The Testimony Of Kolchak And Other Siberian Materials The Testimony Of Kolchak Memoirs Of The Red Partisan Movement In The Russian Far East

This book aims to furnish a history of the origins and development of Soviet military leadership, together with a survey of its relations with the Communist Party and the governmental apparatus, within the chronological limits of the first attempts to organise the Red Army and a military command.

The Russian Revolution and Civil War in the years 1917 to 1921 is one of the most widely studied periods in history. It is also somewhat inevitably one that has generated a huge flow of literature in the decades that have passed since the events themselves. However, until now, historians of the revolution have had no dedicated bibliography of the period and little claim to bibliographical control over the literature. The Russian Revolution and Civil War, 1917-1921offers for the first time a comprehensive bibliographical guide to this crucial and fascinating period of history. The Bibliography focuses on the key years of 1917 to 1921, starting with the February Revolution of 1917 and concluding with the 10th Party Congress of March 1921, and covers all the key events of the intervening years. As such it identifies these crucial years as something more than simply the creation of a communist state.

An objective and documentary history of the earliest origins and formative years of the Workers-Peasants Red Army from the Civil War to the initial disasters of the war with Germany, the Great Patriotic War, culminating in the "battle for Moscow" in November-December 1941.

Between 1895 and 1945, Japan was heavily engaged in other parts of Asia, first in neighbouring Korea and northeast Asia, later in southern China and Southeast Asia. During this period Japanese ideas on the nature of national identities in Asia changed dramatically. At first Japan discounted the significance of nationalism, but in time Japanese authorities came to see Asian nationalisms as potential allies, especially if they could be shaped to follow Japanese patterns. At the same time, the ways in which other Asians thought of Japan also changed. Initially many Asians saw Japan as a useful but distant model, but with the rise of Japanese political power, this distant admiration turned into both cooperation and resistance. This volume includes chapters on India, Tibet, Siberia, Mongolia, Korea, Manchukuo, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia.

“An intriguing and carefully argued entry into a small and often overlooked discussion of American political maneuvering at the end of World War I.” —Library Journal In a little-known episode at the height of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson dispatched thousands of American soldiers to Siberia. Carl J. Richard convincingly shows that Wilson’s original intent was to enable Czechs and anti-Bolshevik Russians to rebuild the Eastern Front against the Central Powers. But Wilson continued the intervention for a year and a half after the armistice in order to overthrow the Bolsheviks and to prevent the Japanese from absorbing eastern Siberia. As Wilson and the Allies failed to formulate a successful Russian policy at the Paris Peace Conference, American doughboys suffered great hardships on the bleak plains of Siberia. Richard argues that Wilson’s Siberian intervention ironically strengthened the Bolshevik regime it was intended to topple. Its tragic legacy can be found in the seeds of World War II—which began with an alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union, the two nations most aggrieved by Allied treatment after World War I—and in the Cold War, a forty-five year period in which the world held its collective breath over the possibility of nuclear annihilation. One of the earliest U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns outside the Western Hemisphere, the Siberian intervention was a harbinger of policies to come. Richard notes that it teaches invaluable lessons about the extreme difficulties inherent in interventions and about the absolute need to secure widespread support on the ground if such campaigns are to achieve success, knowledge that U.S. policymakers tragically ignored in Vietnam and have later struggled to implement in Iraq and Afghanistan.