Britains Withdrawal From East Of Suez

After 1945, Britain maintained a great chain of overseas military outposts stretching from the Suez Canal to Singapore. Commonly termed the `east of Suez' role, this chain had long been thought to be crucial for the country's security and its vitality. Nonetheless, British leaders eventually decided to abandon this network of bases. This study provides the most comprehensive explanation of this pivotal decision to date, while also offering insight into the processes of foreign policy change and the decline of great powers.

The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial rule and the context in which this took place. This publication is the first of three volumes which examine the years 1964 to 1971, during which period ten territories became independent and all but one (Aden) became new members of the Commonwealth. Issues considered include: the symbolic significance of the recall of British troops from East of Suez, and the circumstances of Britain's withdrawl from Aden; a reappraisal of British interests in South-East Asia in the context of Singapore's secession from Malaysia; the ending of confrontation with Indonesia; British views on the Vietnam conflict; the end of Britain's treaties of protection in the Persian Gulf and the creation of the UAE.

In 1964 Britain's defence presence in Malaysia and Singapore was the largest and most expensive component of the country's world-wide role. Yet within three and a half years the Wilson Government had announced that Britain would be withdrawing from its major Southeast Asian bases and abandoning any special military role 'East of Suez'. Drawing upon previously classified government records P.L. Pham examines and explains how the Wilson Government came to this conclusion, one of the most significant decisions in the decline of British global power after the Second World War. Substantially revising earlier accounts, Pham exposes the inner workings of government, the close but strained relations between the United Kingdom and the United States in the midst of Cold War tensions, and how politicians and policy makers managed the decline of British power, providing an in-depth and comprehensive study of British policy processes of the era.

This book, based on recently declassified documents in Britain and the USA, is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson Government in 1967-68. Contrary to received opinion, the author argues that the decision was not taken hastily as a result of the November 1967 devaluation. Nor is there any hard evidence to support the notion that there existed a 'Pound-Defence' deal with the USA. Despite Washington's pressure to maintain Britain's East of Suez role, the decision was taken by the Labour Government on the basis of a long-term effort to re-examine Britain's world role since 1959, and it marked the end of an era for postwar Britain.

This book examines the links between Britain's withdrawal from its east of Suez role and the establishment of South-East Asian regional security arrangements. The link between these two events is not direct, but a relationship existed, which is important to a wider understanding of the development of regional security arrangements.

This book examines Britain's decision to leave the Gulf and considers the interaction between British decision-making, and local responses and initiatives, in shaping the modern Gulf.

This title includes a new Foreword by WM. Roger Louis. On 26 July 1956, the British Empire received a blow from which it would never recover. On this day, Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, one of the gems of Britain's imperial portfolio. It was to be a fateful day for Britain as a world power. Britain, France and Israel subsequently colluded in attacking Egypt, ostensibly - in the case of Britain and France - to protect the Suez Canal but in reality in an attempt to depose Nasser. The US opposition to this scheme forced an ignominious withdrawal, leaving Nasser triumphant and marking a decisive end to Britain's imperial era. In this, the seminal work on the Suez Crisis, Keith Kyle draws on a wealth of documentary evidence to tell this fascinating political, military and diplomatic story. Including new introductory material, this revised edition of a classic work will be essential reading for anyone interested in the history of the twentieth century, military history and the end of empire.