Ordinary Vices

The seven deadly sins of Christianity represent the abysses of character, whereas Shklar's "ordinary vices"--cruelty, hypocrisy, snobbery, betrayal, and misanthropy--are merely treacherous shoals, flawing our characters with mean-spiritedness and inhumanity. Shklar draws from a brilliant array of writers--Moliere and Dickens on hypocrisy, Jane Austen on snobbery, Shakespeare and Montesquieu on misanthropy, Hawthorne and Nietzsche on cruelty, Conrad and Faulkner on betrayal--to reveal the nature and effects of the vices. She examines their destructive effects, the ambiguities of the moral problems they pose to the liberal ethos, and their implications for government and citizens: liberalism is a difficult and challenging doctrine that demands a tolerance of contradiction, complexity, and the risks of freedom.

Judith Shklar draws from a brilliant array of writers--Molière and Dickens on hypocrisy, Jane Austen on snobbery, Shakespeare and Montesquieu on misanthropy, Hawthorne and Nietzsche on cruelty, Conrad and Faulkner on betrayal--to reveal the nature and effects of the vices.

Gabriele Taylor presents a philosophical investigation of the 'ordinary' vices traditionally seen as 'death to the soul': sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust, and gluttony. This complements recent work by moral philosophers on virtue, and opens up the neglected topic of the vices for further study. Whilst in a mild form the vices may be ordinary and common failings, Deadly Vices makes the case that for those wholly in their grip they are fatally destructive, preventingthe flourishing of the self and of a worthwhile life. An agent therefore has a powerful reason to avoid such states and dispositions and rather to cultivate those virtues that counteract a deadly vice.In dealing with individual vices, their impact on the self, and their interrelation, Deadly Vices offers a unified account of the vices that not only encompasses the healing virtues but also engages with issues in the philosophy of mind as well as in moral philosophy, and shows the connection between them. Literary examples are used to highlight central features of individual vices and set them in context.

Winner of the Zócalo Book Prize A New York Times Book Review Editors’ Choice “Combines powerful moral arguments with superb storytelling.” —New Statesman What moral values do we hold in common? As globalization draws us together economically, are the things we value converging or diverging? These twin questions led Michael Ignatieff to embark on a three-year, eight-nation journey in search of an answer. What we share, he found, are what he calls “ordinary virtues”: tolerance, forgiveness, trust, and resilience. When conflicts break out, these virtues are easily exploited by the politics of fear and exclusion, reserved for one’s own group but denied to others. Yet these ordinary virtues are the key to healing and reconciliation on both a local and global scale. “Makes for illuminating reading.” —Simon Winchester, New York Review of Books “Engaging, articulate and richly descriptive... Ignatieff’s deft histories, vivid sketches and fascinating interviews are the soul of this important book.” —Times Literary Supplement “Deserves praise for wrestling with the devolution of our moral worlds over recent decades.” —Los Angeles Review of Books

Incisively and stylishly written, this book constitutes an open challenge to reconsider the fundamental question of the relationship of law to society.

A comprehensive philosophical treatment of the virtues and their competing vices. The first four sections focus on historical classes of virtue: the cardinal virtues, the capital vices and the corrective virtues, intellectual virtues, and the theological virtues. A final section discusses the role of virtue theory in a number of disciplines.

The hidden value of some of our everyday vices Are there times when it's right to be rude? Can we distinguish between good and bad gossip? Am I a snob if I think that NPR listeners are likely to be better informed than devotees of Fox News? Does sick humor do anyone any good? Can I think your beliefs are absurd but still respect you? In The Virtues of Our Vices, philosopher Emrys Westacott takes a fresh look at important everyday ethical questions—and comes up with surprising answers. He makes a compelling argument that some of our most common vices—rudeness, gossip, snobbery, tasteless humor, and disrespect for others' beliefs—often have hidden virtues or serve unappreciated but valuable purposes. For instance, there are times when rudeness may be necessary to help someone with a problem or to convey an important message. Gossip can foster intimacy between friends and curb abuses of power. And dubious humor can alleviate existential anxieties. Engaging, funny, and philosophically sophisticated, The Virtues of Our Vices challenges us to rethink conventional wisdom when it comes to everyday moral behavior.

In this illuminating look at what constitutes American citizenship, Judith Shklar identifies the right to vote and the right to work as the defining social rights and primary sources of public respect. She demonstrates that in recent years, although all profess their devotion to the work ethic, earning remains unavailable to many who feel and are consequently treated as less than full citizens.

"Most of us are far from perfect in virtue. Faced with this fact, moral philosophers can respond in two different ways. On the one hand, they might insist that the only real virtue is perfect virtue, and the only right actions are perfectly virtuous ones. Any failure to meet the exacting standards of perfect virtue will amount to vice, and any less than perfectly virtuous actions will be wrong. On the other hand, and if they reject such a rigorist picture, they can instead affirm that there are actions that are truly good and right even if they fall short of perfection. This book urges the attractions of a virtue ethics committed to the second sort of picture. In doing so, it makes two major innovations. First, it constructs and defends Neo-Aristotelian accounts of supererogation and suberogation. But just as importantly, and far from encouraging a kind of complacency, the recognition that there can be genuine goodness short of perfection is precisely what opens up theoretical space for appreciating the goodness of striving towards ideal virtue. Thus, the second major innovation it makes is to show that self-improvement itself can be morally excellent, and the disposition to seek and engage in it, where appropriate, can itself be a virtue"--

Cambridge paperback library. First published 1969. Includes bibliographical references. 5.