Creating A Safer Financial System

The U.S., the U.K., and more recently, the E.U., have proposed policy measures directly targeting complexity and business structures of banks. Unlike other, price-based reforms (e.g., Basel 3 and G-SIFI surcharges), these proposals have been developed unilaterally with material differences in scope, design and implementation schedules. This may exacerbate cross-border regulatory arbitrage and put a further burden on consolidated supervision and cross-border resolution. This paper provides an analysis of the potential implications of implementing different structural policy measures. It proposes a pragmatic and coordinated approach to development of these policies to reduce risk of regulatory arbitrage and minimize unintended consequences. In doing so, it also aims to identify a set of common policy measures that countries could adopt to re-scope bank business models and corporate structures.

This paper explores the private- and public-sector responses to the crisis and some of the probable outcomes. Aside from improved supervision of individual institutions, greater emphasis needs to be put on financial regulations that reflect the systemic nature of financial risks and the role that macroeconomic policies play. Global consistency of regulation and financial sector taxation will be essential to mitigate systemic risks, avoid unintended distortions, and help ensure a level playing field. This note suggests the key aspects of the future contours will likely be: ? Banks are expected to return to their more traditional function as stricter regulation will limit the risks and activities they can undertake. ? The nonbanking sector will likely have a greater competitive advantage—both in supplying credit and providing investors with nonbank services—and will thus grow. ? The perimeter of regulation will need to expand to take into account risks in the nonbank sector. ? Market infrastructure will be reinforced to protect investors and will need to provide simplicity and transparency to make risks clearer and the financial system safer. ? The global financial system is likely to be smaller and less levered than in the recent past, and could well be less innovative and dynamic, at least for a while.

Alexander Hamilton was the first U.S. Treasury Secretary from 1789 to 1795. When he started, the Federal Government was in default. During his tenure, U.S. Treasuries became the ultimate safe asset. He successfully managed expectations, achieved debt service reduction, and stabilized financial panics. He delivered sound public finances and financial stability. In the end, the U.S. possessed a modern financial system able to finance innovation and growth. At a time when Europe is working its way out of the sovereign debt crisis and implementing Banking Union and Financial Union, it is worthwhile to search for lessons from early U.S. history.

This paper assesses proposals to redefine the scope of activities of systemically important financial institutions. Alongside reform of prudential regulation and oversight, these have been offered as solutions to the too-important-to-fail problem. It is argued that while the more radical of these proposals such as narrow utility banking do not adequately address key policy objectives, two concrete policy measures - the Volcker Rule in the United States and retail ring-fencing in the United Kingdom - are more promising while still entailing significant implementation challenges. A risk factor common to all the measures is the potential for activities identified as too risky for retail banks to migrate to the unregulated parts of the financial system. Since this could lead to accumulation of systemic risk if left unchecked, it appears unlikely that any structural engineering will lessen the policing burden on prudential authorities and on the banks.

This Financial System Stability Assessment paper discusses that Canada has enjoyed favorable macroeconomic outcomes over the past decades, and its vibrant financial system continues to grow robustly. However, macrofinancial vulnerabilities—notably, elevated household debt and housing market imbalances—remain substantial, posing financial stability concerns. Various parts of the financial system are directly exposed to the housing market and/or linked through housing finance. The financial system would be able to manage severe macrofinancial shocks. Major deposit-taking institutions would remain resilient, but mortgage insurers would need additional capital in a severe adverse scenario. Housing finance is broadly resilient, notwithstanding some weaknesses in the small non-prime mortgage lending segment. Although banks’ overall capital buffers are adequate, additional required capital for mortgage exposures, along with measures to increase risk-based differentiation in mortgage pricing, would be desirable. This would help ensure adequate through-the cycle buffers, improve mortgage risk-pricing, and limit procyclical effects induced by housing market corrections.

The April 2012 Global Financial Stability Report assesses changes in risks to financial stability over the past six months, focusing on sovereign vulnerabilities, risks stemming from private sector deleveraging, and assessing the continued resilience of emerging markets. The report probes the implications of recent reforms in the financial system for market perception of safe assets, and investigates the growing public and private costs of increased longevity risk from aging populations.

The choices we make in advance of the next financial crisis will have a major impact in determining the magnitude of the economic damage. Our vulnerability to crisis depends on the strength of the protections we build into the financial system through prudential regulation, as well as on the degrees of freedom we create for ourselves to respond to the unanticipated, and the knowledge and experience we bring in managing crises. Is the financial system safer today? With the reforms now in place and with the memory of the crisis still fresh, how confident should we feel about the resilience of the financial system and our ability to protect the US economy from a major financial crisis? Warburg Pincus President and former US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner attempts to answer these questions in his October 2016 Per Jacobsson Lecture.

This volume focuses on constructing a safer and more efficient financial system based on the lessons learned from the financial debacles of the 1980s. The first essay discusses the economic and political forces both propelling and opposing widespread banking reform. The next two essays describe the intellectual history of the deposit insurance reform provisions of FDICIA, arguably the most important banking legislation since the Banking Act of 1933, discuss the weaknesses and strengths of these provisions and make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the reforms. Theoretical and empirical evidence is then summarized and evaluated with respect to the costs and benefits of regulators granting forbearance to economically insolvent institutions. An analysis is given of the whys and hows of privatizing federal deposit insurance in case the reforms in FDICIA prove ineffective. An examination follows of the causes and consequences of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) debacle of the early 1990s and the implications for the supervision of foreign banks in the United States and elsewhere. Next the broader issue is discussed of whether U.S. financial markets affect the behavior of U.S. corporate managers, particularly whether they encourage managerial myopia. Without concluding whether such myopia exists, policy options are examined that would make financial markets more conducive to longer-term planning, including permitting banks to invest in corporate equity and thus monitor firms as owners as well as creditors.

Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.

We identify current challenges for creating stable, yet efficient financial systems using lessons from recent and past crises. Reforms need to start from three tenets: adopting a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with societies’ goals; and acknowledging that risks of crises will always remain, in part due to (unknown) unknowns – be they tipping points, fault lines, or spillovers. Corresponding to these three tenets, specific areas for further reforms are identified. Policy makers need to resist, however, fine-tuning regulations: a “do not harm” approach is often preferable. And as risks will remain, crisis management needs to be made an integral part of system design, not relegated to improvisation after the fact.