Chamberlain And Appeasement

"A new history of the British appeasement of the Third Reich on the eve of World War II"--

Drawing on a wide range of material, including primary sources, Frank McDonough re-examines the controversial policy of appeasement, and argues that appeasement was part of a broad consensus in British society at the time.

The Sunday Times Bestseller 'Astonishing' ANTONY BEEVOR 'One of the most promising young historians to enter our field for years' MAX HASTINGS On a wet afternoon in September 1938, Neville Chamberlain stepped off an aeroplane and announced that his visit to Hitler had averted the greatest crisis in recent memory. It was, he later assured the crowd in Downing Street, 'peace for our time'. Less than a year later, Germany invaded Poland and the Second World War began. This is a vital new history of the disastrous years of indecision, failed diplomacy and parliamentary infighting that enabled Nazi domination of Europe. Drawing on previously unseen sources, it sweeps from the advent of Hitler in 1933 to the beaches of Dunkirk, and presents an unforgettable portrait of the ministers, aristocrats and amateur diplomats whose actions and inaction had devastating consequences. 'Brilliant and sparkling . . . Reads like a thriller. I couldn't put it down' Peter Frankopan 'Vivid, detailed and utterly fascinating . . . This is political drama at its most compelling' James Holland 'Bouverie skilfully traces each shameful step to war . . . in moving and dramatic detail' Sunday Telegraph

"The book details the course of that historiographical debate, beginning with the earliest accounts on appeasement from l938 through 1940.".

An engaging range of period texts and theme books for AS and A Level history. This book examines the key roles played by Adolf Hitler and Neville Chamberlain in the events that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. It looks at Hitler's foreign-policy aims, why appeasement became British foreign policy and, most extensively, the role of Chamberlain and appeasement in the unfolding international crisis of the late 1930s. Using a wide range of primary sources, Frank McDonough offers a generally critical interpretation of Chamberlain and appeasement, and suggests that standing up to Hitler earlier may have prevented war. The book also features a detailed analysis of the historical debates surrounding the issue of appeasement.

On September 30, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew back to London from his meeting in Munich with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler. As he disembarked from the aircraft, he held aloft a piece of paper, which contained the promise that Britain and Germany would never go to war with one another again. He had returned bringing “Peace with honour—Peace for our time.” Drawing on a wealth of archival material, acclaimed historian David Faber delivers a sweeping reassessment of the extraordinary events of 1938, tracing the key incidents leading up to the Munich Conference and its immediate aftermath: Lord Halifax’s ill-fated meeting with Hitler; Chamberlain’s secret discussions with Mussolini; and the Berlin scandal that rocked Hitler’s regime. He takes us to Vienna, to the Sudentenland, and to Prague. In Berlin, we witness Hitler inexorably preparing for war, even in the face of opposition from his own generals; in London, we watch as Chamberlain makes one supreme effort after another to appease Hitler. Resonating with an insider’s feel for the political infighting Faber uncovers, Munich, 1938 transports us to the war rooms and bunkers, revealing the covert negotiations and scandals upon which the world’s fate would rest. It is modern history writing at its best.

Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Hitler's Germany has been widely condemned. However, historians (and politicians) have been divided about the viability of alternative courses of action. Andrew David Stedman's illuminating new study of British foreign policy before World War II systematically analyses the various alternatives to appeasement - from isolationism to collective security to outright war - and examines their origins, risks and feasibility. It surveys the advocates of other strategies - including key thinkers and decision-makers such as Churchill, Eden, Amery, Beaverbrook and Halifax - and outlines the complexities of the decisions they faced, which have previously been largely overlooked. Marking a valuable new contribution to appeasement historiography, this is the first work to synthesise all the alternatives available to Chamberlain, as well as illuminating policy debate within the British government. Stedman provides a vigorous analysis of Chamberlain's assessment of each rival policy, and shows why ultimately, he opted for appeasement. Also contributing to debates on the use of appeasement in the modern world, this book will be essential reading for historians of World War II and the twentieth century, as well as scholars of International Relations.

Drawing on a wealth of previously unexamined material, this staggering account sheds new light on the Allies’ responsibility for a landmark agreement that had dire consequences. On returning from Germany on September 30, 1938, after signing an agreement with Hitler on the carve-up of Czechoslovakia, Neville Chamberlain addressed the British crowds: “My good friends…I believe it is peace for our time. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts. Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.” Winston Churchill rejoined: “You have chosen dishonor and you will have war.” P. E. Caquet’s history of the events leading to the Munich Agreement and its aftermath is told for the first time from the point of view of the peoples of Czechoslovakia. Basing his work on previously unexamined sources, including press, memoirs, private journals, army plans, cabinet records, and radio, Caquet presents one of the most shameful episodes in modern European history. Among his most explosive revelations is the strength of the French and Czechoslovak forces before Munich; Germany’s dominance turns out to have been an illusion. The case for appeasement never existed. The result is a nail-biting story of diplomatic intrigue, perhaps the nearest thing to a morality play that history ever furnishes. The Czechoslovak authorities were Cassandras in their own country, the only ones who could see Hitler’s threat for what it was, and appeasement as the disaster it proved to be. In Caquet’s devastating account, their doomed struggle against extinction and the complacency of their notional allies finally gets the memorial it deserves.