Iraqi forces. Charts & tables.

Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $640 billion for the global war on terrorism, the majority of this for operations in Iraq. In Jan. 2007, the Pres. announced ¿The New Way Forward¿ to stem violence in Iraq and enable the Iraqi gov¿t. to foster national reconciliation. This new strategy established goals and objectives to achieve over 12 to 18 months, or by July 2008. This report discusses progress in meeting key goals in ¿The New Way Forward¿: (1) improve security conditions; (2) develop capable Iraqi security forces and help the Iraqi gov¿t.; (3) enact key legislation; (4) spend capital budgets; and (5) provide essential services. Also discusses U.S. strategies for Iraq. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.

In Jan. 2007, the Pres. announced a new U.S. strategy to stem the violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi gov¿t. foster conditions for national reconciliation. In ¿The New Way Forward,¿ the Admin. articulated near-term goals to achieve over a 12- to 18-month period and reasserted the end state for Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. To support this strategy, the U.S. increased its military presence and financial commitments for Iraq operations. This testimony discusses: (1) progress in meeting key security, legislative, and economic goals of ¿The New Way Forward¿; and (2) past and current U.S. strategies for Iraq and the need for an updated strategy. Illus.

Statement on whether or not the gov¿t. of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in an Act which requires a report on the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi gov¿t. actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the Iraqi pop¿n., provide essential services to the pop¿n., & promote economic well-being. In summary, the Iraqi gov¿t. met 3, partially met 4, & did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, & it is unclear whether the Iraqi govt. will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. The gov¿t. has not enacted legislation on de-Ba¿athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, & militia disarmament. Tables.

Since 2001, Congress has appropriated nearly $700 billion for the global war on terrorism. The majority of these funds have supported U.S. efforts in Iraq. Congressional oversight is crucial to improve performance, ensure accountability, and protect U.S. programs from fraud, waste, and abuse. Since 2003, there have been nearly 130 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. This testimony addresses: (1) factors contributing to poor contracting outcomes and accountability; (2) long-standing issues in the Dept. of Defense¿s management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces; and (3) efforts to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.