Power And German Foreign Policy

Drawing upon a multi-disciplinary methodology employing diverse written sources, material practices and vivid life histories, Faith in the family seeks to assess the impact of the Second Vatican Council on the ordinary believer, alongside contemporaneous shifts in British society relating to social mobility, the sixties, sexual morality and secularisation. Chapters examine the changes in the Roman Catholic liturgy and Christology; devotion to Mary, the rosary and the place of women in the family and church, as well as the enduring (but shifting) popularity of Saints Bernadette and Thérèse.Appealing to students of modern British gender and cultural history, as well as a general readership interested in religious life in Britain in the second half of the twentieth century, Faith in the family illustrates that despite unmistakable differences in their cultural accoutrements and interpretations of Catholicism, English Catholics continued to identify with and practise the 'Faith of Our Fathers' before and after Vatican II.

What will German foreign policy look like in 2015? This book dares to speculate by making a provocative argument: what drives German foreign policy is its power position in Europe and on the international stage. By examining German manoeuvres in the Balkans, its role in European Monetary Union, and its leadership in curbing Europe's proliferation of WMD technology, Crawford shows how German power is linked to its "embedded hegemony" in Europe and the changing state of its economy. Together these forces shape German foreign policy.

This comprehensive, in-depth assessment of the German foreign policy record under the Red-Green government of Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer from 1998 to 2005, produced by a team of German and international experts, explores the idea of continuity and the sources, depths and directions of German foreign policy.

What will German foreign policy look like in 2015? This book speculates by making a provocative argument: what drives German foreign policy is its power position in Europe and on the international stage. Crawford examines Germany's manoeuvres in the Balkans, its role in EMU, and its leadership in curbing Europe's proliferation of WMD technology.

This book examines the extent to which German foreign policy has changed since unification, and analyzes the fundamental reasons behind this change. The book has three main aims. The essays develop theories of foreign policy to predict and explain Germany's foreign policy behavior. They test competing predictions about German foreign policy behavior since unification in several issue areas. They also assess the much-debated question as to whether post-unification Germany's foreign policy is marked by continuity or change.

Since World War II, Germany has confronted its own history to earn acceptance in the family of nations. Lily Gardner Feldman draws on the literature of religion, philosophy, social psychology, law and political science, and history to understand Germany's foreign policy with its moral and pragmatic motivations and to develop the concept of international reconciliation. Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation traces Germany's path from enmity to amity by focusing on the behavior of individual leaders, governments, and non-governmental actors. The book demonstrates that, at least in the cases of France, Israel, Poland, and Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, Germany has gone far beyond banishing war with its former enemies; it has institutionalized active friendship. The German experience is now a model of its own, offering lessons for other cases of international reconciliation. Gardner Feldman concludes with an initial application of German reconciliation insights to the other principal post-World War II pariah, as Japan expands its relations with China and South Korea.

Essay from the year 2006 in the subject Politics - Topic: German Foreign Policy, London School of Economics (Department of International Relations), language: English, abstract: The end of the Cold War in 1989/90 did not only prompt a fundamental transformation of the international system as a whole; it equally changed the expectations and perceptions of key nation-states acting within that system. This was, as most scholars of International Relations (IR) agree, especially true with regard to reunited Germany. In the run-up to the negotiations of the 'Two-plus-Four Treaty', many observers feared that the demise of the East-West confrontation might encourage the Federal Republic to completely strip off its post-war restraints and use its revamped resources and autonomy more forcefully. By the same token, some European leaders — notably French President François Mitterrand and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher — voiced concerns that a resurgence of German power politics seemed far from being just a theoretical possibility. Indeed, some indications of a renewed German propensity to 'go it alone' emerged even before the legal and political terms of unification had been clarified. Chancellor Kohl's '10 Points Plan' of November 1989 aroused deep scepticism. Even more alarmingly, German contributions to armed operations in Bosnia and Kosovo were perceived as incidents of a much more self-cofident security posture. However, a vast majority of German politicians was eager to defuse their neighbours' suspicions, emphasising that they would retain their commitment to a culture of 'civilian power.' The country would remain a driving force for deeper and wider European integration as well as multilateralism within the frameworks of the UN, NATO and CSCE/OSCE. Yet, despite these efforts to address other states' concerns, some observers doubted whether Germany would actually be willing and able to stick to its 'leadership avoidance reflex' in the future. Almost two decades after reunification, it might thus be worthwhile to ask: is Germany still a 'civilian power'? To answer this question, I will first describe different dimensions of political power as they are treated in IR theory and illustrate what 'civilian power' means in this context. Secondly, I will outline in how far particular concepts of foreign policy (FP) behaviour — the models of 'security', 'trading' and 'civilian states' — are capable of grasping the notion of civilian power. Section 4 relates these conceptual frameworks to important features of Germany's actual FP conduct before and after the watershed events of 1989/90.

This work examines the extent to which German foreign policy and European policy has changed since German unification. Despite significant changes on specific issues, most notably on the deployment of military force outside of the NATO area, there is greater continuity than change in post-unification German policy.

Since the Euro crisis began, Germany has emerged as Europe's dominant power. During the last three years, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been compared with Bismarck and even Hitler in the European media. And yet few can deny that Germany today is very different from the stereotype of nineteenth- and twentieth-century history. After nearly seventy years of struggling with the Nazi past, Germans think that they more than anyone have learned its lessons. Above all, what the new Germany thinks it stands for is peace. Germany is unique in this combination of economic assertiveness and military abstinence. So what does it mean to have a "German Europe" in the twenty-first century? In The Paradox of German Power, Hans Kundnani explains how Germany got to where it is now and where it might go in future. He explores German national identity and foreign policy through a series of tensions in German thinking and action: between continuity and change, between "normality" and "abnormality," between economics and politics, and between Europe and the world.

This book contributes to the debate about a new German power in Europe with an analysis of Germany’s role in European Russia policy. It provides an up-to-date account of Germany’s “Ostpolitik” and how Germany has influenced EU-Russia relations since the Eastern enlargement in 2004 - partly along, partly against the interests and preferences of new member states. The volume combines a rich empirical analysis of Russia policy with a theory-based perspective on Germany’s power and influence in the EU. The findings demonstrate that despite Germany’s central role, exercising power within the EU is dependent on legitimacy and acceptance by other member states.