Constitutional Environments And Economic Growth

In this provocative work, Gerald Scully develops and empirically tests a theory about how a nation's constitutional setting affects its economic growth. Modern growth theory links the rise in the standard of living to capital formation, both physical and human, and to technological progress, and development economists continue to believe that the transformation of the less developed world cannot occur without massive government control of the economy. Scully, on the other hand, maintains that material advancement is as much affected by the choice of the economic, legal, and political institutions under which people live and work as it is by resource endowment and technological progress. Nothing in the neoclassical theory of growth considers the "rules of the game" under which capital is accumulated and innovation is made. Redressing this neglect, Scully proposes ways of measuring the economic, civil, and political freedom within a society's institutional framework, and he reveals that freedom, or the lack thereof, powerfully and demonstrably influences not only economic progress but also income distribution. Politically open societies grow at nearly three times the rate of those where freedom is more circumscribed, and they also have a more equitable distribution of income. Finally, Scully measures the effect of the size of the state on economic progress, showing that the larger the amount of government expenditures out of gross domestic product, the lower the rate of economic progress. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

This text takes issue with the notion that economic well-being of people derives only from quantitatively expanding commercial business activity. It argues that economic qualities flow from the natural and social environment, and that they are public, not private, in character.

The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.

Despite expectations that the celebrated second wave of constitutional democracy in the 1990s would facilitate economic development, Africa remains the continent with the highest level of poverty in the world. The fight against poverty hinges on a vibrant economy that creates jobs and income by generating enough revenue to enable the state to take pro-development measures. However, instead of the economic benefits that were supposed to accrue from the constitutional reforms of the last three decades (including entrenching a market economy), African economies remain weak, a situation that has been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic. By focusing on the relationship between constitutionalism and economic growth in Africa, this volume addresses five questions: (1) In the constitutional reforms of the 1990s and thereafter, did constitutions also reflect the shift towards a market economy, and if so, in what manner? (2) Given that agriculture and extractive industries are the main sources of state revenue in many African economies, how are matters of land and other natural resources dealt with constitutionally? (3) Where the market economy is captured in a constitution, what is the state's relationship to that economy: interventionist or laissez-faire, or somewhere in between? Have constitutions also established a 'social' state that provides its citizens with the basic elements of a dignified life? (4) In the process of constitution-making and implementation concerning the economy, what impact has globalization had on constitutionalism and economic growth in Africa? (5) Finally, how has the relationship between constitutionalism and economic growth played out in practice? Is there a symbiotic relationship? Has constitutionalism led (or may do so) to greater economic prosperity? Constitutionalism and the Economy in Africa offers a range of comprehensive arguments and case studies that will be of interest and use to academics, post-graduate students, judges, lawyers, economists, and policy makers involved in the economic role of the State, the impact of globalization, and the constitutional foundations for land and natural resources exploitation.

Suggests how theories and techniques widely used in business and industry can be applied to schools as a group complementing each other. For administrators, reformers, teachers, parents, and anyone else interested in education. Explains the theory behind each of the five technologies, then describes tools for its implementation. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Built on the theories about talent competition between rent-seeking and entrepreneurship, and the theories about constitutional environment and rent-seeking, this dissertation explores empirically the effects of a country's constitutional settings on entrepreneurship, in terms of the quantity of entrepreneurs and the quality of their performance. Both the de facto and de jure constitutional environments are studied. In particular, with respect to the de facto constitutional environment, I considered the property rights protection, decentralization, and the factors suggested by the "selectorate theory". In relation to the de jure constitutional environment, I focused on six aspects including electoral rules, form of government, federalism, property rights protection, judicial independence and antidiscrimination provisions. Three indexes were constructed to measure the de jure property rights protection, judicial independence and antidiscrimination provisions, using the data set provided by the Comparative Constitution Project. The empirical study first shows that the quantity of entrepreneurs is inversely correlated with the quality of entrepreneurship in a country. If entrepreneurship does serve as the engine of economic growth, it is perhaps the quality, rather than quantity, that matters. This study then demonstrates that the de facto property rights protection is associated negatively with the quantity of entrepreneurs, but positively with the quality of entrepreneurship. The effects of the two key factors of the selectorate theory, the size of the winning coalition and the ratio of this size to the size of the selectorate, also appear to be compatible with what the theory is to predict. On the other hand, neither fiscal nor political decentralization is found to significantly affect entrepreneurship. Among the de jure constitutional features, two have significant influence on entrepreneurship. First, the constitutional design of judicial independence has a negative effect on the quantity of entrepreneurs, but a positive one on the quality of their performance. Second, majoritarian electoral rules, compared with non-majoritarian rules, have a negative effect on the quality of entrepreneurship. In contrast, the presumed effects of the other three formal constitutional attributes, federalism, presidentialism and property rights protection, cannot be ascertained. Apart from the cross-country study, I also conducted a detailed research on China. Entrepreneurship in China is a case of entrepreneurial development in an authoritarian state lack of secure property rights and the rule of law, hence afflicted with profuse rent-seeking activities. Under these circumstances, entrepreneurship hinges on both the rent-seeking and the entrepreneurial abilities. Drawing on the private enterprise surveys, I found that, in China, the politically connected were systematically advantaged in terms of bank finance, entry to regulated industries and judicial treatment, when they plunged into the business world. The Chinese case also indicates that, when entrepreneurs cannot trust the commitment made by the state in the constitution, they will be eager to scoop profits as soon as possible and exit swiftly with accumulated wealth. Finally, this dissertation concludes by suggesting that a healthy development of entrepreneurship should be sustainable rather than aiming merely at quick money and instant success. It should allow all talented people to reach their full potentials, rather than keep the politically disconnected away from resources needed to make the best use of their potentials. Above all, it wants a constitutional environment with reliable property rights and equal access to opportunities, neither of which is seen in today's China.

Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This book makes the case for an approach to constitutional political economy that is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis. Effective institutional design is simply not feasible unless the designers build their structures to withstand rational choice pressures from the political market place. If mean, sensual man is here to stay, then let us, in our better moments, incorporate that knowledge into the institutions that must govern his behavior. A distinguished list of public choice scholars pursue this approach against a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies and the third world.

John Gray is now established as one of the UK's leading political thinkers. For over a decade he has been asssociated with the ideas and think-tanks of the New Right. In this book he presents both a criticism of the ideological excesses of New Right ideology and a radical critique of the New Right itself, developed from the standpoint of traditional conservatism. All the major thinkers and themes of the New Right are examined, together with many major issues of current public policy - such as the growth of the underclass, the future of the welfare state and the role of government in education and culture. The author also argues that there are deep affinities between conservative ideology and Green thought. He advances radical proposals for the preservation and renewal of common life for an age in which the ideals of modernism, including continuous economic growth, are decreasingly viable. He expresses his conviction that conservative philosophy will find its future in dissociating itelf from the neo-liberalism that has lately dominated policy, and returning to the task of redefining traditional values.

"Land tenure is a sensitive issue in Africa and a central theme in the demand for political and economic reform in the region. While traditional development strategies aim for maximum economic growth, new approaches emphasize conservation. The governing of land use is also central to the overall scheme of national governance - the constitution. This book examines the relationship between land ownership and the conservation of natural resources, using the case of Kenya. It proposes specific measures for achieving a balance between private ownership and public interest, and between conservation and economic growth"--Publisher's description.