Optimal Monetary Policy With Distinct Core And Headline Inflation Rates

"In a stylized DSGE model with an energy sector, the optimal policy response to an adverse energy supply shock implies a rise in core inflation, a larger rise in headline inflation, and a decline in wage inflation. The optimal policy is well-approximated by policies that stabilize the output gap, but also by a wide array of "dual mandate" policies that are not overly aggressive in stabilizing core inflation. Finally, policies that react to a forecast of headline inflation following a temporary energy shock imply markedly different effects than policies that react to a forecast of core, with the former inducing greater volatility in core inflation and the output gap"--Federal Reserve Board web site.

A leading academic authority and policymaker discusses monetary policy strategy from the perspectives of both scholar and practitioner, offering theory, econometric evidence, and extensive case studies. This book by a leading authority on monetary policy offers a unique view of the subject from the perspectives of both scholar and practitioner. Frederic Mishkin is not only an academic expert in the field but also a high-level policymaker. He is especially well positioned to discuss the changes in the conduct of monetary policy in recent years, in particular the turn to inflation targeting. Monetary Policy Strategy describes his work over the last ten years, offering published papers, new introductory material, and a summing up, “Everything You Wanted to Know about Monetary Policy Strategy, But Were Afraid to Ask,” which reflects on what we have learned about monetary policy over the last thirty years. Mishkin blends theory, econometric evidence, and extensive case studies of monetary policy in advanced and emerging market and transition economies. Throughout, his focus is on these key areas: the importance of price stability and a nominal anchor; fiscal and financial preconditions for achieving price stability; central bank independence as an additional precondition; central bank accountability; the rationale for inflation targeting; the optimal inflation target; central bank transparency and communication; and the role of asset prices in monetary policy.

How should monetary authorities react to an oil price shock? A trade-off between stabilizing inflation and the welfare relevant output gap arises in a distorted economy once one recognizes: (1) that oil (energy) cannot be easily substituted by other factors in the short-run; (2) that there is no fiscal transfer available to policymakers to neutralize the steady-state distortion due to monopolistic competition; and (3) that increases in oil prices also directly affect consumption by raising the price of fuel, heating oil, and other energy sources. The author derives an interest rate feedback rule that mimics the optimal plan in all relevant dimensions but that depends only on observables, namely core inflation, oil price inflation, and the growth rate of output. Illus.

In models with complete markets, targeting core inflation enables monetary policy to maximize welfare by replicating the flexible price equilibrium. We develop a two-sector two-good new-Keynesian model to study the optimal choice of price index in markets with financial frictions. We find that, in the presence of financial frictions, a welfare-maximizing central bank should adopt flexible headline inflation targeting a target for headline CPI inflation with some weight on the output gap. These results are particularly relevant for emerging markets, where the share of food expenditures in total consumption expenditures is high and a large proportion of consumers are credit constrained.

What inflation measure should central banks target? This paper shows optimal monetary policy targets headline inflation if households pay limited attention to different consumption categories when forming inflation expectations. This result stands in contrast to standard rational expectations models, where optimal policy targets core inflation. The core inflation rate excludes volatile energy and food prices (non-core) from headline inflation. Using novel survey data on inflation expectations for disaggregated consumption categories, I find household expectations are disproportionately driven by beliefs about future non-core prices. I develop a sparsity-based rational inattention model to account for the empirical evidence. While forming inflation expectations, households pay attention to the volatile non-core components; the stable core inflation component receives little attention. Finally, I embed this framework into a multi-sector New Keynesian model to derive the optimal inflation target. In the model, targeting headline inflation is optimal, whereas a core inflation target would fail to stabilize the economy sufficiently.

Large price changes in industries affected by the COVID-19 pandemic have caused erratic fluctuations in the U.S. headline inflation rate. This paper compares alternative approaches to filtering out the transitory effects of these industry price changes and measuring the underlying or core level of inflation over 2020-2021. The Federal Reserve’s preferred measure of core, the inflation rate excluding food and energy prices (XFE), has performed poorly: over most of 2020-21, it is almost as volatile as headline inflation. Measures of core that exclude a fixed set of additional industries, such as the Atlanta Fed’s sticky-price inflation rate, have been less volatile, but the least volatile have been measures that filter out large price changes in any industry, such as the Cleveland Fed’s median inflation rate and the Dallas Fed’s trimmed mean inflation rate. These core measures have followed smooth paths, drifting down when the economy was weak in 2020 and then rising as the economy has rebounded. Overall, we find that the case for the Federal Reserve to move away from the traditional XFE measure of core has strengthened during 2020-21.

We analyze the policy trade-offs generated by local currency price stability of imports in economies where upstream producers strategically interact with downstream firms selling the final goods to consumers. We study the effects of staggered price setting at the downstream level on the optimal price (and markup) chosen by upstream producers and show that downstream price movements affect the desired markup of upstream producers, magnifying their price response to shocks. We revisit the international dimensions of optimal monetary policy, unveiling an argument in favor of consumer price stability as the main prescription for monetary policy. Since stable consumer prices feed back into a low volatility of markups among upstream producers, this contains inefficient deviations from the law of one price at the border. However, efficient stabilization of different CPI components will not generally result into perfect stabilization of headline inflation. National policies optimally respond to the same shocks in a similar way, thus containing volatility of the terms of trade, but not necessarily of the real exchange rate. The latter will be more volatile, among other things, the larger the home bias in expenditure and the content of local inputs in consumer goods.

A book about monetary policy that can be defined broadly as any policy relating to the supply of money. It looks at five economies that have adopted a price stability goal: New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the Euro area. It concludes with a brief analysis of the record of inflation targeting in the developing world.