Waging War Making Peace

Humans are good at making war—and much less successful at making peace. Genocide, torture, slavery, and other crimes against humanity are gross violations of human rights that are frequently perpetrated and legitimized in the name of nationalism, militarism, and economic development. This book tackles the question of how to make peace by taking a critical look at the primary political mechanism used to "repair" the many injuries suffered in war. With an explicit focus on reparations and human rights, it examines the broad array of abuses being perpetrated in the modern era, from genocide to loss of livelihood. Based on the experiences of anthropologists and others who document abuses and serve as expert witnesses, case studies from around the world offer insight into reparations proceedings; the ethical struggles associated with attempts to secure reparations; the professional and personal risks to researchers, victims, and human rights advocates; and how to come to terms with the political compromises of reparations in the face of the human need for justice. Waging War, Making Peace promises to be a major contribution to public policy, political science, international relations, and human rights and peace research.

Humans are good at making war—and much less successful at making peace. Genocide, torture, slavery, and other crimes against humanity are gross violations of human rights that are frequently perpetrated and legitimized in the name of nationalism, militarism, and economic development. This book tackles the question of how to make peace by taking a critical look at the primary political mechanism used to "repair" the many injuries suffered in war. With an explicit focus on reparations and human rights, it examines the broad array of abuses being perpetrated in the modern era, from genocide to loss of livelihood. Based on the experiences of anthropologists and others who document abuses and serve as expert witnesses, case studies from around the world offer insight into reparations proceedings; the ethical struggles associated with attempts to secure reparations; the professional and personal risks to researchers, victims, and human rights advocates; and how to come to terms with the political compromises of reparations in the face of the human need for justice. Waging War, Making Peace promises to be a major contribution to public policy, political science, international relations, and human rights and peace research.

Debates about humanitarian intervention endure because they pose some of the most important political, legal, and moral questions of our time: about the meaning of sovereignty, the nature of international law, the just use of force, and the nature of international order. Humanitarian intervention in practice remains highly contentious because of the irreconcilable tension between the hope of achieving liberal internationalist aims using the ultimate realist means, military force. The book begins by looking at the most contemporary conundrum in the debate about humanitarian war: the concept of the "responsibility to protect" civilians in other countries from grave human rights abuses, even by resort to force, and traces the debate at three levels. First, it shows how decision makers grappled with three main aspects of decisions to use force: authorization, justification, and obligation. Second, the unique contexts of four NATO nations-- Britain, France, Germany, and the United States-- are examined in light of how they influenced national decisions about war. Third, the analysis traces three distinct currents of thought, or worldviews, regarding intervention.

“Vivid…Barron has given us a rich and detailed history.” —The New York Times Book Review “Ambitious...a deep history and a thoughtful inquiry into how the constitutional system of checks and balances has functioned when it comes to waging war and making peace.” —The Washington Post A timely account of a raging debate: The history of the ongoing struggle between the presidents and Congress over who has the power to declare and wage war. The Constitution states that it is Congress that declares war, but it is the presidents who have more often taken us to war and decided how to wage it. In Waging War, David J. Barron opens with an account of George Washington and the Continental Congress over Washington’s plan to burn New York City before the British invasion. Congress ordered him not to, and he obeyed. Barron takes us through all the wars that followed: 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American war, World Wars One and Two, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and now, most spectacularly, the War on Terror. Congress has criticized George W. Bush for being too aggressive and Barack Obama for not being aggressive enough, but it avoids a vote on the matter. By recounting how our presidents have declared and waged wars, Barron shows that these executives have had to get their way without openly defying Congress. Waging War shows us our country’s revered and colorful presidents at their most trying times—Washington, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Johnson, both Bushes, and Obama. Their wars have made heroes of some and victims of others, but most have proved adept at getting their way over reluctant or hostile Congresses. The next president will face this challenge immediately—and the Constitution and its fragile system of checks and balances will once again be at the forefront of the national debate.

Scott Ritter, former Marine and UN weapons inspector, argues that there is a growing despondency amongst the anti-war movement. Ritter proposes the anti-war movement seek guidance from sources they normally spurn — that one must study the "enemy" in order to learn the art of campaigning and of waging battles when necessary. They need to understand the pro-war movement's decision-making cycle, then undertake a comprehensive course of action.

Waging Peace offers the first fully comprehensive study of Eisenhower's "New Look" program of national security, which provided the groundwork for the next three decades of America's Cold War strategy. Though the Cold War itself and the idea of containment originated under Truman, it was left to Eisenhower to develop the first coherent and sustainable strategy for addressing the issues unique to the nuclear age. To this end, he designated a decision-making system centered around the National Security Council to take full advantage of the expertise and data from various departments and agencies and of the judgment of his principal advisors. The result was the formation of a "long haul" strategy of preventing war and Soviet expansion and of mitigating Soviet hostility. Only now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, can Eisenhower's achievement be fully appreciated. This book will be of much interest to scholars and students of the Eisenhower era, diplomatic history, the Cold War, and contemporary foreign policy.

How American Soldiers Opposed and Resisted the War in Vietnam While mainstream narratives of the Vietnam War all but marginalize anti-war activity of soldiers, opposition and resistance from within the three branches of the military made a real difference to the course of America’s engagement in Vietnam. By 1968, every major peace march in the United States was led by active duty GIs and Vietnam War veterans. By 1970, thousands of active duty soldiers and marines were marching in protest in US cities. Hundreds of soldiers and marines in Vietnam were refusing to fight; tens of thousands were deserting to Canada, France and Sweden. Eventually the US Armed Forces were no longer able to sustain large-scale offensive operations and ceased to be effective. Yet this history is largely unknown and has been glossed over in much of the written and visual remembrances produced in recent years. Waging Peace in Vietnam shows how the GI movement unfolded, from the numerous anti-war coffee houses springing up outside military bases, to the hundreds of GI newspapers giving an independent voice to active soldiers, to the stockade revolts and the strikes and near-mutinies on naval vessels and in the air force. The book presents first-hand accounts, oral histories, and a wealth of underground newspapers, posters, flyers, and photographs documenting the actions of GIs and veterans who took part in the resistance. In addition, the book features fourteen original essays by leading scholars and activists. Notable contributors include Vietnam War scholar and author, Christian Appy, and Mme Nguyen Thi Binh, who played a major role in the Paris Peace Accord. The book originates from the exhibition Waging Peace, which has been shown in Vietnam and the University of Notre Dame, and will be touring the eastern United States in conjunction with book launches in Boston, Amherst, and New York.

As the U.S. experience in Iraq following the 2003 invasion made abundantly clear, failure to properly plan for risks associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction can have a devastating impact on the overall success of a military mission. In Waging War, Planning Peace, Aaron Rapport investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars. He argues that research from psychology—specifically, construal level theory—can help explain how individuals reason about the costs of postconflict noncombat operations that they perceive as lying in the distant future.In addition to preparations for "Phase IV" in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Rapport looks at the occupation of Germany after World War II, the planned occupation of North Korea in 1950, and noncombat operations in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Applying his insights to these cases, he finds that civilian and military planners tend to think about near-term tasks in concrete terms, seriously assessing the feasibility of the means they plan to employ to secure valued ends. For tasks they perceive as further removed in time, they tend to focus more on the desirability of the overarching goals they are pursuing rather than the potential costs, risks, and challenges associated with the means necessary to achieve these goals. Construal level theory, Rapport contends, provides a coherent explanation of how a strategic disconnect can occur. It can also show postwar planners how to avoid such perilous missteps.

Making War and Building Peace examines how well United Nations peacekeeping missions work after civil war. Statistically analyzing all civil wars since 1945, the book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn't. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, however, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertaken by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN's role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded.

A revealing examination looks at the decision-making in four NATO capitals about waging war in Kosovo and Iraq. Written by a combat veteran who also served on the faculty of the Naval War College, Waging War to Make Peace: U.S. Intervention in Global Conflicts is a thought-provoking analysis of the decision to make war in the modern world. The subject is examined through the lens of the decision-making of four NATO nations—Britain, France, Germany, and the United States—in the 1999 Kosovo campaign compared to their decisions in 2003 regarding the Iraq war. What emerges is a picture of how the bitter dispute over Iraq was the result of disagreements about who has the authority to wage war, when it is justified, and whether nations have an obligation to intervene in the case of human rights and humanitarian emergencies. The book shows how those who enthusiastically hailed a new era of warfare based upon human rights and humanitarian values misjudged the significance of the Kosovo decision, and it underscores issues with which leaders must come to grips if NATO allies are to avoid broader disputes in the years ahead.