The Transition To Economic And Monetary Union

Europe’s financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro’s invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar’s privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany’s persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community’s Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.

1.The origins of EMU -- 2.The design of EMU -- 3.Monetary policy in Stage Three -- 4.Fiscal policy and EMU -- 5.EMU and the outside world -- 6.The transition to EMU -- 7.Reconsidering the transition -- 8.Getting on with EMU.

The Maastricht Treaty, signed in December 1991, set a timetable for the European Community's economic and monetary union (EMU) and clearly defined the institutional policy changes necessary for its achievement. Subsequent developments have demonstrated, however, the importance of many key issues in the transition to EMU that were largely neglected at the time. This volume reports the proceedings of a joint CEPR conference with the Banco de Portugal, held in January 1992. In these papers, leading international experts address the instability of the transition to EMU, the long-run implications of monetary union and the single market for growth and convergence in Europe. They also consider the prospects for inflation and fiscal convergence, regional policy and the integration of financial markets and fiscal systems. Attention focuses on adjustment mechanisms with differentiated shocks, region-specific business cycles and excessive industrial concentration and the cases for a two-speed EMU and fiscal federalism.

Economic and monetary union in the European Union represents a massive change for Europe and for the world. The Road to Maastricht identifies why the agreement was possible and how the agreement was made. The book examines the motives that inspired European political leaders, the strategies that they pursued, and the institutions that were used to achieve monetary union. Drawing on a wide range of sources and unprecedented research and interviews, the book combines careful political analysis with new information about the way in which European Monetary Union was negotiated. It delves into the complex forces at work in Europe, including the cross-national political interactions, to produce an authoritative account of the boldest and riskiest venture in the history of European integration.

The Heads of State and Government at the European Council meeting in Maastricht definitely decided to embark upon the creation of Economic and Monetary Union by, at the latest, the beginning of 1999, and in doing so opted for a relatively short but difficult journey that should bring the European Community all the benefits one could expect from such an undertaking. However, the question still remains of how Economic and Monetary Union will really affect the day-to-day policymaking of the national civil servants involved, particularly in the areas of monetary and fiscal policies. Can national policymakers adopt a `sit-and-wait' policy or does Economic and Monetary Union really entail a dangerous voyage between Scylla and Charybdis? Will Economic and Monetary Union undermine the sovereignty of national governments because the Maastricht Treaty will give the EC the competence to dictate its own will? Are the benefits of Economic and Monetary Union for the Member States really as great as expected? These and other issues are assessed in this book which, after an assessment of the achievements of the Maastricht European Council, will cover the main implications of a European monetary policy and closer economic cooperation for the relevant policies of the Member States, the division of the competences between Community and member countries and the forthcoming prospects for new EC policies (e.g. regional policy, the EC budget, fiscal union, etc.)

Paul J. J. Welfens European monetary union has been discussed for more than three decades and is likely to be realized in 1999. One may anticipate generous interpretations of the fiscal convergence criteria. Such generosity consistent with the Maastricht Treaty might impair the credibility of the ECB and the stability of the Euro, respectively, despite the fact that inflation is a monetary phenomenon and has little to do with government deficits, unless they were financed via the printing press, which is excluded in the Maastricht Treaty. The European Commission's forecast of spring 1997 suggests that Italy will have problems in joining the EMU starter group as the is expected to be 3. 2% in 1997 and even 3. 9% in 1998. A Italian deficitlGDP ratio fully developed EMU group (with all 15 cowltries included) would represent 38% of the OECD GDP, slightly higher than the U. S. with 33% (Japan 21%). The exports/GDP ratio of EU countries is 30%, the ratio with respect to exports outside the EU would be 10% (Japan, U. S. 8%). The share of the U. S. dollar in international currency reserves fell from 67% to 40% in 1995, while the share of European currencies increased from 13% to 37%. Prior to the EMU, market participants have to anticipate whether a transition to 1999 will bring windfall losses or gains in various bond markets.