Rent Dispersion In The Us Agricultural Insurance Industry

A central, but inadequately explored issue with respect to subsidized crop insurance programs concerns the costs of delivering insurance coverage to farmers. This study examines that issue in the context of the heavily subsidized US crop insurance program which has often been put forward as a model for agricultural insurance programs in other countries. US Government programs often rely on private firms to deliver income transfers or services, which then establish their own rent-seeking lobbies, which are shared with input suppliers. This rent dispersion process is examined in the context of the U.S. agricultural insurance industry, which receives as much as one third of the annual subsidies that support the federal crop insurance program. We find that as total payments to insurance companies increased between 2001 and 2009, an increasingly large share of the agricultural insurance industry’s rents accrued to insurance agents, although in markets where insurance companies possessed some oligopsony power, agent payments are smaller. The findings also suggest that the insurance industry (companies and independent agents) would almost surely provide the same service for substantially less than the gross revenues from the subsidies and underwriting gains they received.

This study examines how, in the context of three major crop insurance legislative initatives by the US government in 1989, 1994, and 2000, regulatory and other innovations to the federal crop insurance program have been designed to jointly benefit farm interest groups and the agricultural insurance industry, with spillover benefits for credit institutions that make loans to farmers. The analysis clearly demonstrates that those initiatives have resulted in considerable and generally increasing costs to US taxpayers and that they evolved as the result of explicit or implicit coalitions between farm interest groups and crop insurance interest groups.

This study is undertaken to quantify the benefits of contract farming (CF) on farmers’ income in a case where new market opportunities are emerging for smallholder farmers in Nepal. CF is emerging as an important form of vertical coordination in the agrifood supply chain. The prospect for CF in a country like Nepal with accessibility issues, underdeveloped markets, and a lack of amenities remains ambiguous. Contractors find it difficult to build links in these cases, particularly when final consumers have quality and safety requirements. However, a lack of other market opportunities makes the contracts more sustainable. The latter happens if there are product-specific quality advantages because of agroecology and, more important, lack of side-selling opportunities. Concerns remain about monoposonistic powers of the buyers when small farmers do not have outside options. Results of this study show that CF is significantly more profitable (81 percent greater net income) than independent production, the main pathway being higher yield and price realization. The positive impact of CF on farmers’ profits can help Nepal in harnessing the growing demand for pulses, especially in neighboring international markets, like India.

Agricultural Policy in Disarray provides fascinating, detailed, and contemporary evidence of how rent-seeking by small, well-organized interest groups results in government policies that do little good and much harm.

Over the past 25 years, economic growth rates in many developing countries have outpaced those in industrialized countries, and per capita incomes of these two groups of countries have started to converge. Growth in developing countries contributed to a dramatic drop—from 37 percent to 13 percent—in the global extreme poverty rate between 1990 and 201. However, the global economic outlook has deteriorated recently. This paper examines the impact of the actual and projected slowdown in the world economy since 2012 on the poor and on the potential for achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It builds on the changes between 2012 and late 2015 in the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook projections to provide the basic slowdown scenario. It then uses a global model to assess the impacts of lower rates of productivity growth and consequent lower savings and investment on key price and income variables. The productivity shocks are passed directly to the production activities included in household microsimulation models for almost 300,000 households. These households are also affected by the modeled changes in prices and wages. Simulations allow us to assess the impacts of the slowdown on the real household incomes of the poor, and hence on the poverty rate. The results suggest that the poorest countries will see the greatest slowdown in poverty reduction, with over 5 percent of their population projected to remain below the poverty line. Overall 38 million fewer people will leave extreme poverty compared to earlier projections. Farm households are at particular risk in middle-income countries, with over 1.5 percent more of the farming population potentially not escaping extreme poverty in these countries. By 2030, average extreme poverty in rural areas is now projected to be about 7.5 percent, rather than 7.1 percent. While substantial poverty reduction is still expected between now and 2030, a strong focus on policies for poverty reduction will be vital to achieving the first SDG goal of eliminating poverty.