Private Security Contractors Operating In Contingency Operations Combat Operations Or Other Significant Military Operations Us Department Of Defense Regulation Dod 2018 Edition

Private Security Contractors Operating in Contingency Operations, Combat Operations or Other Significant Military Operations (US Department of Defense Regulation) (DOD) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Private Security Contractors Operating in Contingency Operations, Combat Operations or Other Significant Military Operations (US Department of Defense Regulation) (DOD) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 29, 2018 This Rule establishes policy, assigns responsibilities and provides procedures for the regulation of the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract during contingency operations, combat operations or other significant military operations. It also assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for incident reporting, use of and accountability for equipment, rules for the use of force, and a process for administrative action or the removal, as appropriate, of PSCs and PSC personnel. For the Department of Defense, this Rule supplements DoD Instruction 3020.41, "Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces," which provides guidance for all DoD contractors operating in contingency operations. This book contains: - The complete text of the Private Security Contractors Operating in Contingency Operations, Combat Operations or Other Significant Military Operations (US Department of Defense Regulation) (DOD) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section

Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: Services Provided by Private Security Contractors (PSC); Number and Profile of PSCs Working in Iraq and Afghanistan; Congressional Focus on PSCs; (3) Private Security Co. Working for the U.S. Gov¿t.: Why the U.S. Gov¿t. Uses PSCs; DoD PSCs; Iraq; Afghanistan; Can the Use of PSCs Undermine U.S. Efforts?; DoD Mgmt. and Oversight of PSCs; (4) Options for Congress: Define the Role that Private Security Contractors Can Play in Support of Mil. Operations in Unsecure Environments; Prohibit armed security contractors from being deployed in combat zones; Restrict armed security contractors to performing static security; Restrict armed security contractors to static security, with an exception for local nationals.

The reality of war, in the 21st century is the presence of the other force, Private Security Contractors (PSCs). Contractors are not only used for their skills in logistics, maintenance, intelligence and interpreters, but they are now a key component of Department of Defense's (DOD's) security operations in Iraq. Commanders now rely on Private Security Contractors (PSCs) to provide additional forces needed to secure forward operating bases, logistical convoys and also to perform protective service operations. The use of PSCs by the Department of Defense in all aspects of military operations has become vital to mission success not only in Iraq, but Afghanistan and around the world. Their extensive use has become the logical solution in bridging the gap of required forces needed to execute and win our nation's wars. This paper will address key issues of Private Security Contractor operations particularly addressing their utilization, PSC legal status and issues, PSC contingency employment risk and recommendations for improving PSC oversight.

The use of private security contractors (PSCs) to protect personnel and property in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a subject of debate. While PSCs are viewed as being vital to U.S. efforts in the region, many are concerned about transparency, accountability, and legal issues raised by the use of armed civilians to perform security tasks formerly performed by the mil. Contents of this report: Legal Status and Authorities: (a) Internat. Law: Can Contractors be Combatants?; Are They Mercenaries?; (b) Iraqi Law, and Afghan Law, and Status of U.S. Forces; (c) U.S. Law; ¿Inherently Gov¿t. Functions¿ and Other Restrictions on Gov¿t. Contracts; Prosecution of Contractor Personnel in U.S. Fed. or Mil. Courts; Uniform Code of Mil. Justice.

The events of 16 September 2007, the Blackwater shooting in Nisoor Square, brought Private Security Contractors (PSC) and their use under an intense focus. The problems highlighted for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) were his lack of necessary tools to exercise oversight and control of operational contractors and an inability to hold them accountable. Steps have been taken since the incident to improve the JFC's arsenal within this area. The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the tools the JFC can utilize to ensure control is maintained of civilians accompanying military forces during a declared war or contingency operation. Additionally, it will examine the benefits of aligning PSC usage in the joint operating area (JOA) under the Department of Defense (DoD) to both establish a solid legal jurisdiction and remove the friction from operations under multiple departments.

Mercenaries are more powerful than experts realize, a grave oversight. Those who assume they are cheap imitations of national armed forces invite disaster because for-profit warriors are a wholly different genus and species of fighter. Private military companies such as the Wagner Group are more like heavily armed multinational corporations than the Marine Corps. Their employees are recruited from different countries, and profitability is everything. Patriotism is unimportant, and sometimes a liability. Unsurprisingly, mercenaries do not fight conventionally, and traditional war strategies used against them may backfire.

This book addresses the ambiguities of the growing use of private security contractors and provides guidance as to how our expectations about regulating this expanding ‘service’ industry will have to be adjusted. In the warzones of Iraq and Afghanistan many of those who carry weapons are not legally combatants, nor are they protected civilians. They are contracted by governments, businesses, and NGOs to provide armed security. Often mistaken as members of armed forces, they are instead part of a new protean proxy force that works alongside the military in a multitude of shifting roles, and overseen by a matrix of contracts and regulations. This book analyzes the growing industry of these private military and security companies (PMSCs) used in warzones and other high risk areas. PMSCs are the result of a unique combination of circumstances, including a change in the idea of soldiering, insurance industry analyses that require security contractors, and a need for governments to distance themselves from potentially criminal conduct. The book argues that PMSCs are a unique type of organization, combining attributes from worlds of the military, business, and humanitarian organizations. This makes them particularly resistant to oversight. The legal status of these companies and those they employ is also hard to ascertain, which weakens the multiple regulatory tools available. PMSCs also fall between the cracks in ethical debates about their use, seeming to be both justifiable and objectionable. This transformation in military operations is a seemingly irreversible product of more general changes in the relationship between the individual citizen and the state. This book will be of much interest to students of private security companies, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR in general. Kateri Carmola is the Christian A. Johnson Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College in Vermont. She received her Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley.

The current operating environment has seen an unprecedented number of private security contractors such as Black Water and Dynacorp engaging in combat with enemy forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the many issues raised is whether such contractors are protected under the Geneva Conventions. The answer to this question is crucial for commanders as the United States prosecutes current and future combat operations along side of civilian security contractors. Private security contractors conducting combat operations on behalf of the United States are civilians and should be afforded all of the protections granted to lawful combatants. They satisfy the definition of a combatant protected by Article 44 of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol of 8 June 1997, and they are defacto members of the United States armed forces.

Faced with a decreasing supply of national troops, dwindling defense budgets, and the ever-rising demand for boots on the ground in global conflicts and humanitarian emergencies, decision makers are left with little choice but to legalize and legitimize the use of private military contractors (PMCs). Outsourcing Security examines the impact that bureaucratic controls and the increasing permissiveness of security environments have had on the U.S. military’s growing use of PMCs during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Bruce E. Stanley examines the relationship between the rise of the private security industry and five potential explanatory variables tied to supply-and-demand theory in six historical cases, including Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the U.S. intervention in Bosnia in 1995, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Outsourcing Security is the only work that moves beyond a descriptive account of the rise of PMCs to lay out a precise theory explaining the phenomenon and providing a framework for those considering PMCs in future global interaction.