Corporate Power And Regulation

One of America's most distinguished economists, Neil H. Jacoby has served as a public member of the Phase II pay board, an economic adviser to President Eisenhower, founding dean of UCLA's Graduate School of Management, and a consultant to numerous government agencies and private corporations. In "Corporate Power And Social Responsibility" he gives a thorough, objective "social assessment" of the American corporation. He identifies trends which point to a changing corporate role at home and abroad and he offers creative reforms of corporate and public policy which will promote a more "just, efficient, creative and democratic society." Jacoby finds no evidence to support New Left charges that the U.S. has become a "corporate state." In fact, he says, corporate political power is waning, conglomeration is tapering off, the corporate share of the nation's wealth is holding steady at 28%. Competition, says Jacoby, is on the increase. Where price and quality of materials and manufacturing were once the only factors, mushrooming technology, new business practices and new markets have created new competitive pressures. An increasing variety of product features, services, warranties, credit terms and trade-in allowances have multiplied consumer choices. As a smaller and smaller proportion of personal income is spent on necessities, competition between different kinds of products has become more important (should discretionary income go for a sail boat or a trip to Europe?). In many industries, increasing competition from foreign manufacturers is a factor. Rapid changes in business practices and technology have even made potential competition from entering firms and new products animportant consideration. Still, Jacoby sees much need for improvement. He proposes measures to increase the political power of the consumer, upgrade the performance of boards of directors, expand the involvement of stockholders in company decision-making, encourage environmental responsibility, and make defense companies function efficiently. For the future, Jacoby predicts the continued decline of corporate power as government regulation expands and new, competing interest blocs spring up. At the same time corporations will become more responsive to changing social values and priorities. The rapid growth of multinational firms, he believes, will increase the stability of the world order and promote the growth of regional and world-wide political organization.

This is a reprint of a previosly published work. It deals with the constraints on corporate decison making.

​“A novel, insightful and provocative foray into the abilities, capacities and limits of corporate power on the one hand and public power and capacities on the other hand. Eckert offers new and refine insights on core issues in the theories of public and private interest regulation.”—David Levi Faur, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel “This impressive book breaks important ground in the regulatory governance literature by bringing in a fresh corporate perspective. Based on a set of fascinating case studies of European regulation, Eckert compellingly unpacks key facets of corporate power. A must-read for regulation scholars who often neglect the targets of regulation!”—Burkard Eberlein, York University, Canada “This book offers systematic and empirically fascinating insights into the regulatory power of corporations which unfolds outside the traditional political arenas. Its policy effects have important implications for the target groups of regulation, the general public, and the democratic political process as such. The conceptualization and use of rich empirical sources make for a compelling read.”—Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute, Italy This book takes a fresh look at corporate power in the regulatory process. It examines how corporations seek to prevent, shape, make or revoke regulation. The central argument is that in doing so, corporations utilise distinct power resources as experts, innovators and operators. By re-emphasising the proactive role of business, the book complements our acquired knowledge of policymakers’ capacity to put pressure on, or delegate power to private actors. Empirically, the book covers European consumer and environmental policies, and conducts case studies on the chemical, paper, home appliance, ICT and electricity industries. A separate chapter is dedicated to the assumption that Brexit will lead to an unprecedented result of EU regulation being lifted, and how this could put corporate power in regulation at risk. This book provides a new perspective on the policy implications of corporate power to scholars, students and practitioners alike.

In an era of systemic crisis and of global critiques of the unsustainable perpetuation of capitalism, Pervasive Powers: The Politics of Corporate Authority critically questions the conditions for the maintenance and expansion of corporate power. The book explores empirical case studies in the realms of finance, urban policies, automobile safety, environmental risk, agriculture, and food in western democracies. It renews understanding of the power of big business, focusing on how the study of temporalities, of multi-sited influence and of sociotechnical tools is crucial to an analysis of the evolution of corporate authority. Drawing on different literatures, ranging from research on business associations and global governance to that on the social production of ignorance or on corporate crime, this book aims at contributing to existing works on the capacity of corporations to rule the world. Unlike approaches focused on economic elites and on the political activities of firms, it goes beyond analysis of the power of corporations to influence policy-making to depict their unprecedented capacity to transform and shape the social world. Operating in numerous social spaces and mobilizing a wide range of strategies, corporate organizations have acquired the pervasive power to act far beyond mere spaces of regulation and government. Based on contributions from historians, science and technology studies scholars, sociologists and political scientists, this book will be of great interest to researchers, academics and students who wish to understand how corporations exert a pervasive influence on public policies, and to NGOs and regulatory agencies.

Deep and detailed research into the workings of corporate enables Professor Herman to throw considerable light on how the board of directors operates, how important outside directors are, how new members are selected, and how multiple directorships interlock the large corporations. Throughout the book the author contrasts the power of the managers with that of other interest groups - bankers, family - and he concludes that power lies with the managers. But this has not changed the basic objectives of the corporation - the pursuit of growth and profits - nor has it enhanced social responsibility. After thorough investigation Edward Herman concludes that government regulation has done surprisingly little to reduce the autonomy of the corporation. Just as the influence of bankers and investors has been resisted, so has the effect of regulation. Improved communications and controls, geographic dispersion, and the enhanced adaptability and mobility of the large corporation have all played a part in maintaining corporate power and managerial control. Corporate Control, Corporate Power will be essential reading for executives, policy makers, regulators, and all those concerned to make the corporation more responsible and accountable.

Managers vs. Owners: The Struggle for Corporate Control in American Democracy deals with a subject of profound importance: understanding the place of the modern corporation in a democratic society. This latest volume in the acclaimed Ruffin Series in Business Ethics describes how the balance between corporate power and government regulation has changed with the interests of society as a whole. The first section examines the debates over the rules that individuals or organized groups would agree to follow in their interactions to accrue social advantages. The second section looks at management's point of view and tells how law promotes the need for managerial collective action and provides a vocabulary for articulating management as a profession. The authors conclude by looking at the impact of collective investor action - especially institutional investors - on the efforts by managers to preserve their autonomy. This examination of the inherent conflicts between the interests of corporate owners, the interests of the larger society, and the interests of managers who run corporations will be essential reading for students, scholars, and professionals concerned with the place of the large corporation in a democratic society.

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

This treatise argues that it should be the function of company law to promote the public interest. It examines a number of topical issues and the protection of interests largely ignored by company law, such as those of employees and the local community.

This volume of selections from the Journal of Economic Issues carries the institutional economics analysis of the acquisition and use of economic power into new and critically significant subject areas: law and economics, the public control of economic power, and international implications of public and private use of power to influence the flow of real income on a global scale. Its particular interest is the possession and use of corporate power, especially in relation to the state as a representative of society.

Why are crimes of the suite punished more leniently than crimes of the street? When police killings of citizens go unpunished, political torture is sanctioned by the state, and the financial frauds of Wall Street traders remain unprosecuted, nothing succeeds with such regularity as the active failures of national states to obstruct the crimes of the powerful. Written from the perspective of global sustainability and as an unflinching and unforgiving exposé of the full range of the crimes of the powerful, Unchecked Corporate Power reveals how legalized authorities and political institutions charged with the duty of protecting citizens from law-breaking and injurious activities have increasingly become enablers and colluders with the very enterprises they are obliged to regulate. Here, Gregg Barak explains why the United States and other countries are duplicitous in their harsh reactions to street crimes in comparison to the significantly more harmful and far-reaching crimes of the powerful, and why the crimes of the powerful are treated as beyond incrimination. What happens to nations that surrender ever-growing economic and political power to the globally super rich and the mammoth multinational corporations they control? And what can people from around the world do to resist the criminality and victimization perpetrated by multinationals, and generated by the prevailing global political economy? Barak examines an array of multinational crimes—corporate, environmental, financial, and state—and their state-legal responses, and outlines policies and strategies for revolutionizing these contradictory relations of capital reproduction, criminality, and unsustainability.