Future World Of Illicit Nuclear Trade

Of the roughly two dozen countries that have pursued or obtained nuclear weapons during the last fifty years, almost all of them depended importantly on foreign supplies. As a short term projection over the next five to ten years, illicit nuclear trade is likely to be conducted by several nations seeking nuclear weapons or wanting to maintain existing nuclear weapons arsenals or capabilities. Additional states in regions of proliferation concern may utilize smuggling methods to acquire advanced, ostensibly civilian, nuclear technology including uranium enrichment and plutonium production and separation capabilities. And despite many recent, particularly United States-led, successes, stopping this trade will remain difficult. Absent mitigating actions, several existing or expected trends are projected to make it easier for smugglers to succeed in acquiring nuclear and nuclear-related goods and technology. Future illicit trade can be stopped through measures taken today as long as the political will is there to foresee and address future threats. A range of countermeasures aimed at mitigating or eliminating these future threats must be employed today to stop them from emerging in the next five to ten years. Preventing the future world of illicit trade is imperative to U.S. and international security and to the creation of a world safer from the spread and use of nuclear weapons.

Every nuclear weapons program for decades has relied extensively on illicit imports of nuclear-related technologies. This book offers the most detailed public account of how states procure what they need to build nuclear weapons, what is currently being done to stop them, and how global efforts to prevent such trade could be strengthened. While illicit nuclear trade can never be stopped completely, effective steps to block illicit purchases of nuclear technology have sometimes succeeded in slowing nuclear weapons programs and increasing their costs, giving diplomacy more chance to work. Hence, this book argues, preventing illicit transfers wherever possible is a key element of an effective global non-proliferation strategy.

Every nuclear weapons program for decades has relied extensively on illicit imports of nuclear-related technologies. This book offers the most detailed public account of how states procure what they need to build nuclear weapons, what is currently being done to stop them, and how global efforts to prevent such trade could be strengthened. While illicit nuclear trade can never be stopped completely, effective steps to block illicit purchases of nuclear technology have sometimes succeeded in slowing nuclear weapons programs and increasing their costs, giving diplomacy more chance to work. Hence, this book argues, preventing illicit transfers wherever possible is a key element of an effective global non-proliferation strategy.

This publication is intended for individuals and organizations that may be called upon to deal with the detection of and response to criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material. It will also be useful for legislators, law enforcement agencies, government officials, technical experts, lawyers, diplomats and users of nuclear technology. In addition, the manual emphasizes the international initiatives for improving the security of nuclear and other radioactive material, and considers a variety of elements that are recognized as being essential for dealing with incidents of criminal or unauthorized acts involving such material.

A groundbreaking investigation of how illicit commerce is changing the world by transforming economies, reshaping politics, and capturing governments.In this fascinating and comprehensive examination of the underside of globalization, Moises Naím illuminates the struggle between traffickers and the hamstrung bureaucracies trying to control them. From illegal migrants to drugs to weapons to laundered money to counterfeit goods, the black market produces enormous profits that are reinvested to create new businesses, enable terrorists, and even to take over governments. Naím reveals the inner workings of these amazingly efficient international organizations and shows why it is so hard — and so necessary to contain them. Riveting and deeply informed, Illicit will change how you see the world around you.

This book addresses ways that governments, international organizations, and other stakeholders can utilize data to uncover illicit trade in materials and equipment that could be used to support chemical, biological, nuclear, and advanced conventional weapons systems. Key concepts of strategic trade are introduced, including examples of strategic goods and their potential uses in weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and weapons systems, the interplay between the Harmonized System and strategic trade control regimes, and the data available for analysis in the field. Innovative, yet practical methodologies to analyze strategic trade cover the use of crime scripts, risk assessment indicators, mirror statistics, market share analysis, and transshipment and re-export analysis. There are also chapters on leading-edge techniques involving machine learning and network analysis that have shown promise in other areas of crime and illicit trade investigations. Each chapter provides step-by-step instructions on applying the technique, numerous case studies and examples, and discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. This volume is designed to provide all types of analysts with practical pathways for understanding, detecting, and disrupting illicit procurement of materials and equipment needed to produce WMDs and advanced weapons.

When we talk about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, armed forces and civilian governments, then controversies and uninvited misperceptions swirl in our minds. If we take in the broad picture, we inevitably conclude that not all is going in the right direction in the country; and that is because the army, politicians and the establishment perceive jihadism as a profitable business. They run this business of killings and torture through their proxies. While we study the militarized mind of Pakistani generals and recognize their resentment towards civilian governments, we find more controversies about the role of armed forces and their relationship with worldwide terrorist organizations. International journalist Musa Khan Jalalzai is ideally positioned to present us with a picture of what is actually afoot and what it means for the future. When we study the militarized mind of Pakistani generals and recognize their resentment towards civilian institutions, we find more controversies about the role of armed forces and their relationship with worldwide terrorist organizations. The Pakistan military controls the financial market, stock exchange, real estate business, banking sector, and smuggling of narcotics. Ethnic representation within the armed forces raises serious concerns. Some experts say this is not a national army but view it as the club of Pashtun and Punjabi generals. The army has failed to develop a true ethnic representation process or motivate Baloch and Sindhis to join the armed forces; but they certainly have gained experience in killing innocent civilians. Then there is the question of the Saudi investment in Pakistan's "Islamic" nuclear bomb. Saudi Arabia's link with Pakistan's nuclear and missile program has long been the source of speculation that Pakistan might either station nuclear forces on Saudi sand or provide a nuclear umbrella to the Wahabi state, in return for oil supply; or that the Saudis would purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan. International journalist Musa Khan Jalalzai is ideally positioned to present us with a picture of what is actually afoot and what it means for the future.

"The Institute of Science and International Security’s new book Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons chronicles the Islamic Republic of Iran’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. The book draws from original Iranian documents seized by Israel’s Mossad in 2018 in a dramatic overnight raid in Tehran. The “Nuclear Archive” allows deep insight into the country’s effort to secretly build nuclear weapons. The book relies on unprecedented access to archive documents, many translated by the Institute into English for the first time. The first part of the book concentrates on Iran’s crash nuclear weapons program in the early 2000s to build five nuclear weapons and an industrial complex to produce many more. By 2003, responding to growing pressure from European powers to freeze its publicly known nuclear programs and fearing a possible U.S. military attack, Iran’s leaders decided to downsize, but not stop, their secret nuclear weapons effort. The second part of the book discusses Iran’s nuclear path post-2003, revealing a careful plan to continue nuclear weapons work, overcome bottlenecks and better camouflage nuclear weapons development activities. Since 2003, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear scientists and weaponeers have concentrated on establishing capabilities to make weapon-grade uranium and developing more reliable, longer-range ballistic missiles."--Publisher description.