Trade Preferences For Less Developed Countries

Trade preferences are a key element in industrial countries' efforts to assist the integration of least developed countries (LDCs) into the world economy. Brenton provides an initial evaluation of the impact of the European Union's recently introduced "Everything but Arms" (EBA) initiative on the products currently exported by the LDCs. He shows that the changes introduced by the EBA initiative in 2001 are relatively minor for currently exported products, primarily because over 99 percent of EU imports from the LDCs are in products which the EU had already liberalized, and the complete removal of barriers to the key remaining products-rice, sugar, and bananas-has been delayed. Brenton looks at the role EU preferences to LDCs in general have been playing and could play in assisting the integration of the LDCs. He shows that there is considerable variation across countries in the potential impact that EU preferences can have given current export structures. There is a group of LDCs for whom EU trade preferences on existing exports are not significant since these exports are mainly of products where the most-favored-nation duty is zero. Export diversification is the key issue for these countries. For other LDCs, EU preferences have the potential to provide a more substantial impact on trade. However, the author shows that only 50 percent of EU imports from non-ACP (Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific) LDCs which are eligible actually request preferential access to the EU. The prime suspect for this low level of use are the rules of origin, both the restrictiveness of the requirements on sufficient processing and the costs and difficulties of providing the necessary documentation. More simple rules of origin are likely to enhance the impact of EU trade preferences in terms of improving market access and in stimulating diversification toward a broader range of exports.

The issue of SDT has become very topical again, following a period during which it was viewed as an outdated concept for the multilateral trading system. We therefore devote attention as well to a number of recent contributions that discuss (i) whether there is a continued need for SDT, and (ii) how this might be designed from both a development (recipient) objective and from the perspective of the trading system more generally. A major theme of the survey is that most of the issues that are debated today were already being discussed in the 1960s. We conclude that those who questioned the value of unilateral preferences have proven to be prescient.

Trade preferences are a key element in industrial countries' efforts to assist the integration of least developed countries (LDCs) into the world economy. Brenton provides an initial evaluation of the impact of the European Union's recently introduced quot;Everything but Armsquot; (EBA) initiative on the products currently exported by the LDCs. He shows that the changes introduced by the EBA initiative in 2001 are relatively minor for currently exported products, primarily because over 99 percent of EU imports from the LDCs are in products which the EU had already liberalized, and the complete removal of barriers to the key remaining products - rice, sugar, and bananas - has been delayed. Brenton looks at the role EU preferences to LDCs in general have been playing and could play in assisting the integration of the LDCs. He shows that there is considerable variation across countries in the potential impact that EU preferences can have given current export structures. There is a group of LDCs for whom EU trade preferences on existing exports are not significant since these exports are mainly of products where the most-favored-nation duty is zero. Export diversification is the key issue for these countries. For other LDCs, EU preferences have the potential to provide a more substantial impact on trade. However, the author shows that only 50 percent of EU imports from non-ACP (Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific) LDCs which are eligible actually request preferential access to the EU. The prime suspect for this low level of use are the rules of origin, both the restrictiveness of the requirements on sufficient processing and the costs and difficulties of providing the necessary documentation. More simple rules of origin are likely to enhance the impact of EU trade preferences in terms of improving market access and in stimulating diversification toward a broader range of exports.This paper - a product of the International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network - is part of a larger effort in the network to analyze the impact of trade preferences.

The proliferation of preferential trade liberalization over the last 20 years has raised the question of whether it slows down multilateral trade liberalization. Recent theoretical and empirical evidence indicates this is the case even for unilateral preferences that developed countries provide to small and poor countries but there is no estimate of the resulting welfare costs. To avoid this stumbling block effect we suggest replacing unilateral preferences by a fixed import subsidy. We argue that this scheme would reduce the drag of preferences on multilateral liberalization and generate a Pareto improvement. More importantly, we provide the first estimates of the welfare cost of preferential liberalization as a stumbling block to multilateral liberalization. By combining recent estimates of the stumbling block effect of preferences with data for 170 countries and over 5,000 products we calculate the welfare effects of the United States, European Union and Japan switching from unilateral preferences to Least Developed Countries to the import subsidy scheme. Even in a model with no dynamic gains to trade we find that the switch produces an annual net welfare gain for the 170 countries ($4,354 million) and for each group: the United States, European Union and Japan ($2,934 million), Least Developed Countries ($520 million) and the rest of the world ($900 million).

Congress has created multiple trade preference programs designed to foster economic growth, reform and development in less developed countries. These programs give temporary, non-reciprocal, duty-free U.S. market access to select exports of eligible countries. Congress conducts regular oversight of these programs, repeatedly revising and extending them. This book discusses the major U.S. trade preference programs, their possible economic effects, stakeholder interests and legislative options