Inflation Targeting And The Anchoring Of Inflation Expectations In The Wstern Hemisphere

This is the second chapter of a forthcoming monograph entitled "On Implementing Full-Fledged Inflation-Targeting Regimes: Saying What You Do and Doing What You Say." We begin by discussing the costs of inflation, including their role in generating boom-bust cycles. Following a general discussion of the need for a nominal anchor, we describe a specific type of monetary anchor, the inflation-targeting regime, and its two key intellectual roots-the absence of long-run trade-offs and the time-inconsistency problem. We conclude by providing a brief introduction to the way in which inflation targeting works.

A growing number of countries are anchoring their monetary policy through explicit inflation targeting. This policy has already scored remarkable successes in several countries, establishing central bank credibility, and reining in inflation where it had long been stubbornly high. But implementing inflation targets raises many difficult questions. What prerequisites must an economy and its institutions meet for the strategy to work? What choices should central banks make from the menu of possible variations on the basic approach? This book summarizes the discussions in a seminar at which economists and policymakers from ten countries reviewed their experiences with inflation targeting.

Do euro area inflation expectations remain well-anchored? This paper finds that the protracted period of low (and below-target) inflation in the euro area since 2013 has weakened their anchoring. Testing their sensitivity to inflation and macroeconomic news, this paper expands existing results in two key dimensions. First, by analyzing all available (advanced) inflation releases. Second, the reactions of expectations are investigated at daily, time-varying and intraday frequency regressions to add robustness to our conclusions. Results point to a significant impact of inflation news over recent years that had not been observed before in the euro area.

This paper develops a method for measuring the anchoring of long-run inflation expectations that does not require estimates of long-run inflation expectations. Such estimates exist for only a few developed economies, and even then only a short time series is available. By not requiring estimates of long-term inflation expectations, this method is able to measure the anchoring of inflation expectations in sixty-four different developed and developing countries. In addition, with rolling-window estimations we can measure the anchoring of expectations across time within a country, and thus we can observe how inflation expectations became unanchored in many countries during the 1970s. Then we can observe how, through means like inflation targeting and monetary unification, these expectations were re-anchored during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.

Inflation targeting is implemented in different ways -- most often by adopting point targets, by having tolerance bands around a point target, or by specifying target ranges. Using data for 20 economies, this paper tests whether the various target types affect the anchoring of inflation expectations at shorter horizons differently. It tests two contradictory hypotheses, namely that targets with intervals lead to (i) less anchoring, e.g. because they provide more flexibility to the central bank, or (ii) better anchoring, because they are missed less often, leading to an enhanced credibility. The evidence refutes the first hypothesis, and generally finds that target ranges or (in some cases) tolerance bands outperform the other types. However, the effects partially depend on the economic context and no target type consistently outperforms all others. This suggests that there are some benefits to adopting intervals, but the central bank can anchor inflation expectations also by other means.

Inflation targeting has been adopted in a set of emerging economies, including eight countries in Latin America. The success of this regime may depend critically on the credibility of the target and the expectation that the authorities will take appropriate actions if the target is breached. This paper exploits a database of inflation expectations and attempts to measure whether, for a set of inflation targeters in Latin America, expectations are well anchored. A tighter anchoring of expectations is interpreted as a gain in credibility. Also considered are the effects on the credibility of the regime if the inflation target is breached. The results indicate that while inflation expectations have not been fully anchored over the whole sample period, credibility has risen, but at the same time the cost of breaching the target has grown.

We study the (lack of) anchoring of inflation expectations in New Zealand using a new survey of firms. Managers of these firms display little anchoring of inflation expectations, despite twenty-five years of inflation targeting by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, a fact which we document along a number of dimensions. Managers are unaware of the identities of central bankers as well as central banks' objectives, and are generally poorly informed about recent inflation dynamics. Their forecasts of future inflation reflect high levels of uncertainty and are extremely dispersed as well as volatile at both short and long-run horizons. Similar results can be found in the U.S. using currently available surveys as shown in Binder (2015).