The United States And The Defense Of The Pacific

This important report was issued by the Department of Defense in June 2019. The Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense's priority theater. The United States is a Pacific nation; we are linked to our Indo-Pacific neighbors through unbreakable bonds of shared history, culture, commerce, and values. We have an enduring commitment to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific in which all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty and able to pursue economic growth consistent with accepted international rules, norms, and principles of fair competition. The continuity of our shared strategic vision is uninterrupted despite an increasingly complex security environment. Inter-state strategic competition, defined by geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions, is the primary concern for U.S. national security. In particular, the People's Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks to reorder the region to its advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce other nations. In contrast, the Department of Defense supports choices that promote long-term peace and prosperity for all in the Indo-Pacific. We will not accept policies or actions that threaten or undermine the rules-based international order - an order that benefits all nations. We are committed to defending and enhancing these shared values.China's economic, political, and military rise is one of the defining elements of the 21st century. Today, the Indo-Pacific increasingly is confronted with a more confident and assertive China that is willing to accept friction in the pursuit of a more expansive set of political, economic, and security interests. Perhaps no country has benefited more from the free and open regional and international system than China, which has witnessed the rise of hundreds of millions from poverty to growing prosperity and security. Yet while the Chinese people aspire to free markets, justice, and the rule of law, the People's Republic of China (PRC), under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), undermines the international system from within by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously eroding the values and principles of the rules-based order.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. 1. Introduction * 1.1. America's Historic Ties to the Indo-Pacific * 1.2. Vision and Principles for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific * 2. Indo-Pacific Strategic Landscape: Trends and Challenges * 2.1. The People's Republic of China as a Revisionist Power * 2.2. Russia as a Revitalized Malign Actor * 2.3. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a Rogue State * 2.4. Prevalence of Transnational Challenges * 3. U.S. National Interests and Defense Strategy * 3.1. U.S. National Interests * 3.2. U.S. National Defense Strategy * 4. Sustaining U.S. Influence to Achieve Regional Objectives * 4.1. Line of Effort 1: Preparedness * 4.2. Line of Effort 2: Partnerships * 4.3. Line of Effort 3: Promoting a Networked Region * Conclusion

This volume examines how the U.S. military must rebuild in the wake of Iraq/Afghanistan, and refocus its power projection to face the new challenges emerging in the Pacific and with China. Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy provides an all-encompassing look at the challenges facing the United States in shaping a 21st-century Pacific strategy: dealing with the growing Chinese colossus, the unpredictable nuclear challenge presented by North Korea, the dynamic of the Arctic opening, and maintaining the security of the conveyor belt of goods and services in the Pacific. Can the United States successfully train and prepare for the 21st century, and break free from the mindset that determined its strategies in the previous century? The authors of the work explain why a carefully considered, fully modernized Pacific strategy is a key element for the evolution of American military power—and why shaping an effective air and maritime strategy in the Pacific as well as globally is the crucial challenge facing the U.S. military and the policy community. Written by authors with significant access to the media, think tanks, and high-level politicians, the book provides an insider's look at how American military leaders are building out relevant capabilities in the Pacific to defend America and its allies, and it contains extensive interviews with those leaders.

In an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific, the United States, Australia and their regional allies and partners face a myriad of strategic challenges that cut across every level of the competitive space. Driven by China’s use of multidimensional coercion in pursuit of its aim to displace the United States as the region’s dominant power, a new era of strategic competition is unfolding. At stake is the stability and character of the Indo-Pacific order, hitherto founded on American power and longstanding rules and norms, all of which are increasingly uncertain. The challenges that Beijing poses the region operate over multiple domains and are prosecuted by the Chinese Communist Party through a whole-of-nation strategy. In the grey zone between peace and war, tactics like economic coercion, foreign interference, the use of civil militias and other forms of political warfare have become Beijing’s tools of choice for pursuing incremental shifts to the geostrategic status quo. These efforts are compounded by China’s rapidly growing conventional military power and expanding footprint in the Western Pacific, which is raising the spectre of a limited war that America would find it difficult to deter or win. All of this is taking place under the lengthening shadow of Beijing’s nuclear modernisation and its bid for new competitive advantages in emerging strategic technologies. Strengthening regional deterrence and counter-coercion in light of these challenges will require the United States and Australia — working independently, together and with their likeminded partners — to develop more integrated strategies for the Indo-Pacific region and novel ways to operationalise the alliance in support of deterrence objectives. There is widespread support for this agenda in both Washington and Canberra. As the Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy makes clear, allies provide an “asymmetric advantage” for helping the United States deter aggression and uphold favourable balances of power around the world. Australia’s Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds mirrored this sentiment in a major speech in Washington last November, observing that “deterrence is a joint responsibility for a shared purpose — one that no country, not even the United States, can undertake alone.” Forging greater coordination on deterrence strategy within the US-Australia alliance, however, is no easy task, particularly when this undertaking is focussed on China’s coercive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific. Although Canberra and Washington have overlapping strategic objectives, their interests and threat perceptions regarding China are by no means symmetrical. Each has very different capabilities, policy priorities and tolerance for accepting costs and risks. Efforts to operationalise deterrence must therefore proceed incrementally and on the basis of robust alliance dialogue. To advance this process of bilateral strategic policy debate, the United States Studies Centre and Pacific Forum hosted the second round of the Annual Track 1.5 US-Australia Deterrence Dialogue in Washington in November 2019, bringing together US and Australian experts from government and non-government organisations. The theme for this meeting was “Operationalising Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” with a focus on exploring tangible obstacles and opportunities for improving the alliance’s collective capacity to deter coercive changes to the regional order. Both institutions would like to thank the Australian Department of Defence Strategic Policy Grants Program and the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency for their generous support of this engagement. The following analytical summary reflects the authors’ accounts of the dialogue’s proceedings and does not necessarily represent their own views. It endeavours to capture, examine and contextualise a wide range of perspectives and debates from the discussion; but does not purport to offer a comprehensive record. Nothing in the following pages represents the views of the Australian Department of Defence, the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency or any of the other officials or organisations that took part in the dialogue.

On May 8, 1945, Victory in Europe Day-shortened to "V.E. Day"-brought with it the demise of Nazi Germany. But for the Allies, the war was only half-won. Exhausted but exuberant American soldiers, ready to return home, were sent to join the fighting in the Pacific, which by the spring and summer of 1945 had turned into a gruelling campaign of bloody attrition against an enemy determined to fight to the last man. Germany had surrendered unconditionally. The Japanese would clearly make the conditions of victory extraordinarily high. In the United States, Americans clamored for their troops to come home and for a return to a peacetime economy. Politics intruded upon military policy while a new and untested president struggled to strategize among a military command that was often mired in rivalry. The task of defeating the Japanese seemed nearly unsurmountable, even while plans to invade the home islands were being drawn. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall warned of the toll that "the agony of enduring battle" would likely take. General Douglas MacArthur clashed with Marshall and Admiral Nimitz over the most effective way to defeat the increasingly resilient Japanese combatants. In the midst of this division, the Army began a program of partial demobilization of troops in Europe, which depleted units at a time when they most needed experienced soldiers. In this context of military emergency, the fearsome projections of the human cost of invading the Japanese homeland, and weakening social and political will, victory was salvaged by means of a horrific new weapon. As one Army staff officer admitted, "The capitulation of Hirohito saved our necks." In Implacable Foes, award-winning historians Waldo Heinrichs (a veteran of both theatres of war in World War II) and Marc Gallicchio bring to life the final year of World War Two in the Pacific right up to the dropping of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, evoking not only Japanese policies of desperate defense, but the sometimes rancorous debates on the home front. They deliver a gripping and provocative narrative that challenges the decision-making of U.S. leaders and delineates the consequences of prioritizing the European front. The result is a masterly work of military history that evaluates the nearly insurmountable trials associated with waging global war and the sacrifices necessary to succeed.

 During the first 10 months of the war in the Pacific, Japan achieved air supremacy with its carrier and land-based forces. But after major setbacks at Midway and Guadalcanal, the empire's expansion stalled, in part due to flaws in aircraft design, strategy and command. This book offers a fresh analysis of the air war in the Pacific during the early phases of World War II. Details are included from two expeditions conducted by the author that reveal the location of an American pilot missing in the Philippines since 1942 and clear up a controversial account involving famed Japanese ace Saburo Sakai and U.S. Navy pilot James "Pug" Southerland.

WINNER OF THE NATIONAL BOOK CRITICS CIRCLE AWARD • AN AMERICAN BOOK AWARD FINALIST • A monumental history that has been hailed by The New York Times as “one of the most original and important books to be written about the war between Japan and the United States.” In this monumental history, Professor John Dower reveals a hidden, explosive dimension of the Pacific War—race—while writing what John Toland has called “a landmark book ... a powerful, moving, and evenhanded history that is sorely needed in both America and Japan.” Drawing on American and Japanese songs, slogans, cartoons, propaganda films, secret reports, and a wealth of other documents of the time, Dower opens up a whole new way of looking at that bitter struggle of four and a half decades ago and its ramifications in our lives today. As Edwin O. Reischauer, former ambassador to Japan, has pointed out, this book offers “a lesson that the postwar generations need most ... with eloquence, crushing detail, and power.”

In a comprehensive study of four decades of military policy, Brian McAllister Linn offers the first detailed history of the U.S. Army in Hawaii and the Philippines between 1902 and 1940. Most accounts focus on the months preceding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. By examining the years prior to the outbreak of war, Linn provides a new perspective on the complex evolution of events in the Pacific. Exhaustively researched, Guardians of Empire traces the development of U.S. defense policy in the region, concentrating on strategy, tactics, internal security, relations with local communities, and military technology. Linn challenges earlier studies which argue that army officers either ignored or denigrated the Japanese threat and remained unprepared for war. He demonstrates instead that from 1907 onward military commanders in both Washington and the Pacific were vividly aware of the danger, that they developed a series of plans to avert it, and that they in fact identified_even if they could not solve_many of the problems that would become tragically apparent on 7 December 1941.

In this carefully crafted and meticulously researched book, Hal M. Friedman contends that US fears after World War II led the nation into military domination of the Pacific Ocean, turning it into an "American lake" in the hope of keeping the mainland safe from attack. According to Friedman, with the country still reeling from a bad case of "Pearl Harbor Syndrome," four departments of the Executive Branch --War, Navy, State, and Interior-- succeeded in creating a new US strategic sphere in the Pacific Basin. However, while the departments agreed on the goal, there were many arguments about the means of reaching it. Friedman recounts disagreements about the best ways to secure the Basin against potential enemies, particularly a resurgent Japan and a hostile Soviet Union. With the United States unofficially claiming jurisdiction over a vast ocean and all of its human occupants, there were titanic clashes of opinion about how to exercise this newly-declared power. Working from primary sources, including declassified materials, Friedman describes the many conflicts between military and civilian services in the period immediately following the war. He provides an indepth analysis of the policies that were thrashed out, often after intense interdepartmental infighting, to turn the Pacific into an American lake. In addition, he investigates the civil administration of Guam and American Samoa, along with the governing of the islands of Micronesia and the Ryukyus, which were formerly occupied by the Japanese. While a few scholars have studied post-war American imperialism, only Friedman has investigated the bureaucracy of policymaking and its consequences on Pacific islands and peoples with this much detail. Not only does Friedman examine the bureaucratic history, but he also illuminates the equally important impacts of Americanization that accompanied the imposition of US ideas about government, economics, and culture far beyond mainland America. This is a revealing examination of how the US took over the Pacific Ocean after World War II.