Us Relations With Southeast Asia In 2018

"This book is the result of a workshop of the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC) held in July 2010"--P. ix.

The United States maintains a comprehensive and robust presence throughout Southeast Asia that has grown dramatically since the 1980s. It includes the commercial, security, education and diplomatic, and other domains. America’s strengths and contributions to the region lie particularly in both hard and soft power, but the U.S. economic footprint is both broad and deep. However, this presence is not very well appreciated or reported by regional media — whereas China’s presence and influence is pervasive. Most Southeast Asian governments are often reluctant to recognize or publicize the U.S. presence or contributions to regional security, stability, and growth. America’s diplomatic engagement of ASEAN and the region has rightly been criticized for its episodic engagement, and Washington should substantially elevate Southeast Asia within its broader Asian and Indo-Pacific diplomatic priorities. Southeast Asia was made the highest priority ever for Washington during the Obama administration. While receding somewhat under the Trump administration, the region remains an important priority — but Washington must devote sustained attention to match the region’s importance to American national interests. As U.S.–China competition escalates, Southeast Asia will become an epicentre of this competition. Southeast Asian states and societies may not realize the significance of the escalating U.S.–China competition for them, as most countries are internally preoccupied and buy into ASEAN’s rhetoric of inclusive engagement of external powers. Southeast Asian countries are likely to become increasing objects of this competition, and it will be become increasingly difficult for them to ignore it. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian states and ASEAN must elevate their own emphasis and engagement with the United States. The U.S. brings many more strengths and benefits than does China and is a far more comprehensive actor in the region. In particular, it would be helpful if ASEAN and its member states would more publicly recognize the contributions and importance of the United States.

The Nixon or Guam Doctrine of 1969 stressed the importance of progress towards regional cooperation and Asian collective security, indicating that Asian countries themselves should take the initiative in creating programs in which the United States could participate. This book analyses the development of United States regional cooperation policy on Southeast Asia and its importance to long-term planning for the region that had been the general aim of successive American post-war administrations. The author demonstrates the link between economic regional cooperation and collective security in Southeast Asia, placing regionalism in an international context by examining the influence United States policy and various important events had on the development of Southeast Asian regionalism. Through the analysis of primary material, including previously classified material, in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia and engagement with historiography of war and peace in Southeast Asia, the book puts forward the argument that Southeast Asian regional cooperation was influenced by both American and Asian policy and its development reflected the economic and political transformation of the post-war Southeast Asian landscape. It also examines the developments in British and Australian policy and how developments in Southeast Asia influenced and, in turn, were affected by the policies of the Western powers. Adding to the current discourse concerning the origins of Southeast Asian regionalism, this book will be of interest to academics in the field of Southeast Asian studies, United States political history, international relations and regionalism.

The United States maintains a comprehensive and robust presence throughout Southeast Asia that has grown dramatically since the 1980s. It includes the commercial, security, education and diplomatic, and other domains. America{u2019}s strengths and contributions to the region lie particularly in both hard and soft power, but the U.S. economic footprint is both broad and deep. However, this presence is not very well appreciated or reported by regional media {u2014} whereas China{u2019}s presence and influence is pervasive. Most Southeast Asian governments are often reluctant to recognize or publicize the U.S. presence or contributions to regional security, stability, and growth. America{u2019}s diplomatic engagement of ASEAN and the region has rightly been criticized for its episodic engagement, and Washington should substantially elevate Southeast Asia within its broader Asian and Indo-Pacific diplomatic priorities. Southeast Asia was made the highest priority ever for Washington during the Obama administration. While receding somewhat under the Trump administration, the region remains an important priority {u2014} but Washington must devote sustained attention to match the region{u2019}s importance to American national interests. As U.S.-China competition escalates, Southeast Asia will become an epicentre of this competition. Southeast Asian states and societies may not realize the significance of the escalating U.S.-China competition for them, as most countries are internally preoccupied and buy into ASEAN{u2019}s rhetoric of inclusive engagement of external powers. Southeast Asian countries are likely to become increasing objects of this competition, and it will be become increasingly difficult for them to ignore it. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian states and ASEAN must elevate their own emphasis and engagement with the United States. The U.S. brings many more strengths and benefits than does China and is a far more comprehensive actor in the region. In particular, it would be helpful if ASEAN and its member states would more publicly recognize the contributions and importance of the United States.

"Though a central part of our modern history, Southeast Asia has tended to be relegated to the backwaters of U.S. foreign policy - except at moments of crisis. The July 1997 collapse of the Thai baht that threatened to destabilize the world financial markets was a chilling reminder of Southeast Asia's importance - and of the complex challenge it poses for the United States. The 1999 East Timor crisis was another tragic event that caught America off guard. The U.S. experience in Asia - where we have fought three wars in the past six decades - instructs that we ignore the region only at great cost." "The Independent Task Force on the United States and Southeast Asia sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and chaired by former Senator Robert Kerrey, was formed to examine these issues. The Task Force found that instability or conflict in Southeast Asia - whether financial instability, genocide in Cambodia, turmoil in Indonesia, or potential conflict in the South China Sea - can rapidly become a matter of major global import that could ultimately threaten U.S. vital interests. The Task Force also concluded that U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia has been perceived in the region as hectoring, unnecessarily ad hoc, overbearing, and reactive." "The Task Force assessment and recommendations offer some guidance for more focused, better-integrated, and more valuable U.S. relations with Southeast Asia at a time of transition."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved