Three Papers On Control Strategies For Macroeconomic Models

Macroeconomic Modelling has undergone radical changes in the last few years. There has been considerable innovation in developing robust solution techniques for the new breed of increasingly complex models. Similarly there has been a growing consensus on their long run and dynamic properties, as well as much development on existing themes such as modelling expectations and policy rules. This edited volume focuses on those areas which have undergone the most significant and imaginative developments and brings together the very best of modelling practice. We include specific sections on (I) Solving Large Macroeconomic Models, (II) Rational Expectations and Learning Approaches, (III) Macro Dynamics, and (IV) Long Run and Closures. All of the contributions offer new research whilst putting their developments firmly in context and as such will influence much future research in the area. It will be an invaluable text for those in policy institutions as well as academics and advanced students in the fields of economics, mathematics, business and government. Our contributors include those working in central banks, the IMF, European Commission and established academics.

Recent analyses of the gains to policy coordination have focussed on the strategic aspects of macroeconomic policy making in a static setting. A major theme is that noncooperative policy making is likely to be Pareto inefficient because of the presence of beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This paper extends the analysis to a dynamic setting, thereby introducing three important points of realism to the static game. First, the payoffs to beggar-thy-neighbor policies look very different in one-period and multiperiod games, and thus so do the gains to coordination. Second, we show that policy coordination may reduce economic welfare if governments are nyopic in their policy making, as is sometimes claimed. Third, governments act under a fundamental constraint that they cannot bind the actions of later governments, and we investigate how this constraint alters the gains to policy coordination.

Hardbound. This meeting provided a forum for the exchange of ideas and information on modelling and control of national economies among scientists, economists and engineers from around the world. The proceedings are separated into three parts. Part I, Modelling and Control, is concerned with macro-economic models, growth models, input-output models, state-space models and evaluation models, adaptive control, optimal control, coordinated decentralized control and predictive control policies and evaluation methods. Part II, Games, Forecasting and Optimization, includes papers related to nonconvex games, multiobjective decision-making, macro-economic forecasting models and methods, multilevel and hierarchical optimization. Part III, Intelligent Management Systems, reflects the new progress of artificial intelligence in management and economies, such as IMS-intelligent management systems design, implementation and applications, intelligen