The Us Export Control System And The Export Control Reform Initiative

This report looks at how the 112th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system.

This report discusses some of the proposed legislation and other issues related to the U.S. export control system. In considering the future of the U.S. export control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a unified export control system -- the end result of the President's proposal -- or the continuation of the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing the present Export Administration Act (EAA) or writing new legislation. In doing so, Congress may debate the record of the present dual-use system maintained by emergency authority, the aims and effectiveness of the present non-proliferation control regimes, the maintenance of the defense industrial base, and the delicate balance between the maintenance of economic competitiveness and the preservation of national security.

The U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies-as well as some military items, are licensed by the Department of Commerce-munitions are licensed by the Department of State, and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Treasury. Administrative enforcement of export controls is conducted by these agencies, while criminal enforcement is carried out by the Department of Commerce, units of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and by the Department of Justice (DOJ).

The 113th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense items or munitions; so-called "dual-use" goods and technology-items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. At present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities. The U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies are licensed by the Department of Commerce, munitions are licensed by the Department of State, and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Treasury. Enforcement of export controls is conducted by these agencies as well as by units of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Export Control Reform Initiative - Strategic Trade Authorization License Exception (US Bureau of Industry and Security Regulation) (BIS) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Export Control Reform Initiative - Strategic Trade Authorization License Exception (US Bureau of Industry and Security Regulation) (BIS) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 29, 2018 This rule adds a new license exception to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that authorizes the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of specified items to destinations that pose relatively low risk that those items will be used for a purpose that license requirements are designed to prevent. Use of the exception is conditioned upon the creation and exchange by the parties to the transaction of notifications and statements designed to provide assurance against diversion of such items to other destinations. The exception is only relevant to exports, reexports, and transfers for which a license is required under the EAR. Thus, if the EAR do not impose an obligation to apply for and receive a license before exporting, reexporting, or transferring an item subject to the EAR, STA is not relevant to the transaction. The exception does not alter any of the General Prohibitions in the EAR against unlicensed exports, reexports, or transfers to proscribed end users, end uses, or destinations. This rule, has been cleared by several departments, including Defense, State, Homeland Security, and Justice. This rule is part of the Administration's Export Control Reform Initiative, undertaken as a result of the fundamental review of the U.S. export control system that the President announced in August 2009. This book contains: - The complete text of the Export Control Reform Initiative - Strategic Trade Authorization License Exception (US Bureau of Industry and Security Regulation) (BIS) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section

The Institute for Science and International Security became interested in the results of President Obama's ECR Initiative in 2015, after hearing differing opinions about the impacts of the reforms. The reforms generated intense controversy among experts, officials, company officials, and practitioners who were involved in the initiative or had seen initial results regarding the control of proliferation-sensitive goods. The Institute decided to investigate the reforms and contact a wide range of officials and experts to better understand and assess the ECR Initiative. In Part I of this report, we explain the main elements of the ECR Initiative, including its goals, justification, intended impacts, and status. We also provide an overview of the U.S. export control system, including its licensing and enforcement functions. We describe how the ECR Initiative has impacted government functions more broadly based on preliminary data. Part II discusses the positive, negative, and neutral views of more than a dozen experts we interviewed about the effects of the reforms. In Part III we offer policy solutions for mitigating the potential threats identified in Parts I and II that may have been opened by the reforms. These solutions are aimed at better securing efforts to prevent the spread of proliferation-sensitive goods under a reformed U.S. export control system. We also suggest ways for the Trump administration and Congress to further implement and strengthen the reforms.