Law Economics And Conflict

In Law, Economics, and Conflict, Kaushik Basu and Robert C. Hockett bring together international experts to offer new perspectives on how to take analytic tools from the realm of academic research out into the real world to address pressing policy questions. As the essays discuss, political polarization, regional conflicts, climate change, and the dramatic technological breakthroughs of the digital age have all left the standard tools of regulation floundering in the twenty-first century. These failures have, in turn, precipitated significant questions about the fundamentals of law and economics. The contributors address law and economics in diverse settings and situations, including central banking and the use of capital controls, fighting corruption in China, rural credit markets in India, pawnshops in the United States, the limitations of antitrust law, and the role of international monetary regimes. Collectively, the essays in Law, Economics, and Conflict rethink how the insights of law and economics can inform policies that provide individuals with the space and means to work, innovate, and prosper—while guiding states and international organization to regulate in ways that limit conflict, reduce national and global inequality, and ensure fairness. Contributors: Kaushik Basu; Kimberly Bolch; University of Oxford; Marieke Bos, Stockholm School of Economics; Susan Payne Carter, US Military Academy at West Point; Peter Cornelisse, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Gaël Giraud, Georgetown University; Nicole Hassoun, Binghamton University; Robert C. Hockett; Karla Hoff, Columbia University and World Bank; Yair Listokin, Yale Law School; Cheryl Long, Xiamen University and Wang Yanan Institute for Study of Economics (WISE); Luis Felipe López-Calva, UN Development Programme; Célestin Monga, Harvard University; Paige Marta Skiba, Vanderbilt Law School; Anand V. Swamy, Williams College; Erik Thorbecke, Cornell University; James Walsh, University of Oxford. Contributors: Kimberly B. Bolch, Marieke Bos, Susan Payne Carter, Peter A. Cornelisse, Gaël Giraud, Nicole Hassoun, Karla Hoff, Yair Listokin, Cheryl Long, Luis F. López-Calva, Célestin Monga, Paige Marta Skiba, Anand V. Swamy, Erik Thorbecke, James Walsh

In Law, Economics, and Conflict, Kaushik Basu and Robert C. Hockett bring together international experts to offer new perspectives on how to take analytic tools from the realm of academic research out into the real world to address pressing policy questions. As the essays discuss, political polarization, regional conflicts, climate change, and the dramatic technological breakthroughs of the digital age have all left the standard tools of regulation floundering in the twenty-first century. These failures have, in turn, precipitated significant questions about the fundamentals of law and economics. The contributors address law and economics in diverse settings and situations, including central banking and the use of capital controls, fighting corruption in China, rural credit markets in India, pawnshops in the United States, the limitations of antitrust law, and the role of international monetary regimes. Collectively, the essays in Law, Economics, and Conflict rethink how the insights of law and economics can inform policies that provide individuals with the space and means to work, innovate, and prosper—while guiding states and international organization to regulate in ways that limit conflict, reduce national and global inequality, and ensure fairness. Contributors: Kaushik Basu; Kimberly Bolch; University of Oxford; Marieke Bos, Stockholm School of Economics; Susan Payne Carter, US Military Academy at West Point; Peter Cornelisse, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Gaël Giraud, Georgetown University; Nicole Hassoun, Binghamton University; Robert C. Hockett; Karla Hoff, Columbia University and World Bank; Yair Listokin, Yale Law School; Cheryl Long, Xiamen University and Wang Yanan Institute for Study of Economics (WISE); Luis Felipe López-Calva, UN Development Programme; Célestin Monga, Harvard University; Paige Marta Skiba, Vanderbilt Law School; Anand V. Swamy, Williams College; Erik Thorbecke, Cornell University; James Walsh, University of Oxford. Contributors: Kimberly B. Bolch, Marieke Bos, Susan Payne Carter, Peter A. Cornelisse, Gaël Giraud, Nicole Hassoun, Karla Hoff, Yair Listokin, Cheryl Long, Luis F. López-Calva, Célestin Monga, Paige Marta Skiba, Anand V. Swamy, Erik Thorbecke, James Walsh

Provides comprehensive, up-to-date coverage of the key themes and principles of conflict economics.

The Handbook on the Economics of Conflict conveys how economics can contribute to the understanding of conflict in its various dimensions embracing world wars, regional conflicts, terrorism and the role of peacekeeping in conflict prevention. The economics of conflict is a relatively new branch of the discipline of economics. Conflict provides opportunities for applying game theory involving strategic behaviour, interactions and interdependence betweenadversaries. The Handbook demonstrates that conflict and its prevention is costly; it considers new dimensions such as ethnic cleansing, destructive power, terrorism, corruption, the impact of new technology, peacekeeping, the role of economists in defence ministries and the use of privatecontractors in conflict.

Conflict economics contributes to an understanding of violent conflict in two important ways. First, it applies economic analysis to diverse conflict activities such as war, arms races, and terrorism, showing how they can be understood as purposeful choices responsive to underlying incentives. Second, it treats appropriation as a fundamental economic activity, joining production and exchange as a means of wealth acquisition. Drawing on a half-century of scholarship, this book presents a primer on the key themes and principles of conflict economics. Although much work in the field is abstract, the book is made accessible to a broad audience of scholars, students and policymakers by relying on historical data, relatively simple graphs and intuitive narratives. In exploring the interdependence of economics and conflict, the book presents current perspectives of conflict economics in novel ways and offers new insights into economic aspects of violence.

This Handbook brings together contributions from leading scholars who take an economic perspective to study peace and conflict. Some chapters are largely empirical, exploring the correlates and quantifying the costs of conflict. Others are more theoretical, examining the mechanisms that lead to war or are more conducive to peace.

The character of economic life] in a society is dependent upon, among 2 other things, its political-legal-economic institutional setting. Within that institutional structure, the individuals who comprise that society attempt to cooperate with one another to their mutual advantage so as to accommodate their joint utility-maximizing endeavors. In addition, these same individuals call upon certain societal institutions to adjust the con flicting claims of different individuals and groups. In this regard, a society is perceived as both a cooperative venture for mutual advantage where there are an identity of interests and, as well, an arena of conflict where there exists a mutual interdependence of conflicting claims or interests. The manner in which a society structures its political-legal-economic institutions 1) to enhance the scope of its cooperative endeavors and 2) to channel internal political-legal-economic conflicts toward resolution, shapes the character of economic life in that society. In contemplating the structure of its institutions intended to promote cooperation and channel conflict, a society confronts several issues. At the most general level an enduring issue is how a society both perceives and then ideologically transmits (perhaps teaches or rationalizes), inter nally and/or externally, its perceptions of so-called "cooperative en deavors" and "arenas of conflict." There can be no doubt that the resultant structure of a society's institutions will reflect that society's perception as to what cooperation entails and what conflict constitutes.

Volume I Acknowledgements Introduction Erin O'Hara PART I ECONOMIC AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EXISTING APPROACHES A Theoretical Insights 1. William F. Baxter (1963), 'Choice of Law and the Federal System' 2. Larry Kramer (1991), 'On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code' B Empirical Insights 3. Michael E. Solimine (2002), 'The Law and Economics of Conflict of Laws' 4. Patrick J. Borchers (1992), 'The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study' 5. Stuart E. Thiel (2000), 'Choice of Law and the Home-Court Advantage: Evidence' PART II PROPOSALS FOR MORE EFFICIENT CHOICE-OF-LAW SYSTEMS A Alternative Efficiency-based Approaches to Choice of Law 6. Larry Kramer (1990), 'Rethinking Choice of Law' 7. Erin A. O'Hara and Larry E. Ribstein (2000), 'From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law' 8. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), 'Choice of Law: New Foundations' 9. Erin Ann O'Hara (2002), 'Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws' 10. Paul B. Stephan (2002), 'The Political Economy of Choice of Law' 11. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), 'Public Choice and International Regulatory Competition' B Choice of Law for Torts 12. Bruce L. Hay (1992), 'Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System' 13. Michael J. Whincop and Mary Keyes (1999), 'The Market Tort in Private International Law' 14. Michael Whincop and Mary Keyes (1998), 'Economic Analysis of Conflict of Laws in Torts Cases: Discrete and Relational Torts' Name Index Volume II Acknowledgements An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I PART I CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM PROVISIONS A Choice-of-Law Clauses 1. Paul B. Stephan (2000), 'Choice of Law and its Consequences: Constitutions for International Transactions' 2. Michael J. Whincop and Mary E. Keyes (1998), 'Statutes' Domains in Private International Law: An Economic Theory of the Limits of Mandatory Rules' 3. Erin Ann O'Hara (2000), 'Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of Law' 4. Larry E. Ribstein (2003), 'From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law' B Choice-of-Forum Provisions 5. Erin Ann O'Hara (2002), 'The Jurisprudence and Politics of Forum-Selection Clauses' PART II CHOICE OF LAW AND JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITON A Securities Regulation 6. Roberta Romano (1998), 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation' B Bankruptcy Rules and Courts 7. Robert K. Rasmussen (2000), 'Resolving Transnational Insolvencies through Private Ordering' C Law Firm Rules of Ethics 8. Larry E. Ribstein (2001), 'Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and Choice of Law' D Same-Sex Marriage 9. F.H. Buckley and Larry E. Ribstein (2001), 'Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars' E Asset-Protection Trusts 10. Stewart E. Sterk (2000), 'Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?' PART III JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AND CHOICE OF LAW 11. Michael Whincop (1999), 'The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments' Name Index.

This book describes how international law regulates the problems that arise where economic activity meets violent conflict.