Executive Power In Theory And Practice

Since September 11, 2001, long-standing debates over the nature and proper extent of executive power have assumed a fresh urgency. In this book eleven leading scholars of American politics and political theory address the idea of executive power.

This monograph offers a theoretical foundation of the executive branch in Western democracies and argues that the tension between dominance and submission is maintained by the adoption of various forms of fuzziness, under which a guise of legality masks the absence of the substantive limitation of power.

Why have the early years of the 21st century seen increasing use of emergency-type powers or claims of supra-legal executive authority, particularly by the Western countries regarded as the world's leading democracies, notably the United States? This book examines the extraordinary range of executive and prerogative powers, emergency legislation, martial law provisos and indemnities in countries with English-derived legal systems, primarily the UK, the US and Australia. The author challenges attempts by legal and academic theorists to relativise, rationalise, legitimise or propose supposedly safe limits for the use of emergency powers, especially since the September 2001 terrorist attacks. This volume also considers why the reputation of Carl Schmitt, the best-known champion of 'exceptional' dictatorial powers during the post-1919 Weimer Republic in Germany, and who later enthusiastically served and sanctified the Nazi dictatorship, is being rehabilitated, and examines why his totalitarian doctrines are thought to be of relevance to modern society. This diverse book will be of importance to politicians, the media, the legal profession, as well as academics and students of law, humanities and politics.

This book is the first to undertake a detailed historical and legal examination of presidential power and the theory of the unitary executive. This theory--that the Constitution gives the president the power to remove and control all policy-making subordinates in the executive branch--has been the subject of heated debate since the Reagan years. To determine whether the Constitution creates a strongly unitary executive, Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo look at the actual practice of all forty-three presidential administrations, from George Washington to George W. Bush. They argue that all presidents have been committed proponents of the theory of the unitary executive, and they explore the meaning and implications of this finding.

Presidential power is perhaps one of the most central issues in the study of the American presidency. Since Richard E. Neustadt's classic study, first published in 1960, there has not been a book that thoroughly examines the issue of presidential power. Presidential Power: Theories and Dilemmas by noted scholar John P. Burke provides an updated and comprehensive look at the issues, constraints, and exercise of presidential power. This book considers the enduring question of how presidents can effectively exercise power within our system of shared powers by examining major tools and theories of presidential power, including Neustadt's theory of persuasion and bargaining as power, constitutional and inherent powers, Samuel Kernell's theory of going public, models of historical time, and the notion of internal time. Using illustrative examples from historical and contemporary presidencies, Burke helps students and scholars better understand how presidents can manage the public's expectations, navigate presidential-congressional relations, and exercise influence in order to achieve their policy goals.

The idea that the government of the United States is composed of three elements, legislative, executive, and judicial is introduced to the school child at an early age. These three functions he is told form a perfect equilateral triangle. In actuality, however, one may conclude today without too much difficulty that strict observance of the doctrine of separation of powers is mythical, and that in some cases, separation of powers is virtually non-existent. Why then, this thesis; to trace an outworn concept?-- hardly. For to begin with, the concept is by no means outworn. We have come a long way from Montesquieu and a long way from 1787, but while the doctrine has undergone repeated qualifications it remains a potent force. Witness the fact that it was only a decade ago that the Supreme Court declared the NRA unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers. Today, this nation is in the throes of the greatest war in history and it is only natural that in these days of total war the administrative branch will tend to expand as never before. But the war will not last forever, and the question of the constitutional distribution of power will regain its importance in the return to normalcy.

“I have an Article II,” Donald Trump has announced, citing the US Constitution, “where I have the right to do whatever I want as president.” Though this statement would have come as a shock to the framers of the Constitution, it fairly sums up the essence of “the unitary executive theory.” This theory, which emerged during the Reagan administration and gathered strength with every subsequent presidency, counters the system of checks and balances that constrains a president’s executive impulses. It also, the authors of this book contend, counters the letter and spirit of the Constitution. In their account of the rise of unitary executive theory over the last several decades, the authors refute the notion that this overweening view of executive power has been a common feature of the presidency from the beginning of the Republic. Rather, they show, it was invented under the Reagan Administration, got a boost during the George W. Bush administration, and has found its logical extension in the Trump administration. This critique of the unitary executive theory reveals it as a misguided model for understanding presidential powers. While its adherents argue that greater presidential power makes government more efficient, the results have shown otherwise. Dismantling the myth that presidents enjoy unchecked plenary powers, the authors advocate for principles of separation of powers—of checks and balances—that honor the Constitution and support the republican government its framers envisioned. A much-needed primer on presidential power, from the nation’s founding through Donald Trump’s impeachment, The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government makes a robust and persuasive case for a return to our constitutional limits.

CasebookPlus Hardbound - New, hardbound print book includes lifetime digital access to an eBook, with the ability to highlight and take notes, and 12-month access to a digital Learning Library that includes self-assessment quizzes tied to this book, leading study aids, an outline starter, and Gilbert Law Dictionary.

The George W. Bush administration’s ambitious—even breathtaking—claims of unilateral executive authority raised deep concerns among constitutional scholars, civil libertarians, and ordinary citizens alike. But Bush’s attempts to assert his power are only the culmination of a near-thirty-year assault on the basic checks and balances of the U.S. government—a battle waged by presidents of both parties, and one that, as Peter M. Shane warns in Madison’s Nightmare, threatens to utterly subvert the founders’ vision of representative government. Tracing this tendency back to the first Reagan administration, Shane shows how this era of "aggressive presidentialism" has seen presidents exerting ever more control over nearly every arena of policy, from military affairs and national security to domestic programs. Driven by political ambition and a growing culture of entitlement in the executive branch—and abetted by a complaisant Congress, riven by partisanship—this presidential aggrandizement has too often undermined wise policy making and led to shallow, ideological, and sometimes outright lawless decisions. The solution, Shane argues, will require a multipronged program of reform, including both specific changes in government practice and broader institutional changes aimed at supporting a renewed culture of government accountability. From the war on science to the mismanaged war on terror, Madison’s Nightmare outlines the disastrous consequences of the unchecked executive—and issues a stern wake-up call to all who care about the fate of our long democratic experiment.

This book provides a detailed historical and legal examination of presidential power and the theory of the unitary executive.