9 11 And The Design Of Counterterrorism Institutions

How did the North European states react to the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001? Michael Karlsson argues that 9/11 led to a considerable pressure to strengthen rules and practices for counterterrorism and security, but that this pressure was mediated by several other conditions. The reforms were also affected by, among other things, how the threat of global terrorism was perceived, pressure from international institutions such as the UN, EU, and NATO, the domestic political context, and pre-existing rules and practices. His analysis uses the new institutionalism framework, tested through case studies of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The book offers a unique lens on the study of counterterrorism from a new theoretical and regional perspective.

How did the North European states react to the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001? Michael Karlsson argues that 9/11 led to a considerable pressure to strengthen rules and practices for counterterrorism and security, but that this pressure was mediated by several other conditions. The reforms were also affected by, among other things, how the threat of global terrorism was perceived, pressure from international institutions such as the UN, EU, and NATO, the domestic political context, and pre-existing rules and practices. His analysis uses the new institutionalism framework, tested through case studies of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The book offers a unique lens on the study of counterterrorism from a new theoretical and regional perspective.

The most comprehensive account to date of the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon and aftermath, this volume includes unprecedented details on the impact on the Pentagon building and personnel and the scope of the rescue, recovery, and caregiving effort. It features 32 pages of photographs and more than a dozen diagrams and illustrations not previously available.

This book provides a multifaceted array of answers to the question, In the ten years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, how has America responded? In a series of essays, RAND authors lend a farsighted perspective to the national dialogue on 9/11's legacy. The essays assess the military, political, fiscal, social, cultural, psychological, and even moral implications of U.S. policymaking since 9/11. Part One of the book addresses the lessons learned from America's accomplishments and mistakes in its responses to the 9/11 attacks and the ongoing terrorist threat. Part Two explores reactions to the extreme ideologies of the terrorists and to the fears they have generated. Part Three presents the dilemmas of asymmetrical warfare and suggests ways to resolve them. Part Four cautions against sacrificing a long-term strategy by imposing short-term solutions, particularly with respect to air passenger security and counterterrorism intelligence. Finally, Part Five looks at the effects of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. public health system, at the potential role of compensation policy for losses incurred by terrorism, and at the possible long-term effects of terrorism and counterterrorism on American values, laws, and society.--Publisher description.

The Legacy of 9/11 is a retrospective about how policing, intelligence, and counter-terrorism have changed in the more than twenty years since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Bringing together scholars and practitioners, the book takes an interdisciplinary approach with fields including history, international relations, intelligence studies, law, and political science. It highlights how some challenges in policing, intelligence, and counter-terrorism brought about by the attacks have been resolved, how some persist and how others have been transformed. The chapters explore state and non-state actors’ actions, reactions, and overreactions that shape contemporary aspects of policing, intelligence, and terrorism. In all three worlds, intelligence, policing, and counter-terrorism, the 9/11 attacks changed how the threat of terrorism is perceived, approached, and effectively countered by learning from the mistakes that led to the success of the attacks and initiating a process on the national and international levels of integrating security structures and implementing changes that have made 9/11 the last large scale terrorist strike on U.S. soil. To illustrate these accomplishments and to highlight future challenges, the volume examines the inextricably connected elements of policing and intelligence in counter-terrorism as well as how counter-terrorism practitioners and jihadists were transformed by one day of attacks, more than twenty years ago. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism.

In the aftermath of 9/11, many law enforcement agencies (LEAs) shifted more resources toward developing counterterrorism (CT) and homeland security (HS) capabilities. This volume examines the effects the focus on CT and HS has had on law enforcement since 9/11, including organizational changes, funding mechanisms, how the shift has affected traditional crime-prevention efforts, and an assessment of benefits, costs, and future challenges.

On July 22, 2004 the 9/11 Commission released its final report. The report calls for changes to be made by the executive branch and Congress to more effectively protect our nation in an age of modern terrorism and provides forty-one concrete recommendations. Generally, the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission as they relate to strategy content and implementation appear consistent with, and supportive of, the National Strategy. Few question the 9/11 Commission Report's overarching premise that U.S. counter-terrorism structure, strategy, and implementation can be improved. Some, however, see certain Commission recommendations as incomplete, if not flawed. They suggest that the Commission is often focused on the "last war" and not a future one and suggest that the Commission consciously avoids tackling some of the more complex, yet pressing issues. For example, the Commission, as its first recommendation, stresses the need for identifying and prioritizing terrorist sanctuaries with a focus on failed states. Some assert, however, that terrorists are increasingly returning to their politically stable home countries for sanctuary where they blend into local communities, where their training camps are in civilian housing complexes, and where their bomb factories are in private residences. Although a number of the Commission's recommendations fall within the category of preventing the growth of Islamic extremism, none addresses directly the issue of confronting incitement to terrorism when promoted, countenanced, or facilitated by the action -- or inaction -- of nation states. With terrorists able to change targets, tactics, and weapons on short notice, many argue that a successful counterterrorism strategy and institutional structures will need similar flexibility. The degree to which such flexibility will be built into strategy, and into any new institutional structures recommend by the 9/11 Commission, is yet to be determined. On December 17, 2004, President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act of 2004 (S. 2845, P.L. 108-458) establishing the position of National Intelligence Director (a position separate from that of the CIA Director) to serve as the President's principal intelligence advisor, overseeing and coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of the intelligence community. Established as well is a National Counterterrorism Center designed to serve as a central knowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and to coordinate and monitor counterterrorism plans and activities of all government agencies. The Center will also be responsible for preparing the daily terrorism threat report for the President.

"In the recent years, terrorism and radicalization have (unfortunately) become something of a regular topic in the news, in movies and TV shows, and even in dinnertime conversations. It seems like everyone knows something and has a theory or two to explain the growing number of terrorist attacks around the world. Some blame it on Muslims, some on the news media and the Internet, and some on the CIA and the U.S. government. It has become difficult to judge the quality of all this information. Thus, it makes sense to ask for credentials of the messengers"--

The Oklahoma City bombing, intentional crashing of airliners on September 11, 2001, and anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001 have made Americans acutely aware of the impacts of terrorism. These events and continued threats of terrorism have raised questions about the impact on the psychological health of the nation and how well the public health infrastructure is able to meet the psychological needs that will likely result. Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism highlights some of the critical issues in responding to the psychological needs that result from terrorism and provides possible options for intervention. The committee offers an example for a public health strategy that may serve as a base from which plans to prevent and respond to the psychological consequences of a variety of terrorism events can be formulated. The report includes recommendations for the training and education of service providers, ensuring appropriate guidelines for the protection of service providers, and developing public health surveillance for preevent, event, and postevent factors related to psychological consequences.

The Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, is the official report of the events leading up to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was prepared by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States The commission interviewed over 1,200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over two and a half million pages of documents, including some closely guarded classified national security documents. Before it was released by the commission, the final public report was screened for any potentially classified information and edited as necessary._x000D_ A Factual Overview of the September 11 Border Story_x000D_ The September 11 Travel Operation – a Chronology_x000D_ Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics, 1993-2001_x000D_ The Redbook_x000D_ Terrorist Travel Tactics by Plot_x000D_ Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure for Travel and Travel Tactics_x000D_ Immigration and Border Security Evolve, 1993 to 2001_x000D_ The Intelligence Community_x000D_ The State Department_x000D_ The Immigration and Naturalization Service_x000D_ Planning and Executing Entry for the 9/11 Plot_x000D_ The State Department_x000D_ The Immigration and Naturalization Service_x000D_ Finding a Fair Verdict_x000D_ Crisis Management and Response Post-September 11_x000D_ The Intelligence Community_x000D_ The Department of State_x000D_ The Department of Justice_x000D_ Response at the Borders, 9/11-9/20, 2001_x000D_ The Department of Homeland Security