Americas Asian Alliances

Systematic and concrete prescriptions for strengthening America's alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. Unlike the new and largely peaceful Europe, the Asia-Pacific region is fraught with old instabilities and new risks, as well as opportunities. America's Asian alliances face an arc of potential instability, from the divided Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia, to the nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan on the South Asian subcontinent, to an unstable Indonesia in Southeast Asia. The United States and its allies must also address the rise of Chinese power, slow the spread of nuclear and high-tech conventional weapons, maintain access to energy resources, and expand the world free-trade system. In this book, nine distinguished US and Australian strategists present systematic and concrete prescriptions for strengthening America's Asian alliances. These policy-driven chapters address the roles that the US-Japan, US-South Korea, and US-Australia alliances can play in ensuring long-term stability and prosperity in the region.

For the past half century, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have maintained a three-cornered alliance to guarantee peace in Northeast Asia. U.S.-Japanese security relations currently thrive. However, conflicting perceptions in Seoul and Washington of Kim Jong-Ils North Korean regime and how to deal with it have generated deep concerns about the future of the U.S.-Korean alliance.

A close look at the evolution of American political alliances in Asia and their future While the American alliance system in Asia has been fundamental to the region's security and prosperity for seven decades, today it encounters challenges from the growth of China-based regional organizations. How was the American alliance system originally established in Asia, and is it currently under threat? How are competing security designs being influenced by the United States and China? In Powerplay, Victor Cha draws from theories about alliances, unipolarity, and regime complexity to examine the evolution of the U.S. alliance system and the reasons for its continued importance in Asia and the world. Cha delves into the fears, motivations, and aspirations of the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies as they contemplated alliances with the Republic of China, Republic of Korea, and Japan at the outset of the Cold War. Their choice of a bilateral "hub and spokes" security design for Asia was entirely different from the system created in Europe, but it was essential for its time. Cha argues that the alliance system’s innovations in the twenty-first century contribute to its resiliency in the face of China’s increasing prominence, and that the task for the world is not to choose between American and Chinese institutions, but to maximize stability and economic progress amid Asia’s increasingly complex political landscape. Exploring U.S. bilateral relations in Asia after World War II, Powerplay takes an original look at how global alliances are achieved and maintained.

Is America’s alliance system so quietly effective that politicians and voters fail to appreciate its importance in delivering the security they take for granted? For the first century and a half of its existence, the United States had just one alliance—a valuable but highly controversial military arrangement with France. Largely out of deference to George Washington’s warnings against the dangers of “entangling alliances,” subsequent American presidents did not consider entering another until the Second World War. Then everything suddenly changed. Between 1948 and 1955, US leaders extended defensive security guarantees to twenty-three countries in Europe and Asia. Seventy years later, the United States had allied with thirty-seven. In Shields of the Republic, Mira Rapp-Hooper reveals the remarkable success of America’s unprecedented system of alliances. During the Cold War, a grand strategy focused on allied defense, deterrence, and assurance helped to keep the peace at far lower material and political costs than its critics allege. When the Soviet Union collapsed, however, the United States lost the adversary the system was designed to combat. Its alliances remained without a core strategic logic, leaving them newly vulnerable. Today the alliance system is threatened from without and within. China and Russia seek to break America’s alliances through conflict and non-military erosion. Meanwhile, US politicians and voters are increasingly skeptical of alliances’ costs and benefits and believe we may be better off without them. But what if the alliance system is a victim of its own quiet success? Rapp-Hooper argues that America’s national security requires alliances that deter and defend against military and non-military conflict alike. The alliance system is past due for a post–Cold War overhaul, but it remains critical to the country’s safety and prosperity in the 21st century.

Throughout the Cold War, US officials feared that Washington's disloyalty to one ally would automatically cause other allies to doubt America's security reliability. These doubts could prompt allies to adopt policies of neutrality, or even defect to the Communist bloc. This dissertation challenges the conventional wisdom - that alliance interdependence is underpinned by loyalty - by proposing the "alliance audience effect". The alliance audience effect framework shows that discrete alliance commitments can be practically interdependent, but that this interdependence is not underpinned by loyalty. Through an investigation of Cold War case studies, using a process tracing methodology and archival research, this dissertation argues that US allies in Asia were unconcerned about whether America was loyal to other allied states. Instead, they monitored America's behaviour in order to reassure themselves that the US was reliable: that their own alliance did not pose risks of either abandonment or entrapment. When allies feared abandonment, they encouraged America to solidify its presence in Asia and adopt a more aggressive posture. But when allies feared entrapment, they encouraged conciliatory US policies and worked to restrain Washington, thus reducing the risk of conflict. In some cases, American disloyalty to one ally was welcomed, or even encouraged, by other allies, as this disloyalty better served their own interests. Like the adage that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter", this dissertation shows that one state's disloyal ally can be another state's reliable ally. Because US allies have different interests, they will have different views of American behaviour: one ally might praise an instance of US disloyalty as proof of reliability, while another ally might condemn Washington for unreliability. In short, reliability is not synonymous with loyalty, and America does not have a collective alliance loyalty reputation. Beyond the allied perspective, this research also demonstrates how the United States managed its alliances and used alliance interdependence to achieve its own ends. This dissertation's findings have relevance for the alliance politics literature, theories about international reputation, and the practical management of alliances.

This study provides an analysis of the role the United States alliance with Nationalist China played in US strategy to contain first the Sino-Soviet alliance and then China during the 1950s and 1960s.

The passing of the Cold War is the most important development of the late 20th century, yet the United States clings tenaciously to old policies. Both the Bush administration and Democratic leaders have insisted on perpetuating a host of obsolete alliances, including NATO and the alliance with Japan, which cost American taxpayers nearly $150 billion a year. Ted Galen Carpenter, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, offers a provocative critique of that status quo strategy. Although Washington's outdated alliances have no real adversary or credible mission, Carpenter says, they hold the potential to embroil the United States in obscure conflicts, ethnic and otherwise, that have little relevance to America's legitimate security concerns. As an alternative, he proposes strategic independence, under which the United States would act only to defend vital interests - the republic's physical integrity, political independence, or domestic liberty. Carpenter calls for the foreign policy equivalent of zero-based budgeting, insisting that because of the dramatic changes in the world caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, all alliances must be justified anew, regardless of any utility they may have had during the Cold War. He places under the microscope America's multilateral treaty obligations to defend other nations - NATO; ANZUS, which links the United States, Australia, and New Zealand; and the Rio Treaty, which provides a collective defense arrangement for the Western Hemisphere. He also examines four important bilateral security agreements - with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Pakistan. This is the book on a new foreign policy for the United States.