Understanding The Militarys Role In Ending State Sponsored Terrorism

Countries sponsoring and supporting terrorism impede the efforts of the United States and the international community to fight terrorism. Until states that support terrorism cease such sponsorship, they remain a critical foundation for terrorist groups and their operations. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the U.S. military's role in coercing states to cease their sponsorship of terrorism. Using game theory, this thesis analyzes the utility of military force against state-sponsored terrorism. It explains why past military responses did not pose a credible threat and were thus, an ineffective instrument of national power. It then examines how military force is employed in the current war on terrorism. The findings of this thesis suggest that the limited military strikes employed against states for their role in terrorist attacks prior to September 11, 2001, preconditioned the leaders of supportive states to believe U.S. leadership lacked commitment in its strategy to end state-sponsored terrorism. The findings also suggest the dramatic change in the United Stat method of employing its military forces against state sponsors of terrorism after September 11, 2001, created the credible, coercive military threat required to accomplish the U.S. national objective of ending state- sponsored terrorism.

"This paper reviews the current legislation and policies that govern the military's role when supporting law enforcement in a domestic terrorism crisis and highlights some of the issues confronting the U.S. government. To fully understand the military's role in domestic crisis response it is necessary to explore existing national level structures and response options prior to the involvement of military forces. Crisis management is predominately a law enforcement function that manages the resources necessary to prevent or resolve a terrorist incident, including one involving WMD. Current U.S. government terrorism response policy is contained in presidential directives. Among other matters, these directives address National Security Council structure and federal agency crisis response roles when responding to a domestic terrorism incident. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command has not yet changed the basic roles and relationships described herein.

States that sponsor terrorism pose one of the greatest policy and security challenges of the 21st century. Over the past decade, the United States and coalition allies have invested over a trillion dollars in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, both waged, in part, to end their support for terrorism. Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas makes negotiations over its nuclear program tremendously difficult and the prospect of an Iranian nuclear umbrella, under which these groups could operate, especially concerning. Likewise, Qaddafi's overthrow and the siege on Assad's regime in Syria have both been justified in the context of their historic support for terrorists, as well as the more recent normative concern for the repression of their people. This paper moves beyond a simple explanation of state sponsorship as covert war or way to persuade target states to concede policy objectives. Rather, it models state sponsored terrorism as a leader survival strategy that leaders choose when facing simultaneous internal and external threats. By investing a portion of the state's military power outside the control of the military and into terrorist groups and the security services that arm and train them, the leader is able to signal competency to other elites in his coalition and insulate himself from existing threats of coup d'état from the military while avoiding defeat in external conflict. Using a newly constructed dataset on state sponsorship that uses the leader-year (1968-2001) as the unit of analysis (N=5139), this study finds that many existing explanations for state sponsorship do not withstand empirical testing and that the combined level of high external threat and elevated threat of coup d'état are key determinants of a leader's decision to sponsor terrorist groups. This work has tremendous implications for US security policy as current practices, such as regime-targeted sanctions, may have the unintended effect of increasing the level of threat that the leader experiences and thus the likelihood of state sponsorship. These insights highlight a major reason why military strikes and economic sanctions are less successful than regime change for ending state sponsorship. Furthermore, it suggests that carefully reducing the external and internal levels of threat the leader faces may be the most effective method to end state sponsorship of terrorism.

"This book provides an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Islamic State in battle"--

The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism systematically integrates the substantial body of scholarship on terrorism and counterterrorism before and after 9/11. In doing so, it introduces scholars and practitioners to state of the art approaches, methods, and issues in studying and teaching these vital phenomena. This Handbook goes further than most existing collections by giving structure and direction to the fast-growing but somewhat disjointed field of terrorism studies. The volume locates terrorism within the wider spectrum of political violence instead of engaging in the widespread tendency towards treating terrorism as an exceptional act. Moreover, the volume makes a case for studying terrorism within its socio-historical context. Finally, the volume addresses the critique that the study of terrorism suffers from lack of theory by reviewing and extending the theoretical insights contributed by several fields - including political science, political economy, history, sociology, anthropology, criminology, law, geography, and psychology. In doing so, the volume showcases the analytical advancements and reflects on the challenges that remain since the emergence of the field in the early 1970s.

Since the previous National Military Strategy (2011_, global disorder has significantly increased while some of our comparative military advantage has begun to erode. We now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and transregional networks of sub-state groups -- all taking advantage of rapid technological change. This 2015 National Military Strategy describes how the U.S. will employ our military forces to protect and advance our national interests. We must be able to rapidly adapt to new threats while maintaining comparative advantage over traditional ones. Future conflicts will come more rapidly, last longer, and take place on a much more technically challenging battlefield. Success will increasingly depend on how well our military instrument can support the other instruments of power and enable our network of allies and partners. Figures. This is a print on demand report.

Mercenaries are more powerful than experts realize, a grave oversight. Those who assume they are cheap imitations of national armed forces invite disaster because for-profit warriors are a wholly different genus and species of fighter. Private military companies such as the Wagner Group are more like heavily armed multinational corporations than the Marine Corps. Their employees are recruited from different countries, and profitability is everything. Patriotism is unimportant, and sometimes a liability. Unsurprisingly, mercenaries do not fight conventionally, and traditional war strategies used against them may backfire.

Although military power is only one component of the portfolio of instruments that can be brought to bear in the fight against terrorist groups, military capabilities play unique and crucial roles in the overall strategy. These capabilities will call for a mix of forces somewhat different from those fielded today as well as new concepts and technologies. Equally challenging will be the tasks of training/advising friendly forces and protecting forces and interests around the world.

A military response has been a viable option for combating international terrorism in the past and it will continue to be an option in the future. Possible military actions range from rescuing hostages to neutralizing terrorist camps and making direct strikes against targets verified as the infrastructure for state-sponsored training and support complexes of complex groups. The military response is part of a larger strategy that seeks to maximize the risk of punishment for terrorists and their sponsors and supporters while minimizing their potential rewards. In this context military action must be consistent with international law. If states decide that all means are justified, then those acting to preserve the rule of law in the face of the terrorist threat will become indistinguishable from the evil they seek to undo. Colonel Erickson?s study presents an overview of international law directed at the issue of managing international terrorism. This study is thought provoking and provides the decision-maker with a useful tool. Of particular note is the checklist provided in appendix A that summarizes chapters 4-6. It behooves everyone dedicated to achieving a world free from terror to learn more of this phenomenon and how we can deal with it. Colonel Erickson?s study, for the first time and in one place, makes available a general survey of international law concerning this subject. I highly recommend his study. Robert W. Norris Major General, United States Air Force The Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force