Civil Military Relations In Ukraine During The Transition From The Soviet Union To The Independent Ukrainian Republic

This thesis analyzes three case studies that chronologically review the main factors that influence the creation of the system of civil control over the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The first case analyzes the period of time before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second case examines the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from 1991 until 2000. The third case reviews the present system of civil-military relations in Ukraine, The conclusion summarize all findings of the three case studies and states that neglect of the defense issues today will lead to the risk of losing statehood tomorrow or shifting responsibility and financial burden to the future generations, Only a well funded and well-defined program of reform can help to build modern, highly capable, professional western type Armed Forces with good quality civil control over the military, Ukraine has great experience of building and reforming its military structure and system of civil control, The best proof of this is that Ukraine prevented involvement of the army in politics.

This thesis analyses the strategy of modern Ukrainian - U.S. defense and military relations in three areas: Defense Relations; Military Relations; and Civil-Military Relations. These relations are assessed in terms of their adequacy to obtain Ukraine's overall strategic goals. The quantity and complexity of the U.S. defense and military engagement programs towards Ukraine have made the entire coordination process fragmented. The thesis concludes that the recent goals and objectives of existing relations should be concentrated on the Ukrainian Armed Forces transition to democratic civil-military relations. The transformation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is essential to maintaining progress toward the development of stable and democratic civil-military relations in Ukraine and its armed forces that are prepared to assume their place within European and Transatlantic Security.

From the earliest times of its post-Soviet independence, Ukraine has been open to security cooperation with the United States. In the beginning, there were significant differences in political, security and even bureaucratic cultures between the two countries, which formed some obstacles to building bridges quickly. Many of these obstacles remain, especially in the political dimension of relations between the two countries. But in the absence of their former ideological differences and united by common interests in preserving international peace and fighting terrorism, Ukraine and the United States have established constructive and mutually beneficial military cooperation. The United States has been interested in engaging post-Soviet Ukraine in security cooperation and clearly articulated what it wanted to achieve from this cooperation. It was in U.S. interests to have a strong, independent, stable, and democratic Ukraine as a partner in Eastern Europe. Guided by such a vision, the United States consistently has demonstrated initiative in supporting Ukraine in building its national military by engaging it in peacetime military- to-military contacts. The Ukrainian government unhesitatingly accepted U.S. leadership in bilateral military cooperation, which has provided it with an opportunity to learn useful approaches to defense reform, raised Ukraine's international prestige, and strengthened the country's position vis-a-vis the pressure for regional influence exerted by its neighbor (and regional dominant power), Russia.

Fifteen new independent entities were propelled by national security imperatives to create their own armed forces once the Soviet Union was dissolved. That process varied from state to state because of differences in interests and resources. An instructive example is Ukraine, perhaps the most important of the emergent states after Russia. A country of 52 million people, the size of France, and rich in natural resources, it could be destined to play a central role in the new geopolitical environment of eastern and central Europe. The speed of the Soviet Union's breakup left its forces practically intact where they were deployed. While Russia proper retained the second-rate forces that were previously part of the central strategic reserve, the former republics on the western frontier, especially Ukraine and Belarus, inherited first-class force packages which were part of the second strategic echelon of the Warsaw Pact. Each of the newly independent states has dealt differently with its military inheritance. Ukraine decided to nationalize former Soviet forces stationed on its territory, the first former Soviet republic to do so. Over 700,000 ground, air, and air defense forces along with 500,000 paramilitary troops were based in Ukraine. Motivated by national (regional) patriotism and economic considerations, most remained and swore allegiance to the new state. Only 20,000 officers departed to Russia or other former republics. As approved by the Supreme Rada, the major tenets of military doctrine are preventing war, building the armed forces, and repelling aggression. This article discusses Ukraine's actions to reform the military in the areas of force reduction, military reeducation, force conversion and quality of life, ethnic relations, language of command, civil-military relations, force structure, readiness, and Ukraine-U.S. relations. (1 figure, 5 photographs).

The Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University has established the Harvard Papers in Ukrainian Studies as a medium for occasional papers, lectures, reports, reprints, long articles, and recent theses of particular merit. It also is a venue for monograph-length works that utilize new analyses and methodologies that broaden the field of Ukrainian studies. The series is not geographically limited to Ukraine proper--it also will examine questions of importance to surrounding countries, inasmuch as these questions are significant to the history and current development of Ukraine. This booklet contains the proceedings of the first Annual Conference sponsored by the Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, and the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University at Harvard University, May 12-13, 1994. Kostiantyn P. Morozov, first Minister of Defense of independent Ukraine, gave the keynote address. Papers exploring recent Ukrainian military history and the construction and Ukrainianization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were presented by Professors Zenon Kohut (Director, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies), Mark von Hagen (Columbia University), and John Jaworsky (University of Waterloo). Responses to these papers were given by senior Ukrainian military personnel who attended the conference. The Military Tradition in Ukrainian History will be useful to specialists in East European affairs, military historians, and Ukrainianists.

From the earliest times of its post-Soviet independence, Ukraine has been open to security cooperation with the United States. In the beginning, there were significant differences in political, security and even bureaucratic cultures between the two countries, which formed some obstacles to building bridges quickly. Many of these obstacles remain, especially in the political dimension of relations between the two countries. But in the absence of their former ideological differences and united by common interests in preserving international peace and fighting terrorism, Ukraine and the United States have established constructive and mutually beneficial military cooperation. The United States has been interested in engaging post-Soviet Ukraine in security cooperation and clearly articulated what it wanted to achieve from this cooperation. It was in U.S. interests to have a strong, independent, stable, and democratic Ukraine as a partner in Eastern Europe. Guided by such a vision, the United States consistently has demonstrated initiative in supporting Ukraine in building its national military by engaging it in peacetime military-to- military contacts. The Ukrainian government unhesitatingly accepted U.S. leadership in bilateral military cooperation, which has provided it with an opportunity to learn useful approaches to defense reform, raised Ukraine's international prestige, and strengthened the country's position vis-à-vis the pressure for regional influence exerted by its neighbor (and regional dominant power), Russia. Bilateral programs of military contacts with the United States have become the largest among Ukraine's many international military cooperation programs. Since 1992 bilateral military cooperation has improved in terms of quality and substance, and set the stage for preparation, execution, and support of actual U.S. Ukraine combined operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq. These combined deployments have demonstrated that the years of cooperation were not in vain; Ukrainians have proven their ability to be a reliable and capable peacekeeping combat force. However, as this monograph suggests, despite steady improvement in bilateral cooperation, developing full interoperability between the Ukrainian and U.S. militaries beyond joint peacekeeping is not yet a realistic possibility. At a time when full combat interoperability is beyond reach for even the closest U.S. allies, the experience of previous U.S.-Ukraine partnership shows that the most logical and realistic option is to promote and further improve tactical interoperability for low intensity conflict: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance. More ambitious goals are far beyond Ukraine's current financial capabilities, and are restrained by the country's inability to qualify politically and economically for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership soon. This monograph consists of four parts. Part I presents a strategic context for U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation and provides general data on the history and current state of security relations between Ukraine and the United States. Part II focuses on the development and improvement of cooperative mechanisms for bilateral military contacts. Part III provides data and analysis of peacetime military engagement and discusses important lessons learned. Part IV examines Ukraine's practical cooperation with the U.S. military in operations in Kosovo and Iraq, operations where cooperation continues today. In sum, U.S. Ukrainian military cooperation has created a reasonable foundation for limited joint and combined action, with the United States helping Ukraine to build a noticeable cooperative capability. This capability currently is being adjusted in Iraq and other places. The potential remains for even greater cooperation, if necessary improvements are made.

This thesis describes the conditions that surrounded the creation of the new Ukrainian state and its major institutions, including the military. The thesis also evaluates the state of the Ukrainian military and civil-military relations during their development from 1991 and presents propositions to improve such relations. The conclusion states that the level of development of the Ukrainian Military, as well as the state of civil-military relations in the country, is far from perfect. However, conditions can be improved; Ukraine has a good chance to maintain the quality of its civil-military relations similar to this maintained by developed democracies.

From the earliest times of its post-Soviet independence, Ukraine has been open to security cooperation with the United States. In the beginning, there were significant differences in political, security and even bureaucratic cultures between the two countries, which formed some obstacles to building bridges quickly. Many of these obstacles remain, especially in the political dimension of relations between the two countries. But in the absence of their former ideological differences and united by common interests in preserving international peace and fighting terrorism, Ukraine and the United States have established constructive and mutually beneficial military cooperation. The United States has been interested in engaging post-Soviet Ukraine in security cooperation and clearly articulated what it wanted to achieve from this cooperation. It was in U.S. interests to have a strong, independent, stable, and democratic Ukraine as a partner in Eastern Europe. Guided by such a vision, the United States consistently has demonstrated initiative in supporting Ukraine in building its national military by engaging it in peacetime military- to-military contacts. The Ukrainian government unhesitatingly accepted U.S. leadership in bilateral military cooperation, which has provided it with an opportunity to learn useful approaches to defense reform, raised Ukraine's international prestige, and strengthened the country's position vis-a-vis the pressure for regional influence exerted by its neighbor (and regional dominant power), Russia.