Chisholm To Alden

Most simply said, this dissertation is about whether the citizen of one state of the United States may sue another state of the United States despite the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which reads: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. Though this provision addresses the broader issue of states' sovereignty, the principle objective of this work, Chisholm to Alden: James Wilson's "Artificial Person" in American Constitutional History, 1793-1999, is on the suability of the states. To appropriately appraise this subject, I investigate what the original intent of those who wrote the Constitution was and what various Courts in the history of US jurisprudence consider that intent or meaning to have been, ending with the textualist-originalist Justices of the 1990s, many or whom remain on the bench today. This is a discombobulating task, for there were so many differing opinions at the Federal Convention as to what the text meant, that there cannot be just one. Therefore, taking a look at some of the major cases that address states' suability in US Supreme Court history, I focus on the more specific question of what could have reasonably been meant by the Founders on states' suability. The point of departure for this venture is Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), since it was the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment, with aspecial focus on James Wilson's opinion in the case. From there, selected cases from theMarshall Court through to the 1999 case of Alden v. Maine are carefully discussed as a meansof discovering whether or not the states were ever actually suable and which cases may haveled more modern Courts astray.

This is a collection of interviews of twenty-one actors from Shakespeare theaters and festivals across North America, from the Oregon Shakespeare Festival in Ashland to the Chicago Shakespeare Theatre and the Stratford Shakespeare Festival in Ontario. The interviews celebrate the variety in education, training, and approaches to acting conducted by recognized performance scholars. Thus, this book combines scholarly expertise with actors' insights to produce unique views on contemporary Shakespearean performances in the United States and Canada, and fills an important niche in performance criticism. Michael W. Shurgot is Professor of Humanities at South Puget Sound Community College.

The protagonists of STORIES FROM THEN AND NOW are, variously male, female and of various racial and ethnic backgrounds, and of, successively, elementary school high school and post-college age, involved in situations to which almost all Americans can relate.. Vol. 11 stories will take place during the 1980 to 2000 years. Whether read alone or as chapters of a book, readers will find the stories interesting enlightening, and often amusing.

"With keen insight into the common law mind, Edlin argues that there are rich resources within the law for judges to ground their opposition to morally outrageous laws, and a legal obligation on them to overturn it, consequent on the general common law obligation to develop the law. Thus, seriously unjust laws pose for common law judges a dilemma within the law, not just a moral challenge to the law, a conflict of obligations, not just a crisis of conscience. While rooted firmly in the history of common law jurisprudence, Edlin offers an entirely fresh perspective on an age-old jurisprudential conundrum. Edlin's case for his thesis is compelling." ---Gerald J. Postema, Cary C. Boshamer Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and author of Bentham and the Common Law Tradition "Douglas Edlin builds a powerful historical, conceptual, and moral case for the proposition that judges on common law grounds should refuse to enforce unjust legislation. This is sure to be controversial in an age in which critics already excoriate judges for excessive activism when conducting constitutional judicial review. Edlin's challenge to conventional views is bold and compelling." ---Brian Z. Tamanaha, Chief Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo Professor of Law, St. John's University, and author of Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law "Professor Edlin's fascinating and well-researched distinction between constitutional review and common law review should influence substantially both scholarship on the history of judicial power in the United States and contemporary jurisprudential debates on the appropriate use of that power." ---Mark Graber, Professor of Law and Government, University of Maryland, and author of Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil Is a judge legally obligated to enforce an unjust law? In Judges and Unjust Laws, Douglas E. Edlin uses case law analysis, legal theory, constitutional history, and political philosophy to examine the power of judicial review in the common law tradition. He finds that common law tradition gives judges a dual mandate: to apply the law and to develop it. There is no conflict between their official duty and their moral responsibility. Consequently, judges have the authority---perhaps even the obligation---to refuse to enforce laws that they determine unjust. As Edlin demonstrates, exploring the problems posed by unjust laws helps to illuminate the institutional role and responsibilities of common law judges. Douglas E. Edlin is Associate Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College.

Constitutional law's central narrative in the 20th century has been one of radical reinterpretation--Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, Bush v. Gore. What justifies this phenomenon? How does it work doctrinally? What structures it or limits it? Rubenfeld finds a pattern in constitutional interpretation that answers these questions.