Principles Of Household Debt Restructuring

This paper examines the estimated compliance with the macroeconomic convergence targets for 2008, based on estimates contained in the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (the REO). SADC’s regional economic integration agenda includes a macroeconomic convergence program, intended to achieve and maintain macroeconomic stability in the region, thereby contributing to faster economic growth and laying the basis for eventual monetary union. Targets for key macroeconomic variables have been set out for 2008, 2012, and 2018. Most SADC member states have recorded solid macroeconomic performance in recent years, in general coming close to, and in many cases surpassing, the convergence targets specified for 2008. A notable exception in this regard is Zimbabwe, which was in the grip of hyperinflation. The macroeconomic targets for 2012 are ambitious and, in some cases, warrant further evaluation, given that achieving the targets may be neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve good macroeconomic results.

When facing financial distress, French households can file a case to a "households' over-indebtedness commission" (HDC). The HDC can order an immediate repayment or grant a debt suspension. Exploiting the random assignment of bankruptcy filings to managers, we show that a debt suspension has a very significant and negative effect on the likelihood to re-default but that this impact is only short-lived. The effect depends not only on the characteristics of the households but also on the nature of their indebtedness. Our results imply that rather than focusing on a specific debt profile, above all a deeper restructuring of the expenditure side is necessary to make the plan sustainable. They also single out specific banks lending to particular fragile households. They indicate the importance of policy actions on budget counseling, as well as the importance of regulation of credit distribution to avoid both entering into bankruptcy and re-filing for bankruptcy.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.

Given the ongoing work on a multilateral restructuring process for sovereign debt in the UN, consideration of the content and implementation of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is timely. The framework and content of the SDRM proposed here differs from earlier proposals in several important respects. For the classification and supermajority voting of claims in the approval a restructuring plan, it would mimic the structure and operation of the model collective action clauses (Model CACs) proposed by the International Capital Markets Association. Restructuring under a qualified sovereign debt restructuring law (QSDRL) would be guided by four principles: (i) observe the KISS (keep it simple, stupid) principle, (ii) follow the Model CACs, (iii) limit the discretion of an administrator of a proceeding, and (iv) address only major current problems.A convention would oblige each adopting state to recognize and enforce a restructuring plan approved under a QSDRL of another adopting state. This obligation would be subject to exceptions along the lines of those under the New York Convention on arbitral awards. The QSDRL would employ novel methods of binding creditors under an approved restructuring plan. The convention would specify the requirements for a QSDRL while leaving implementing legislation to adopting states wishing to enact a QSDRL. A QSDRL would address many matters normally covered in an insolvency law, such as the requirements for approval of a plan. But it would not provide for the cramdown of dissenting classes of creditors, which would offend the norm of super-majority voting and require a tribunal with substantial discretion. It also would not provide for priority interim financing, as priority rules necessarily would offend the KISS principle and could be addressed outside the QSDRL. The proposed QSDRL would embrace a voluntary, contractual, and market-based approach -- standards advocated by SDRM opponents such as the United States, the EU, and the IMF.

This book explores the issue of private sector over-indebtedness following the recent financial crisis. It addresses the various challenges for policymakers, investors and economic agents affected by applied remedial policies as the private non-financial sector in Europe continues to face increased challenges in servicing its debt, with the problem mainly concentrated in several countries in the EU periphery and Eastern Europe. Chapters from expert contributors address reduced investment as firms concentrate on deleveraging and repairing their balance sheets, curtailed consumer spending, depressed collateral values and weak credit creation. They examine effective policies to facilitate private sector debt restructuring which may involve significant upfront costs in terms of time to implement and committed budgetary resources, as well as necessary reforms required to improve the broader institutional framework and judicial capacity. The book also explores the issue of over indebtedness in the household sector, contributing to the literature in establishing best practice principles for household debt.

This paper studies the effect of sovereign debt restructurings with external private creditors on growth during the period 1970-2010. We find that there are bad and good (or not so bad) debt restructurings for growth. While growth generally declines in the aftermath of a sovereign debt restructuring, agreements that allow countries to exit a default spell (final restructurings) are associated with improving growth. The impact can be significant. In general, three years after restructuring, growth is about 5 percent lower compared to countries that did not face restructuring over the same period. The exception is for final restructurings, which result in positive growth in the years immediately after the restructuring. Final restructurings tend to be better for growth because they reduce countries’ debt, with the strongest effect for countries that exit restructurings with relatively low debt levels.

The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.