Transnational Business Governance Interactions And Technical Systems In Global Finance

Most transnational regulatory problems involve technical systems: extended sets of productive connections between humans, organized knowledge, and material objects. The functioning and relations between transnational business governance (TBG) schemes in any particular issue area are usually shaped by these technical systems. These technical systems and the material world that they interact with are not simply exogenous environments for TBG schemes. Individual TBG schemes can enhance their power and influence by expanding their function in a technical system, by incorporating the material aspects of the system into their activities, or by producing the system's technical knowledge. I hypothesize that where a robust technical system exists, the degree of integration and the need for coordination of the activities it involves will mean that in most cases that technical system will be coordinated overall by only one TBG scheme. There are two exceptions: where technical systems overlap; or where the system is so weak that competitive pressures outweigh the factors contributing to specialization. The article develops these themes by drawing on theories that have focused on the social and political aspects of technical systems. The article identifies the contributions and limits of these theories and of a focus on technical systems in analyzing interactions among TBG schemes. The relevance of the theoretical points is assessed with regard to the TBG schemes that are active in global finance.

From agriculture to sport and from climate change to indigenous rights, transnational regulatory regimes and actors are multiplying and interacting with poorly understood effects. This interdisciplinary book investigates whether, how and by whom transnational business governance interactions (TBGIs) can be harnessed to improve the quality of transnational regulation and advance the interests of marginalized actors.

The role of business in global governance is now widely recognized, but exploration of its role in global financial governance has been more haphazard than systematic. This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of the role of transnational financial associations (TFAs) in the organization of global finance. This book develops three theoretical themes of assemblage, functionality, and power as enrolment. These themes challenge approaches that treat financial power as emanating from a single location or force. Whilst existing approaches tend to treat TFAs as irrelevant or as merely transmitting power originating elsewhere, this book argues that power must be created by painstakingly assembling actors, networks, and objects that are often quite autonomous and working at cross purposes to one another--a process in which TFAs play a central role. The book explores these themes in chapters examining the roles of TFAs in interacting with public authorities, constructing global financial markets, and creating financial communities. The authors additionally analyse the roles of TFAs in the European Union, in the Global South, and in promoting goals other than profitability, including Islamic finance, microfinancing, savings banks and cooperatives. Making a distinctive contribution to our understanding of global finance and global governance, Transnational Financial Associations and the Governance of Global Finance is an important book for students and scholars of international political economy, finance, global governance and international relations.

Since the summer of 2007, the world scenario has been dominated by the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and its repercussions on global financial markets and economic growth. As banks around the world wrote down their losses and governments intervened to rescue domestic financial institutions, financial distress severely hit the real economy leading to what has been widely defined as the worst recession since the 1930s. Under these conditions, along with the immediate concern for stemming the effects of the crisis, policy-makers around the world have been debating the long-term measures that have to be adopted in order to reduce the likelihood of future crises and to ensure stable economic growth. Although this debate has not yet produced significant transformations, it indicates a renewed concern about the institutional architecture that is meant to govern the global economic and financial system. This book tackles the issue of what the governance of the global economic and financial system looks like and what the prospects for its reform are. Specifically, the book will address the following three main themes: Governance: What is governance in the international economic system? What forms does it take? How did it come about? How can we study it?; Functions of governance: What are the functions of global economic governance? Who performs them? What are the rules and mechanisms that make global governance possible? Problems and prospects of governance: What are the problems in global economic governance? Is there a trade-off between legitimacy and efficiency? What are the prospects for reform of global economic governance in the aftermath of the global financial crisis? This book will: _ Provide a thorough analysis of the issues at stake in designing international rules and institutions able to govern the global economy; _ Illustrate and analyze virtually all the main institutions, rules, and arrangements that make up global economic governance, inscribing them within the function these institutions, rules, and arrangements are meant to perform; _ Discuss the problems that affect today’s global economic governance and assess alternative proposals to reform the international financial architecture.

In this era of globalisation, different legal systems and structures no longer operate within their own jurisdictions. The effects of decisions, policies and political developments are having an increasingly wide-reaching impact. Nowhere is this more keenly felt than in the sphere of European Union law. This collection of essays contributes to the co-operative search for interpretative and normative grids needed in charting the contemporary legal landscape. Written by leading lawyers and legal philosophers, they examine the effects of law's de-nationalisation by placing European law in the context of transnational law and demonstrate how it forces us to rethink our basic legal concepts and propose an approach to transnational law beyond the dichotomy of national and international law.

This book provides the first comprehensive account of post-crisis international regulation of derivatives by bringing together the international relations literature on regime complexity and the international political economy literature on financial regulation. It addresses three questions: What factors drove international standard-setting on derivatives post-crisis? Why did international regime complexity emerge? And how was it managed and with what outcomes? This research innovatively combines a state-centric, a transgovernmental, and business-led explanations. It examines all the main sets of standards (or elemental regimes) concerning various aspects of derivatives markets, namely: trading, clearing, and reporting of derivatives; resilience, recovery and resolution of central counterparties; capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties and derivatives; margins for derivatives non-centrally cleared. It is argued that regime complexity in derivatives ensued from the multi-dimensionality and the interlinkages of the problems to tackle, especially given the fact that it was a new policy area without a focal international standard-setter. Despite these challenges, international cooperation resulted in relatively precise, stringent, and consistent rules, even though there was variation across standards. The main jurisdictions played an important role in managing regime complexity, but their effectiveness was constrained by limited domestic coordination. Networks of regulators gathered in international standard-setting bodies deployed a variety of formal and informal coordination tools to deal with regime complexity. The financial industry, at times, lobbied for less precise and stringent rules and engaged in 'venue shopping', whereas, other times, it contributed to the quest for regulatory consistency.

This work examines the governance of large technical systems (LTS) at firm, imdustry and state levels and the interactions between the systems and society. In particular, international contributors explore the implications of major technological , economic and social changes during the last twenty years for traditional forms of LTS governance. Their research is centred around the following themes: * traditional forms of governance * new regulatory challenges * the governability of complex technologies * conceptual issues related to the governance of inter-organizational networks

What has been done since the 2008 financial crisis to reform the regulation of derivatives markets? The volume analyzes the goals, limitations, and unexpected outcomes associated with post-crisis international initiatives to regulate these markets, as well as the different transnational, inter-state, and domestic political dynamics that have shaped these outcomes.

The UK and Multi-level Financial Regulation examines the role of the United Kingdom (UK) in shaping post-crisis financial regulatory reform, and assesses the implications of the UK's withdrawal from the European Union (EU). It develops a domestic political economy approach to examine how the interaction of three domestic groups - elected officials, financial regulators, and the financial industry - shaped UK preferences, strategy, and influence in international and EU-level regulatory negotiations. The framework is applied to five case studies: bank capital and liquidity requirements; bank recovery and resolution rules; bank structural reforms; hedge fund regulation; and the regulation of over-the-counter derivatives. It concludes by reflecting on the future of UK financial regulation after Brexit. The book argues that UK regulators pursued more stringent regulation when they had strong political support to resist financial industry lobbying. UK regulators promoted international harmonisation of rules when this protected the competitiveness of industry or enabled cross-border externalities to be managed more effectively; but were often more resistant to new EU rules when these threatened UK interests. Consequently, the UK was more successful at shaping international standards by leveraging its market power, regulatory capacity, and alliance building (with the US). But it often met with greater political resistance at the EU level, forcing it to use legal challenges to block reform or secure exemptions. The book concludes that political and regulatory pressure was pivotal in defining the UK's 'hard' Brexit position, and so the future UK-EU relationship in finance will most likely be based on a framework of regulatory equivalence.

Despite the role of shadow banking in the building up of the 2008 international financial crisis, the massive size of this sector, its cross-border nature, and the risks it entails for financial stability, the post-crisis regulation of shadow banking has remained rather feeble. Why?The Perils of International Regime Complexity in Shadow Banking identifies a 'game of shadows', which unfolded recursively concerning the definition, monitoring, and regulation of shadow banking internationally. Thus, states, regulators, and private actors tended to cast light away from variousparts of the shadow banking system - shadow banking was (re)fined over time, its measurement was narrowed down, lessening the (perceived) need for regulation.The playing out of such a game was facilitated by the international architecture for shadow banking governance, which is a 'regime complex' characterized by the presence of multiple institutions and elemental regimes governing a set of related issues. Indeed, shadow banking is a quintessential casefor demonstrating the perils of international regime complexity, which magnifies problems that are endemic in governing global finance - namely, interstate competition, disagreement between technocratic bodies, and the power of the financial industry - while splintering solutions, due to thefragmentation of regulatory authority.Empirically, this book examines various elemental regimes concerning different aspects of shadow banking, namely: international standards for defining, measuring, and monitoring global shadow banking; international standards for shadow banking entities, including money market funds, hedge funds, andinvestment funds; international standards for shadow banking activities, such as securitization, securities lending, and repos; international standards for bank capital exposures to shadow banking.