The Ukrainian Military

The Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University has established the Harvard Papers in Ukrainian Studies as a medium for occasional papers, lectures, reports, reprints, long articles, and recent theses of particular merit. It also is a venue for monograph-length works that utilize new analyses and methodologies that broaden the field of Ukrainian studies. The series is not geographically limited to Ukraine proper--it also will examine questions of importance to surrounding countries, inasmuch as these questions are significant to the history and current development of Ukraine. This booklet contains the proceedings of the first Annual Conference sponsored by the Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, and the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University at Harvard University, May 12-13, 1994. Kostiantyn P. Morozov, first Minister of Defense of independent Ukraine, gave the keynote address. Papers exploring recent Ukrainian military history and the construction and Ukrainianization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were presented by Professors Zenon Kohut (Director, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies), Mark von Hagen (Columbia University), and John Jaworsky (University of Waterloo). Responses to these papers were given by senior Ukrainian military personnel who attended the conference. The Military Tradition in Ukrainian History will be useful to specialists in East European affairs, military historians, and Ukrainianists.

The Ukrainian army is no longer perceived to be a security challenge as it was during the first stages of the Ukraine's independence. Rather, Ukraine's leadership is primarily concerned with strengthening the army's ability to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. The Ukrainian army continues to present a challenge to national interests. In addition to the army's inability to defend the Ukraine from outside military aggression, it also poses the challenge of weapons proliferation and miniaturization of the economy, and a growing dependence on Russia, both as a security partner and as a purveyor of social welfare needs. In these ways the Ukrainian military endangers the society it is meant to protect. The Ukrainian government must recognize that while military cooperation with Russia is more lucrative than military confrontation, there are still basic needs that is must provide to the army to prevent over-reliance on its big neighbor. Political and civil control of the military must concentrate on the more acute problems, to include lawlessness, black marketeering, and collaboration with paramilitary forces. This can be accomplished by simultaneously strengthening civil control over the military, and increasing the army's reputation and prestige within society.

From the earliest times of its post-Soviet independence, Ukraine has been open to security cooperation with the United States. In the beginning, there were significant differences in political, security and even bureaucratic cultures between the two countries, which formed some obstacles to building bridges quickly. Many of these obstacles remain, especially in the political dimension of relations between the two countries. But in the absence of their former ideological differences and united by common interests in preserving international peace and fighting terrorism, Ukraine and the United States have established constructive and mutually beneficial military cooperation. The United States has been interested in engaging post-Soviet Ukraine in security cooperation and clearly articulated what it wanted to achieve from this cooperation. It was in U.S. interests to have a strong, independent, stable, and democratic Ukraine as a partner in Eastern Europe. Guided by such a vision, the United States consistently has demonstrated initiative in supporting Ukraine in building its national military by engaging it in peacetime military- to-military contacts. The Ukrainian government unhesitatingly accepted U.S. leadership in bilateral military cooperation, which has provided it with an opportunity to learn useful approaches to defense reform, raised Ukraine's international prestige, and strengthened the country's position vis-a-vis the pressure for regional influence exerted by its neighbor (and regional dominant power), Russia.

America's new allies in Central and Eastern Europe have been struggling with defense reform since the end of the Cold War. Only recently since the Orange Revolution has Ukraine's national political and military leadership seriously engaged the process of radical and comprehensive defense reform. This monograph applies the various roadmaps for reform developed in the postcommunist states of Central European states to the emerging Ukrainian case. The author draws upon this mixed picture to suggest a framework focused on key areas in need of reform as well as key conditions that facilitate the achievement of reform objectives. The result is a richly developed monograph revealing Ukraine's main strengths as well as obstacles limiting the improvement of its military capabilities. Ukraine's interests in the East and West, along with the reality of its divided society, shape the outcomes to date and constrain the future of its Euro-Atlantic orientation.

In early 2014, sparked by an assault by their government on peaceful students, Ukrainians rose up against a deeply corrupt, Moscow-backed regime. Initially demonstrating under the banner of EU integration, the Maidan protesters proclaimed their right to a dignified existence; they learned to organize, to act collectively, to become a civil society. Most prominently, they established a new Ukrainian identity: territorial, inclusive, and present-focused with powerful mobilizing symbols. Driven by an urban “bourgeoisie” that rejected the hierarchies of industrial society in favor of a post-modern heterarchy, a previously passive post-Soviet country experienced a profound social revolution that generated new senses: “Dignity” and “fairness” became rallying cries for millions. Europe as the symbolic target of political aspiration gradually faded, but the impact (including on Europe) of Ukraine’s revolution remained. When Russia invaded—illegally annexing Crimea and then feeding continuous military conflict in the Donbas—, Ukrainians responded with a massive volunteer effort and touching patriotism. In the process, they transformed their country, the region, and indeed the world. This book provides a chronicle of Ukraine’s Maidan and Russia’s ongoing war, and puts forth an analysis of the Revolution of Dignity from the perspective of a participant observer.

Explaining and illustrating the immediate background to the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, this book investigates the Ukrainian and Russian regular and irregular forces which have been fighting in the Donbas region since 2014. In February 2014, street protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities led to the ousting of the Russian-backed President Yanukovych. Simultaneously, Russia carried out an almost-bloodless seizure of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula. Ukraine's 'Euromaidan Revolution' would see many changes to the country's constitution, and a turn towards the West for civic assistance and military training. Meanwhile, a violent reaction in the mainly Russian-speaking south-eastern industrial Donbas region led to a local armed counter-revolution, backed by Russia from April 2014. This conflict became an essential example of Russia's policy of so-called 'hybrid warfare', which pursues its strategic aims by a blend of propaganda and misinformation with the clandestine deployment of Special Forces and regular troops, alongside 'deniable' proxies and mercenaries. Meanwhile, Ukraine's efforts to reform its government culminated in the landslide election of President Zelensky in April 2019. Using his extensive contacts in both Russia and Ukraine, Prof Mark Galeotti presents a thorough and intriguing primer on all the forces involved in the conflict up to 2018. Supported by orders-of-battle, colour photos and specially commissioned artwork, his book also analyses the background and the stuttering progress of the war, and addresses the Russian military capabilities which are today being tested in all-out battle.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the Army's traditional methodology for finding and analyzing relevant information for its operations, is not effective for tackling the operational and intelligence challenges of urban operations. The authors suggest new ways to categorize the complex terrain, infrastructure, and populations of urban environments and incorporate this information into Army planning and decisionmaking processes.

From the earliest times of its post-Soviet independence, Ukraine has been open to security cooperation with the United States. In the beginning, there were significant differences in political, security and even bureaucratic cultures between the two countries, which formed some obstacles to building bridges quickly. Many of these obstacles remain, especially in the political dimension of relations between the two countries. But in the absence of their former ideological differences and united by common interests in preserving international peace and fighting terrorism, Ukraine and the United States have established constructive and mutually beneficial military cooperation. The United States has been interested in engaging post-Soviet Ukraine in security cooperation and clearly articulated what it wanted to achieve from this cooperation. It was in U.S. interests to have a strong, independent, stable, and democratic Ukraine as a partner in Eastern Europe. Guided by such a vision, the United States consistently has demonstrated initiative in supporting Ukraine in building its national military by engaging it in peacetime military-to- military contacts. The Ukrainian government unhesitatingly accepted U.S. leadership in bilateral military cooperation, which has provided it with an opportunity to learn useful approaches to defense reform, raised Ukraine's international prestige, and strengthened the country's position vis-à-vis the pressure for regional influence exerted by its neighbor (and regional dominant power), Russia. Bilateral programs of military contacts with the United States have become the largest among Ukraine's many international military cooperation programs. Since 1992 bilateral military cooperation has improved in terms of quality and substance, and set the stage for preparation, execution, and support of actual U.S. Ukraine combined operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq. These combined deployments have demonstrated that the years of cooperation were not in vain; Ukrainians have proven their ability to be a reliable and capable peacekeeping combat force. However, as this monograph suggests, despite steady improvement in bilateral cooperation, developing full interoperability between the Ukrainian and U.S. militaries beyond joint peacekeeping is not yet a realistic possibility. At a time when full combat interoperability is beyond reach for even the closest U.S. allies, the experience of previous U.S.-Ukraine partnership shows that the most logical and realistic option is to promote and further improve tactical interoperability for low intensity conflict: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance. More ambitious goals are far beyond Ukraine's current financial capabilities, and are restrained by the country's inability to qualify politically and economically for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership soon. This monograph consists of four parts. Part I presents a strategic context for U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation and provides general data on the history and current state of security relations between Ukraine and the United States. Part II focuses on the development and improvement of cooperative mechanisms for bilateral military contacts. Part III provides data and analysis of peacetime military engagement and discusses important lessons learned. Part IV examines Ukraine's practical cooperation with the U.S. military in operations in Kosovo and Iraq, operations where cooperation continues today. In sum, U.S. Ukrainian military cooperation has created a reasonable foundation for limited joint and combined action, with the United States helping Ukraine to build a noticeable cooperative capability. This capability currently is being adjusted in Iraq and other places. The potential remains for even greater cooperation, if necessary improvements are made.