Menkiti Gyekye And Beyond

This Special Issue of Filosofia Theoretica is dedicated to Ifeany Menkiti's and Kwame Gyekye's debate on Personhood in Afro-communitarianism (African philosophy). It collects new essays from the most popular philosophers who are engaging in the discourse in the contemporary time. Some of the renowned contributors include: Molefi Kete Asante, Polycarp Ikuenobe, Peter Amato, Bernard Matolino, and Ifeanyi Menkiti himself and a host of others. This collection takes the debate to a new level transcending the perimeters of the old debate. This volume is a must-have and a must-read.

Ifeanyi Menkiti’s articulation of an African conception of personhood—especially in “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought” —has become very influential in African philosophy. Menkiti on Community and Becoming a Person contributes to the debate in African philosophy on personhood by engaging with various aspects of Menkiti’s account of person and community. The contributors examine this account in relation to themes such as individualism, communalism, rights, individual liberty, moral agency, communal ethics, education, state and nation building, elderhood and ancestorhood. Through these themes, this book, edited by Edwin Etieyibo and Polycarp Ikuenobe, shows that Menkiti’s account of personhood in the context of community is both fundamental and foundational to epistemological, metaphysical, logical, ethical, legal, social and political issues in African thought systems.

This book explores the salient ethical idea of personhood in African philosophy. It is a philosophical exposition that pursues the ethical and political consequences of the normative idea of personhood as a robust or even foundational ethical category. Personhood refers to the moral achievements of the moral agent usually captured in terms of a virtuous character, which have consequences for both morality and politics. The aim is not to argue for the plausibility of the ethical and political consequences of the idea of personhood. Rather, the book showcases some of the moral-political content and consequences of the account it presents.

This book articulates an African conception of dignity in light of the salient axiological category of personhood in African cultures. The idea of personhood embodies a moral system for evaluating human lives exuding with virtue or ones that are morally excellent. This book argues that this idea of personhood embodies an under-explored conception of dignity, which accounts for it in terms of our capacity for the virtue of sympathy. It then proceeds to apply this personhood-based conception of dignity to bioethical questions, specifically, those of abortion and euthanasia. Regarding abortion, it concludes that it is impermissible since foetuses possess partial moral status. Regarding euthanasia, it argues that it is permissible for reasons revolving around avoiding the reversing of personhood. It also, though, minimally, touches on the questions regarding the mentally disabled and animals, to which it assigns lower moral status.

This insightful book is the first edited book volume in the literature to concern itself, primarily, with the question of life’s meaning from the, largely under-explored, African perspective. In this collection, the authors have undertaken to answer this question, and other related questions, by showing some of the possible conceptions of life’s meaning that can be derived from traditional African perspectives. African Perspectives to the Question of Life's Meaning will be a key resource for academics, researchers, and advanced students of philosophy, African studies, psychology, and religion. This book was originally published as a special issue of South African Journal of Philosophy.

Recently, the salient idea of personhood in the tradition of African philosophy has been objected to on various grounds. Two such objections stand out the book deals with a lot more. The first criticism is that the idea of personhood is patriarchal insofar as it elevates the status of men and marginalises women in society. The second criticism observes that the idea of personhood is characterised by speciesism. The essence of these concerns is that personhood fails to embody a robust moral-political view. African Personhood and Applied Ethics offers a philosophical explication of the ethics of personhood to give reasons why we should take it seriously as an African moral perspective that can contribute to global moral-political issues. The book points to the two facets that constitute the ethics of personhood an account of (1) moral perfection and (2) dignity. It then draws on the under-explored view of dignity qua the capacity for sympathy inherent in the moral idea of personhood to offer a unified account of selected themes in applied ethics, specifically women, animal and development.

"A disciplinary map for understanding African Catholicism today by engaging some of the most pressing and pertinent issues, topics, and conversations in diverse fields of studies in African Catholicism"--

In Menkiti’s Moral Man, Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe offers an original interpretation of Ifeanyi Menkiti’s conception of person, one that has significant implications for his metaphysics and moral philosophy. Menkiti holds that one is not born a person but becomes a person in a linguistic and cultural community, denies that the mere possession of intrinsic properties makes one a person, and maintains that personhood is defined by the community. This last process consists in the community socially recognizing as person one who has been incorporated into society and has successfully carried out a range of obligations linked to social roles and positions. On the one hand, Oyowe clarifies the role of intrinsic properties in Menkiti's account by arguing that for Menkiti, moral agency and personhood do not coincide. One is a moral agent but not a person in virtue of being rational, free, and endowed with a moral personality. On the other hand, he clarifies the sense in which the community makes one a person by drawing on principles of social ontology to explain how by adopting certain attitudes and practices a community constitutes its members as persons.This interpretation has the potential to illuminate a range of problems raised in response to Menkiti’s conception of person.

This book contends that Africa’s sustainable development must be built on African identity and values. Contributors reflect of the role of values in Africa’s effort to overcome poverty, the focus of SDG 1. The volume reflects on how indigenous values such as Ubuntu constitute a critical resource in addressing poverty. It reiterates the importance of positioning the response to poverty in Africa on the continent’s own, home grown values. Contributors also interrogate how values such as integrity, hard work, tolerance, solidarity, respect and others serve to position Africa strategically to overcome poverty. The volume focuses on how values can help Africa to overcome challenges such as corruption, violence, intolerance, competitive ethnicity, xenophobia, misplaced priorities and others. It provides fresh and critical reflections on the role of values and identity in anchoring Africa’s development in the light of SDG 1.