Leavenworth Papers Number 5 Fighting The Russians In Winter Three Case Studies

This study addresses those aspects of warfare in the vicinity of European Russia. The harsh climate of that region can be an indiscriminate killer, and the successful army must adapt to winter conditions. The obvious special conditions encountered in the northern latitudes are: extreme cold, deep snow, short days, and-in most subarctic locales-dense coniferous forests, spares population (and consequently few ready-made shelters), and poor and widely separated roads. Their military corollaries are also readily apparent: Mobility and logistical support are restricted. Roads and runways can only be kept open by plowing or compacting the snow. Cross-country transport-if possible at all-requires wide-tracked vehicles or sleds; Infantrymen moving through deep snow rapidly become exhausted; Extended marches require skis or at least snowshoes; Without special lubricants firearms and motors may freeze up and become inoperative at subzero temperatures; Human efficiency and survival require adequate shelter. If not available locally, portable shelter must be provided; Frostbite* casualties may exceed battle losses unless troops wear proper cothing, including warm gloves and footgear; and Speedy removal of the wounded from the battlefield to shelter is essential to prevent even minor wounds from resulting in death from exposure.

This paper contains three case studies about winter warfare drawn from twentieth century experience. It provides several valuable perspectives about this well known, but sometimes little understood subject. Our attention is directed to the distinctive aspects of warfare in subarctic climes, the characteristics of this harsh environment and the climatic impact upon a broad range of military operations. These case studies also provide examples of how several armies adapted-or failed to adapt-to the demands of winter warfare. Finally, they demonstrate that even military forces indigenous to subarctic regions, with experienced soldiers, can have difficulty in conducting winter operations.

[Includes 12 maps and 4 tables] In recent years, the U.S. Army has paid increasing attention to the conduct of unconventional warfare. However, the base of historical experience available for study has been largely American and overwhelmingly Western. In Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Dr. Robert F. Baumann makes a significant contribution to the expansion of that base with a well-researched analysis of four important episodes from the Russian-Soviet experience with unconventional wars. Primarily employing Russian sources, including important archival documents only recently declassified and made available to Western scholars, Dr. Baumann provides an insightful look at the Russian conquest of the Caucasian mountaineers (1801-59), the subjugation of Central Asia (1839-81), the reconquest of Central Asia by the Red Army (1918-33), and the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-89). The history of these wars—especially as it relates to the battle tactics, force structure, and strategy employed in them—offers important new perspectives on elements of continuity and change in combat over two centuries. This is the first study to provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the Russian and Soviet unconventional experience on the predominantly Muslim southern periphery of the former empire. There, the Russians encountered fierce resistance by peoples whose cultures and views of war differed sharply from their own. Consequently, this Leavenworth Paper addresses not only issues germane to combat but to a wide spectrum of civic and propaganda operations as well.

This Leavenworth Paper is a critical reconstruction of World War II Ranger operations conducted at or near Djebel el Ank, Tunisia; Porto Empedocle, Sicily; Cisterna, Italy; Zerf, Germany; and Cabanatuan in the Philippines. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account of World War II Ranger operations, for such a study would have to include numerous minor actions that are too poorly documented to be studied to advantage. It is, however, representative for it examines several types of operations conducted against the troops of three enemy nations in a variety of physical and tactical environments. As such, it draws a wide range of lessons useful to combat leaders who may have to conduct such operations or be on guard against them in the future. Many factors determined the outcomes of the operations featured in this Leavenworth Paper, and of these there are four that are important enough to merit special emphasis. These are surprise, the quality of opposing forces, the success of friendly forces with which the Rangers were cooperating, and popular support.

Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.

In the seventy years that have passed since the tank first appeared, antitank combat has presented one of the greatest challenges in land warfare. Dramatic improvements in tank technology and doctrine over the years have precipitated equally innovative developments in the antitank field. One cycle in this ongoing arms race occurred during the early years of World War II when the U.S. Army sought desperately to find an antidote to the vaunted German blitzkrieg. This Leavenworth Paper analyzes the origins of the tank destroyer concept, evaluates the doctrine and equipment with which tank destroyer units fought, and assesses the effectiveness of the tank destroyer in battle.

Detailed reports by German commanders: “Powerful testimony to the Germans’ lack of preparation for the harsh climatic conditions of the Russian winter.” —Military Machines International When their troops invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the initial success convinced the German high command that the Red Army could be destroyed west of the Dnepr River and that there would be no need for conducting operations in cold, snow, and mud. They were wrong. In fact, the German war in Russia was so brutal in its extremes that all past experience paled beside it. Everything in Russia—the land, the climate, the distances, and above all the people—were harder, harsher, more unforgiving, and deadlier than anything the German soldier had ever faced before. One panzer-grenadier who fought in the West and in Russia summed it up: In the West war was the same honorable old game; nobody went out of his way to be vicious, and fighting stopped often by five in the afternoon. But in the East, the Russians were trying to kill you—all the time. The four detailed reports of campaigning in Russia included in this invaluable book (Russian Combat Methods in WWII, Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia, Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps and Warfare in the Far North) were written in the late 1940s and early 1950s as part of the US Army program to record the German strategies and tactics of World War II directly from the commanders. The authors were all veterans of the fighting they described, and frankly admitted that the soldiers sent to Russia were neither trained nor equipped to withstand the full fury of the elements. Fighting in Hell shows what happened on the ground, through firsthand accounts of the commanders who were there.