Nuclear Deterrence Right Or Wrong

Whole World on Fire focuses on a technical riddle wrapped in an organizational mystery: How and why, for more than half a century, did the U.S. government fail to predict nuclear fire damage as it drew up plans to fight strategic nuclear war?U.S. bombing in World War II caused massive fire damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but later war plans took account only of damage from blast; they completely ignored damage from atomic firestorms. Recently a small group of researchers has shown that for modern nuclear weapons the destructiveness and lethality of nuclear mass fire often--and predictably--greatly exceeds that of nuclear blast. This has major implications for defense policy: the U.S. government has underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons, Lynn Eden finds, and built far more warheads, and far more destructive warheads, than it needed for the Pentagon's war-planning purposes. How could this have happened? The answer lies in how organizations frame the problems they try to solve. In a narrative grounded in organization theory, science and technology studies, and primary historical sources (including declassified documents and interviews), Eden explains how the U.S. Air Force's doctrine of precision bombing led to the development of very good predictions of nuclear blast--a significant achievement--but for many years to no development of organizational knowledge about nuclear fire. Expert communities outside the military reinforced this disparity in organizational capability to predict blast damage but not fire damage. Yet some innovation occurred, and predictions of fire damage were nearly incorporated into nuclear war planning in the early 1990s. The author explains how such a dramatic change almost happened, and why it did not. Whole World on Fire shows how well-funded and highly professional organizations, by focusing on what they do well and systematically excluding what they don't do well, may build a poor representation of the world--a self-reinforcing fallacy that can have serious consequences. In a sweeping conclusion, Eden shows the implications of the analysis for understanding such things as the sinking of the Titanic, the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, and the poor fireproofing in the World Trade Center.

The Cold War is over and the Soviet Union is gone. Africa, the South Pacific, and Latin America are nuclear weapon free zones. China is a most favored trading partner. The United States and Russia have dismantled hundreds of nuclear weapons and decommissioned scores of bombers and submarines. There is a myriad of international treaties designed to create a world without threat of nuclear holocaust. So why do states and other actors continue to seek nuclear weapons? Iran is in the media with its thinly veiled efforts to establish itself as a nuclear power. On 6 September 2007, Israel bombed a facility in Syria they believed to be a nuclear threat. North Korea is fattening its international bargaining power with its nuclear program. Pakistan, a nation teetering on the edge of political upheaval, has nuclear missiles. Transnational terrorist organizations relish the thought of acquiring an atomic device. Today's nuclear world is not the one our parent's knew. The purpose of this paper is to assess U.S. nuclear deterrence policy to see how it has evolved and if it is appropriate for today's changed security environment.During the Cold War the United States built an immense nuclear arsenal to deter nuclear war with the Soviet Union; a clear and valid raison d'etre. The Cold War is over; has been over for more than 10 years. The Soviet Union is gone. Our Armed Forces got a medal for it. Africa, the South Pacific, Outer Space, and Latin America are nuclear weapons free zones. Today, we have the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an Outer Space Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), three Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, two Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. The convergent thesis of these and other international agreements is a movement to remove nuclear arsenals from the options list of nation-states. The cornerstone of the movement to create a nuclear weapons free world is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is a universally recognized agreement among 136 nuclear and non-nuclear nations to prevent the expansion of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. The days of living under the cloud of "Mutual Assured Destruction" have passed. So what is the purpose of retaining nuclear weapons in this new environment? Why are we investing tax dollars in new nuclear technology and upgrading our weapons stockpile? Where is the peace dividend?

Moral and political questions are vitally relevant to the issue of survival in the nuclear age. Ethics has much to teach us about the meaning of national defence and civic responsibility in the nuclear state. For instance, those in NATO who argue for increased spending on such weapons do so with the intention of defending the values of the West. They must therefore be absolutely sure that they are not – as the contributors to this volume, originally published in 1984, powerfully suggest – undermining or destroying those values by the very means they adopt to preserve them. With the continued success of nuclear deterrence itself in question, responsible citizens feel an urgent need to assess the clash between personal doubts, cherished principles and their governments’ loudly voiced moral certainties. In Objections to Nuclear Defence, professional philosophers of widely varying persuasions provide new analyses of these problems. They spell out clearly and vividly the moral and political objections – objections to the concrete nuclear policies of the Western governments today. Often impassioned but always rational, the book will be of special interest to students of international affairs, peace studies and applied philosophy as well as to the general reader who is trying to choose between political parties in Europe or North America.

This volume examines the complex and vitally important ethical questions connected with the deployment of nuclear weapons and their use as a deterrent. A number of the essays contained here have already established themselves as penetrating and significant contributions to the debate on nuclear ethics. They have been revised to bring out their unity and coherence, and are integrated with new essays. The books exceptional rigor and clarity make it valuable whether the reader's concern with nuclear ethics is professional or personal. Part I explores the morality of nuclear deterrrence from each of the two dominant traditions in moral philosophy, deontology and consequentialism, and points out a number of interesting ethical dilemmas. Part II criticizes a variety of alternatives to deterrence - unilateral nuclear disarmament, world government, strategic defense against ballistic missiles, and nuclear coercion - and argues for mutual nuclear disarmament as a realistic and desirable long-run alternative.

Essay from the year 2003 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 1+ (A), University of Kent (Department of Politics and International Relations), language: English, abstract: When the USA dropped two nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima in August 1945, the world witnessed the first and so far the last use of these weapons. Their devastating effect led to a worldwide fear of atomic bombs, but could not, however, prevent a number of states from developing these fatal devices. In fact, the two superpowers engaged in the subsequent arms race during the Cold War, which, in the end, left both with a nuclear arsenal big enough to destroy the entire world several times over. Although these weapons exist in huge amounts, they have never been used for military purposes since. This distinction is important to make, because the superpowers did make use of their nuclear arsenal on a political level, namely with the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Based on the US assurance that a Soviet attack on the USA or its allies would be answered with massive retaliation, this strategy has prevented a nuclear war. By looking at the concept of nuclear deterrence in more detail this essay will argue that nuclear deterrence must be seen as a conflict, even though arguments can be found underlining the view that it is not. It is certainly true that the abstract nature of nuclear strategy makes an explanation in the traditional Clausewitzian sense of conflict impossible. However, recognising the fact that the arrival of the nuclear bomb has changed the purpose of military strategy fundamentally, namely from the purpose of winning wars to the purpose of preventing wars , inevitably leads to a new concept of conflict. Nuclear strategy has introduced a shift of strategic thinking away from the military towards politics. This does of course mean that ‘conflict’ now has to be defined in political terms. ‘Conflict’ can no longer only be seen as the confrontation of armies in the battlefield but must include the threat of use of force, as the political dimension of conflict, as well.

Expanded from an article that created a stir in foreign policy circles, this book shows why five central arguments promoting nuclear weapons are, in essence, myths.

As nuclear weapons become ever more sophisticated, so the deterrence debate becomes increasingly complex. The ‘Ban the Bomb’ slogans of the 1950s had been replaced by cries for ‘nuclear-free zones’, and talk of ‘megatonnage’ and ‘fallout’ had given way to talk of ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons and ‘limited strike capability’. Originally published in 1982, this book considers the ethical issues raised by nuclear policies and by the debate between proponents of the multilateralist/unilateralist approaches to disarmament and arms control at the time. It is not, like so many books on the subject, an ideological statement: there are essays by defence strategists which put the case for deterrence and essays by academics and churchmen which strenuously oppose it. The book also includes an essay on attempts to mitigate the appalling brutality of the many ‘conventional’ wars since 1945. At a time when the rhetoric and misinformation produced on both sides of the debate continued to obscure many vital issues, this book was welcome, sensible and necessary.

This 1993 book is the first post-Cold War assessment of nuclear deterrence, -providing a comprehensive normative understanding of nuclear deterrence policy.