On The Problem Of Empathy

New York Post Best Book of 2016 We often think of our capacity to experience the suffering of others as the ultimate source of goodness. Many of our wisest policy-makers, activists, scientists, and philosophers agree that the only problem with empathy is that we don’t have enough of it. Nothing could be farther from the truth, argues Yale researcher Paul Bloom. In AGAINST EMPATHY, Bloom reveals empathy to be one of the leading motivators of inequality and immorality in society. Far from helping us to improve the lives of others, empathy is a capricious and irrational emotion that appeals to our narrow prejudices. It muddles our judgment and, ironically, often leads to cruelty. We are at our best when we are smart enough not to rely on it, but to draw instead upon a more distanced compassion. Basing his argument on groundbreaking scientific findings, Bloom makes the case that some of the worst decisions made by individuals and nations—who to give money to, when to go to war, how to respond to climate change, and who to imprison—are too often motivated by honest, yet misplaced, emotions. With precision and wit, he demonstrates how empathy distorts our judgment in every aspect of our lives, from philanthropy and charity to the justice system; from medical care and education to parenting and marriage. Without empathy, Bloom insists, our decisions would be clearer, fairer, and—yes—ultimately more moral. Brilliantly argued, urgent and humane, AGAINST EMPATHY shows us that, when it comes to both major policy decisions and the choices we make in our everyday lives, limiting our impulse toward empathy is often the most compassionate choice we can make.

Empathy (Einfühlung)—as a crucial concept for understanding ourselves, others, and communities—was a central topic of interest in the first half of the twentieth century amongst philosophers and in the emerging sciences of psychology and sociology. Edith Stein’s dissertation and inaugural publication, On the Problem of Empathy, introduces her unique take on empathy, embodiment, phenomenology, and intersubjectivity. Her immersion in phenomenology and her intimate familiarity with the psychology and sociology of her day make it a challenge for contemporary readers to understand. This companion provides a guide to Stein’s first philosophical masterpiece. The opening essays, including a contribution from Íngrid Vendrell Ferran, indicate the most important influences on Stein’s thought circa 1917, the structure and method of her argument, the place of this work in her oeuvre, its historical significance, and its relevance for contemporary philosophical discussions. Timothy Burns then provides a clear and detailed summary of each section of Empathy, elucidating the argument that weaves through this classic of philosophical thought.

This volume contains twelve original papers about the importance of empathy and sympathy to morality, with perspectives from philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, and neuroscience.

We have always struggled to explain why some people behave in the most evil way imaginable, while others are completely self-sacrificing. From the Nazi concentration camps of World War Two to the playgrounds of today, the author examines empathy, cruelty and understanding and looks at what exactly makes our behaviour uniquely human.

This book explores the phenomenological investigations of Edith Stein by critically contextualising her role within the phenomenological movement and assessing her accounts of empathy, sociality, and personhood. Despite the growing interest that surrounds contemporary research on empathy, Edith Stein’s phenomenological investigations have been largely neglected due to a historical tradition that tends to consider her either as Husserl’s assistant or as a martyr. However, in her phenomenological research, Edith Stein pursued critically the relation between phenomenology and psychology, focusing on the relation between affectivity, subjectivity, and personhood. Alongside phenomenologists like Max Scheler, Kurt Stavenhagen, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Stein developed Husserl’s method, incorporating several original modifications that are relevant for philosophy, phenomenology, and ethics. Drawing on recent debates on empathy, emotions, and collective intentionality as well as on original inquiries and interpretations, the collection articulates and develops new perspectives regarding Edith Stein’s phenomenology. The volume includes an appraisal of Stein’s philosophical relation to Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, and develops further the concepts of empathy, sociality, and personhood. These essays demonstrate the significance of Stein’s phenomenology for contemporary research on intentionality, emotions, and ethics. Gathering together contributions from young researchers and leading scholars in the fields of phenomenology, social ontology, and history of philosophy, this collection provides original views and critical discussions that will be of interest also for social philosophers and moral psychologists.