Federal Efforts To Address The Threat Of Bioterrorism

The federal government¿s efforts to address the perceived threat of bioterrorism span many different agencies and are organized and directed through several strategy and planning documents. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat. Despite these efforts, many experts, including congressional commissions, non-governmental org., and industry rep., have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government¿s biodefense activities. Contents of this report: (1) Introduction; (2) Strategic Planning; (3) Risk Assessment; (4) Biosurveillance; (5) Medical Countermeasures: R&D; Procurement; (6) Conclusion.

The federal government's efforts to address the perceived threat of bioterrorism span many different agencies and are organized and directed through several strategy and planning documents. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat. Despite these efforts, many experts, including congressional commissions, non-governmental organizations, and industry representatives, have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government's biodefense activities. Key questions face congressional policymakers in these areas: Are the efforts already underway sufficient to face the threat of bioterrorism? Have the federal investments to date met the expectations of Congress or other stakeholders? Should these existing programs be altered, augmented, or terminated in the current environment of fiscal challenge? What is the appropriate federal role in response to the threat of bioterrorism, and what mechanisms are most appropriate for involving other stakeholders, including state and local jurisdictions, industry, and others? Congressional policymakers will likely be faced with many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs versus creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting such programs may incur additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges while maintaining or shrinking such programs may be deemed as incurring unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack.

This report focuses on four areas under congressional consideration deemed critical to the success of the biodefense enterprise: strategic planning; risk assessment; surveillance; and the development, procurement, and distribution of medical countermeasures. This report also discusses the effectiveness and sufficiency of programs implementing these aspects of the federal biodefense efforts, outside analysts' suggestions for improving the government's efforts, and current issues under congressional consideration.

Although the probability of a domestic bioterrorist attack has been considered to be low, some characteristics of biological agents may make them appealing to terrorist. The information for the production of agents is readily available on the Internet, and the agents are relatively easy to grow and conceal. According to intelligence agencies, the possibility that terrorists may use chemical or biological materials may increase over the next decade.- Results in Brief, BIOTERRORISM: The National Preparedness & ActivitiesDespite federal efforts, significant concerns exist regarding preparedness at the state and local levels. As a result, the Federal Government is involved in a range of research activities related to the public health and medical consequences of a bioterrorist attack on the civilian population.BIOTERRORISM: THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS & ACTIVITIES is part of studies being done to enable the rapid identification of biological agents in a variety of settings: to develop new vaccines, antibodies, and to improve treatment for infectious diseases caused by biological agents, including developing and testing emergency response equipment.The GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) is an agency that works for Congress and the American people. Congress asks GAO to study the programs and expenditures of the Federal Government. The GAO, commonly called the investigative arm of Congress or the congressional watchdog, is independent and non-partisan. For information on the GAO and its activities, please visit: http: //www.gao.gov/index.html

Papers include: bioterrorism: how prepared are we?; the emerging threat of bioterrorism; Congressional efforts to address bioterrorism; finding the right balance against bioterrorism: historical trends related to bioterrorism; the threat of biological attack; nuclear blindness: an overview of the biological weapons programs of the Former Soviet Union & Iraq; Aum Shinriukyo: once & future threat?; the prospect of domestic bioterrorism; potential biological weapons threats; epidemiology of bioterrorism; vaccines in civilian defense against bioterrorism; & vaccines, pharmaceutical products, & bioterrorism: challenges for the U.S. Food & Drug Administration.

The attacks of September 11 and the release of anthrax spores revealed enormous vulnerabilities in the U.S. public-health infrastructure and suggested similar vulnerabilities in the agricultural infrastructure as well. The traditional public health response-surveillance (intelligence), prevention, detection, response, recovery, and attribution-is the paradigm for the national response not only to all forms of terrorism but also to emerging infectious diseases. Thus, investments in research on bioterrorism will have enormous potential for application in the detection, prevention, and treatment of emerging infectious diseases that also are unpredictable and against which we must be prepared. The deciphering of the human genome sequence and the complete elucidation of numerous pathogen genomes, our rapidly increasing understanding of the molecular mechanisms of pathogenesis and of immune responses, and new strategies for designing drugs and vaccines all offer unprecedented opportunities to use science to counter bioterrorist threats. But these same developments also allow science to be misused to create new agents of mass destruction. Hence the effort to confront bioterrorism must be a global one. Countering Bioterrorism makes the following recommendations: Recommendation 1: All agencies with responsibility for homeland security should work together to establish stronger and more meaningful working ties between the intelligence, S&T, and public health communities. Recommendation 2: Federal agencies should work cooperatively and in collaboration with industry to develop and evaluate rapid, sensitive, and specific early-detection technologies. Recommendation 3: Create a global network for detection and surveillance, making use of computerized methods for real-time reporting and analysis to rapidly detect new patterns of disease locally, nationally, and ultimately- internationally. The use of high-throughput methodologies that are being increasingly utilized in modern biological research should be an important component of this expanded and highly automated surveillance strategy. Recommendation 4: Use knowledge of complex biological patterns and high-throughput laboratory automation to classify and diagnose infections in patients in primary care settings. Recommendation 5: USDA should create an agency for control and prevention of plant disease. This agency should have the capabilities necessary to deal effectively with biothreats.