Thirty Eighth Progress Report

Thirty-eighth report of Session 2010-12 : Documents considered by the Committee on 19 July 2011, including the following recommendation for debate, EU enlargement: Croatia

Tax lost through the hidden economy could be over £2 billion and involve some 2 million people. HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) spent 41 million in 2006-07 on encouraging people and businesses into the formal economy, detecting and imposing sanctions on those operating in the hidden economy, achieving a return/cost ration of 4.5:1. HMRC detects some 30,000 hidden economy cases a year, a detection rate of only around 1.5 per cent, but the amount of tax recovered has increased by 13 per cent in real terms since 2003-04. Areas of risk include: self-employed builders and decorators who often receive cash payments; individuals who trade on the internet; and buy-to-let landlords. To increase detections HMRC is making more use of data matching techniques, and the Tax Evasion hotline received over 120,000 calls in 2006-07, but progress in investigating cases has been slow with only 2000 completed against a target of 5,500. HMRC can impose penalties of up to 100 per cent of tax owed, but usually imposes a lower penalty or waives them. Prosecutions are not given much publicity, limiting their wider deterrent effect. Advertising campaigns to encourage people to declare tax owed have led to 8,300 registrations bringing in extra tax of £38 million over three years. Offshore Disclosure arrangements have been even more successful following landmark rulings requiring financial institutions to release details of around 400,000 offshore accounts. Some 45,000 people came forward bringing in around £400 million at a cost of £6 million, a return of £67 for every £1 spent.

In July 2002, the Government announced a public expenditure increase of £61 billion over three years, to be targeted at improving key public services. The three largest recipients of the extra funding were the Department for Education and Skills, the Department of Health and the Department for Transport. Following on from a NAO report on this topic (HCP 234, session 2003-04; ISBN 0102927103) published in January 2004, the Committee's report examines how these departments are using their extra resources, focusing on three main issues: the complexity of the service deliver chain, how they can secure further improvements in service quality, and performance monitoring and benchmarking. Conclusions reached include that, complex delivery chains and financing mechanisms need to be simplified, and a direct link established between funding and specific targets for service improvements. As all three departments deliver services indirectly through a network of partners and contractors, they need to ensure delivery partners have sufficient capability and capacity to deliver services effectively. Departments should also share information on their plans to increase delivery capacity more widely among key suppliers.

The Inland Revenue collects over £200 billion a year in tax and National Insurance contributions from 30 million taxpayers, ranging from individuals to multinational corporations. The total amount of debt from unpaid taxes stood at £12 billion at the end of March 2004, of which £3 billion was more than a year old. Following on from a NAO report (HCP 363, session 2003-04; ISBN 0102927596) published in March 2004, the Committee has examined the progress made by the Inland Revenue to speed up debt recovery, whether more can be done to encourage prompt payment and the application of good practice in debt management. Findings include that the Department should impose a surcharge on persistent late payers; use other government departmental records to find taxpayers it cannot trace; seek additional powers for enforcing debts similar to those of other tax authorities; and include debt management data in its performance measures.

This is the 52nd report from the Committee of Public Accounts (HC 571, session 2007-08, ISBN 9780215524928), and it follows an NAO report (HC 342, session 2007-08, ISBN 9780102953114). It looks at protection of consumers through removal of price controls by regulators, examines the benefits of this decision to different groups of consumers and the challenges of regulating these markets. The regulators Ofcom, Ofgem and Postcomm have statutory objectives requiring them to protect consumers through the introduction of competition, where appropriate. Between 2002 and 2006, each removed retail price controls from the following: fixed line telephone provision; gas and electricity supply; special delivery postal services for business account users. Once price controls are removed, regulators rely on consumers to switch suppliers, so in theory rewarding companies who offer good service and competitive prices. For this to work, consumers need good information about the different suppliers, must be able to switch supplier easily, have confidence in the market to believe changing supplier will make a difference and, when necessary, obtain redress if the company behaves anti-competitively. Regulators need to ensure the competition is working effectively and that there is protection for vulnerable consumers, especially at a time of large increases in energy prices and telecoms prices above those of most countries.