Us Nato Russian Strategic Stability And The War In Ukraine

This paper analyzes the role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s war in Ukraine as well as the war’s impact on overall US/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–Russian strategic stability. Strategic stability refers to the existence of two conditions: (1) crisis stability, where there is no incentive for either country to conduct a first nuclear strike, and (2) arms race stability, where there is no incentive for either country to augment its nuclear arsenal to gain significant advantages over the other’s. The paper uses open-source data to analyze the immediate and longer-terms impacts of the Russo-Ukrainian war on both crisis stability and on arms race stability. Because many of the potential nuclear escalation pathways involve escalation from the use of conventional (non-nuclear) weapons, this paper also necessarily explores the interactions between conventional war and potential nuclear use.

For three decades after the Cold War, NATO member states no longer faced a major threat, and focussed on out-of-area operations. They took the opportunity to reduce defence spending and foster their own national defence industries; interoperability was limited to air and maritime missions on a small scale. The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and war by proxy in eastern Donbass was a wake-up call, while China’s creeping seizure and fortification of islands in the South China Sea, as well as its relentless acquisition of Western technologies, similarly alerted the Western leadership to a less benign strategic environment. But the real shift occurred in 2022. China and Russia not only announced their ‘unlimited friendship’, but made clear their intention to reduce American hegemony by breaking up the NATO alliance and its Pacific equivalents. This volume is the first account of the challenges and solutions for so-called strategic integration in this coercive global situation. The contributors show, thematically and through selected national case-studies, how strategic integration and interoperability are conceived, debated, problematised and resolved. The chapters are written with specific reference to the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has galvanised a new era of integration and alliance cooperation within NATO.

This unique analysis of Soviet and Russian defense affairs provides an authoritative and thoroughly documented assessment from a former Soviet foreign policy insider. As an active and informed participant, Sokov's discussion of the evolution of the Soviet and Russian strategic posture offers fascinating and illuminating firsthand insights into Soviet weapons systems, elite decisionmaking, and bureaucratic politics during both the Soviet and Russian periods. The book thus casts light not merely on the development of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs, but on a much broader spectrum of issues linked to Soviet and Russian security policy formulation. With its combination of informed analysis and use of new documentation, this work will be invaluable for all concerned with U.S.-Russian strategic relations.

This book examines the recent changes in strategic stability, caused by the collapse of the international security architecture. Against the background of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, international experts discuss topics and critical issues such as the revanchist strategy of Russia and the readiness of the United States (US) and Europe to give an adequate response; the influence of new technologies in the future of nuclear deterrence; and the crumbling of the arms control and nonproliferation system under the new challenges. The book explains how the combination of these factors lead to a crucial change of strategic stability and the international security landscape, the first such change since the end of the Cold War. Divided into three parts, the book presents timely analyses on (1) US, Russia: New Challenges and Strategic Stability in Europe; (2) Extended Deterrence and Arms Control in Europe; and (3) Regional Dimensions of Strategic Stability in Europe. It further offers perspectives from and case studies on different countries, such as Ukraine, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA, Turkey, Poland, and Romania. This book is a must-read for scholars for international relations, as well as policy-makers interested in a better understanding of the changing international security architecture, Russia's strategy, arms control, nonproliferation, and the future of nuclear deterrence.

This open access volume surveys the state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging. Bringing together insights from world-leading experts from three continents, the volume identifies the most pressing strategic challenges, frames theoretical concepts, and describes new strategies. The use and utility of deterrence in today’s strategic environment is a topic of paramount concern to scholars, strategists and policymakers. Ours is a period of considerable strategic turbulence, which in recent years has featured a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons used in defence postures across different theatres; a dramatic growth in the scale of military cyber capabilities and the frequency with which these are used; and rapid technological progress including the proliferation of long-range strike and unmanned systems. These military-strategic developments occur in a polarized international system, where cooperation between leading powers on arms control regimes is breaking down, states widely make use of hybrid conflict strategies, and the number of internationalized intrastate proxy conflicts has quintupled over the past two decades. Contemporary conflict actors exploit a wider gamut of coercive instruments, which they apply across a wider range of domains. The prevalence of multi-domain coercion across but also beyond traditional dimensions of armed conflict raises an important question: what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century? Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of Western and non-Western actors in order to assess how they hold up in today’s world. Air Commodore Professor Dr. Frans Osinga is the Chair of the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the Special Chair in War Studies at the University Leiden. Dr. Tim Sweijs is the Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Research Fellow at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda.

NATO force posture upon its return to Europe : too little, too late / John R. Deni -- NATO's return : implications for extended deterrence / Schuyler Foerster -- Prospects and options for NATO's enlargement policy to Ukraine and beyond / Andrew T. Wolff -- NATO's territorial defense : the global approach and the regional approach / Magnus Petersson -- Still learning? NATO's Afghan lessons beyond the Ukraine crisis / Sten Rynning -- European security at a crossroads after Ukraine? institutionalization of partnerships and compliance with NATO's security policies / Ivan Dinev Ivanov -- The purpose of NATO partnership : sustaining liberal order beyond the Ukraine crisis / Rebecca R. Moore -- NATO-Russia technical cooperation : unheralded prospects / Damon Coletta -- The Ukraine crisis and beyond : strategic opportunity or strategic dilemma for the China-Russia strategic partnership? / Huiyun Feng -- Conclusion and comment : NATO's ever evolving identity / Stanley R. Sloan

The transition from the end of the Cold War to a new world order is both promising and perilous. The US and its NATO allies were caught largely unprepared by the rapid collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the sudden demise of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany - events that redrew the map of East Central Europe and shifted US security concerns eastward in Eurasia. They also redefined security as a condition based more on the prevention or containment of regional and civic conflicts, compared with the Cold War expectations of global or nuclear war. The next century is certain to strain US and NATO strategy considerably, if indeed NATO survives at all. A new group of interstate institutions for European security will compete for the right to claim pre-eminence in security issues. International peace-keeping and peace enforcement, whether United Nations-directed or regionally sponsored, will also challenge traditional definitions or military missions. Changes will also occur in the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy. US and Russian strategic nuclear forces will be drastically reduced, and both states will take other steps to dampen the nuclear arms race. The antagonists of the Cold War will be the collaborators of the next century in seeking to stabilize conflicts inside and outside Europe.

The term strategic stability is surrounded by tremendous controversy. In the text of this monograph it is defined as a situation between adversaries in which they are deterred from war on a strategic level (involving attacks against industrial base, center of population, or strategic military forces). The purpose of this paper is to examine U.S. national military strategy and assess to what extent current military doctrine on the employment of conventional forces has kept pace with the realities of the nuclear age. I will examine the viability and role of conventional forces in NATO and five assessment of their deterrence credibility and contribution to the NATO traid defense posture of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces. This analysis should prove to be militarily significant by providing an in depth look at current U.S. strategy concerning conventional forces deployed in NATO. (fr).

U.S. and Western relations with Russia remain challenged as Russia increasingly reasserts itself on the global stage. Russia remains driven by a worldview based on existential threats-real, perceived, and contrived. As a vast, 11-time zone Eurasian nation with major demographic and economic challenges, Russia faces multiple security dilemmas internally and along its vulnerable and expansive borders. Exhibiting a reactive xenophobia stemming from a long history of destructive war and invasion along most of its borders, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and perceived Western slights, Russia increasingly threatens others and lashes outward. However, time is not on Russia's side, as it has entered into a debilitating status quo that includes unnecessary confrontation with the West, multiple unresolved military commitments, a sanctions-strained and only partially diversified economy, looming domestic tensions, and a rising China directly along its periphery.Washington still has an opportunity to carefully improve U.S.-Russia relations and regain a more stable relationship in the near term, but only if activities and initiatives are based on a firm and frank appreciation of each other's core interests, including those of their allies and partners. In a dual-track approach, the United States and its allies must continue to work closely to deter any destabilizing Russian behavior ranging from corrosive gray zone disinformation activities-including malign cyber efforts to erode Western democracies-up to full and overt military aggression. Simultaneously, rebuilding atrophied conduits between key American and Russian political and military leadership is imperative in order to calm today's distrustful and increasingly mean-spirited relations, to seek and positively act upon converging interests, and to avert potential incidents or accidents that could potentially lead to dangerous brinksmanship. Notably the July 2018 Trump-Putin summit failed to bring any positive developments to the U.S.-Russia relationship; however, pragmatic efforts to bridge major and increasingly dangerous divides must continue. Perhaps most notable during the summit was the emphasis made by both sides that the weakened arms control regimen and overall strategic stability be addressed to stop a dangerous drift toward renewed nuclear weapons development and competition. Yet in recent months, the relationship has only continued to weaken on multiple fronts too numerous to summarize, including Russian actions against Ukraine in the Sea of Azov and the end of the 31-year Intermediate Nuclear Weapons Treaty signed in 1987 by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan.

"The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is in the process of implementing posture enhancements to increase capabilities on its eastern flank, and the escalation in tensions between Russia and NATO since 2014 has led analysts to propose measures that are even more extensive. However, Russia's likely reactions to such posture enhancements remain understudied. In this report, we develop a framework that analysts can use to assess likely Russian reactions to ongoing and proposed NATO posture enhancements in Europe. We develop this framework by assessing Russian strategic writing, the broader international relations literature, and the history of post-Cold War interactions between Russia and NATO. Our analysis suggests that Russian reactions will depend on 11 key factors that capture the strategic context, the Russian domestic context, and the characteristics of the proposed posture enhancements. We then illustrate how this framework can be applied in practice by assessing Russia's potential reactions to both planned and proposed enhancements. These assessments highlight the importance of clear analysis of Russian perceptions of NATO's intentions and commitment, domestic threats to the Russian regime, and the cost sensitivity of the Russian leadership"--Publisher's description.