Bank Liquidity Creation Monetary Policy And Financial Crises

Bank Liquidity Creation and Financial Crises delivers a consistent, logical presentation of bank liquidity creation and addresses questions of research and policy interest that can be easily understood by readers with no advanced or specialized industry knowledge. Authors Allen Berger and Christa Bouwman examine ways to measure bank liquidity creation, how much liquidity banks create in different countries, the effects of monetary policy (including interest rate policy, lender of last resort, and quantitative easing), the effects of capital, the effects of regulatory interventions, the effects of bailouts, and much more. They also analyze bank liquidity creation in the US over the past three decades during both normal times and financial crises. Narrowing the gap between the "academic world" (focused on theories) and the "practitioner world" (dedicated to solving real-world problems), this book is a helpful new tool for evaluating a bank’s performance over time and comparing it to its peer group. Explains that bank liquidity creation is a more comprehensive measure of a bank’s output than traditional measures and can also be used to measure bank liquidity Describes how high levels of bank liquidity creation may cause or predict future financial crises Addresses questions of research and policy interest related to bank liquidity creation around the world and provides links to websites with data and other materials to address these questions Includes such hot-button topics as the effects of monetary policy (including interest rate policy, lender of last resort, and quantitative easing), the effects of capital, the effects of regulatory interventions, and the effects of bailouts

Financial crises and bank liquidity creation are often connected. We examine this connection from two perspectives. First, we examine the aggregate liquidity creation of banks before, during, and after five major financial crises in the U.S. from 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q1. We uncover numerous interesting patterns, such as a significant build-up or drop-off of quot;abnormalquot; liquidity creation before each crisis, where quot;abnormalquot; is defined relative to a time trend and seasonal factors. Banking and market-related crises differ in that banking crises were preceded by abnormal positive liquidity creation, while market-related crises were generally preceded by abnormal negative liquidity creation. Bank liquidity creation has both decreased and increased during crises, likely both exacerbating and ameliorating the effects of crises. Off-balance sheet guarantees such as loan commitments moved more than on-balance sheet assets such as mortgages and business lending during banking crises.Second, we examine the effect of pre-crisis bank capital ratios on the competitive positions and profitability of individual banks during and after each crisis. The evidence suggests that high capital served large banks well around banking crises - they improved their liquidity creation market share and profitability during these crises and were able to hold on to their improved performance afterwards. In addition, high-capital listed banks enjoyed significantly higher abnormal stock returns than low-capital listed banks during banking crises. These benefits did not hold or held to a lesser degree around market-related crises and in normal times. In contrast, high capital ratios appear to have helped small banks improve their liquidity creation market share during banking crises, market-related crises, and normal times alike, and the gains in market share were sustained afterwards. Their profitability improved during two crises and subsequent to virtually every crisis. Similar results were observed during normal times for small banks.

We formulate the “High Liquidity Creation Hypothesis” (HLCH) that a proliferation in the core activity of bank liquidity creation increases failure probability. We test the HLCH in the context of Russian banking, which provides a natural field experiment due to numerous failures experienced over the past decade. Using Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) liquidity creation measures as a comprehensive proxy for overall bank output, we find that high liquidity creation significantly increases the probability of bank failure; this finding survives multiple robustness checks. Our results suggest that regulatory authorities can mitigate systemic distress and reduce the costs of bank failures to society through early identification of high liquidity creators and enhanced monitoring of their funding and investment activities.

One important cause of the 2007-2009 crisis was illiquidity combined with exposure of many financial institutions to liquidity needs. But what is liquidity and why is it so important for financial institutions to command enough liquidity? This book brings together classic articles and recent contributions to this important field.

We formulate the “High Liquidity Creation Hypothesis” (HLCH) that a proliferation in the core activity of bank liquidity creation increases failure probability. We test the HLCH in the context of Russian banking, which provides a natural field experiment due to numerous failures experienced over the past decade. Using Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) liquidity creation measures as a comprehensive proxy for overall bank output, we find that high liquidity creation significantly increases the probability of bank failure; this finding survives multiple robustness checks. Our results suggest that regulatory authorities can mitigate systemic distress and reduce the costs of bank failures to society through early identification of high liquidity creators and enhanced monitoring of their funding and investment activities.

Standing apart from the swollen stream of writing dealing with financial crises, this much-needed book makes a legal case for enforcement of legal accountability for financial crises and for providing justice for the inestimable and untold human suffering caused by Washington and Wall Street. The extraordinarily detailed analysis comes with the authority of a widely experienced and internationally respected banking and finance lawyer. The book’s driving forces may be summarized as follows: it establishes that persistent and progressive money debasement is at the heart of all serious systemic financial crises; it establishes that the crisis in 2008 was not only simply immoral or wrong but also illegal, the result of intentional violation of the foundational legal requirements of honest, safe, and sound money and banking; it establishes that Washington and Wall Street have intentionally manipulated asset values and liquidity characteristics through proliferation of ineffective banking law and regulation magnified by the rise of structured finance and shadow banking. Basing its analysis on numerous case studies and illustrations, this book enables readers to untangle the web of false narratives wrought by Washington and Wall Street to obscure and misdirect any clear understanding of how fundamental civil, legal and constitutional rights are undermined. Designed to empower readers to effect meaningful legal action against money manipulation and debasement for the benefit of financial elites, this book is essential reading for banking lawyers, bankers, securities firms, lobbyists, government regulators and supervisory institutions. It is also sure to be welcomed by academics in finance and securities law.

Provides a comprehensive overview of a broad range of uses of the flow of funds within the central bank community as well as in the academic field, prepared by international experts in the field. Based on the crisis experience, it offers an overview of lessons for macrofinancial analysis and financial stability.

We study the effects of interest rate shocks (IRS) on banks' liquidity creation. A unique supervisory data set from the Deutsche Bundesbank allows identifying banks' liquidity creation for the real economy and the effects of banking market competition. Here, we employ a novel approach to account for IRS that are both unexpected and effective for a bank's business model. We find that higher individual pricing power in the market lowers banks' liquidity creation, which is in line with theory that monopolistic firms undersupply the market when utilizing their high pricing power in the bank competition-liquidity creation nexus. While positive IRS per se lead to an increase in bank liquidity creation, we find that a high bank-individual pricing power curbs this impact on liquidity creation significantly. Moreover, we show that monetary policy was most effective during the global financial crisis and for well-capitalized banks, whereas periods of low interest rates are characterized by the persistent increase in liability-side liquidity creation.

This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.