The Supreme Court As Final Arbiter In Federal

In analyzing the Supreme Court's powers in federal-state relations, the author demonstrates that the framers of the constitution clearly intended that the Court should be the federal umpire, thus disproving a charge by modern states' righters of usurpation of power by the Supreme Court. In each historical period the effect of the Court interpretations on the autonomy of the state governments and on the acceleration of federal centralization is considered. Originally published in 1958. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

The resolution of the 2000 presidential election by the U.S. Supreme Court's Bush v. Gore decision generated an extraordinary outpouring of literature in a very short period of time. Now that the initial furor over the decision has subsided, The Final Arbiter presents a sober consideration of the consequences of the decision for the law, the presidency, and the legitimacy of the American political system. The contributors include well-established names in law and political science, as well as up-and-coming scholars, offering a broad understanding of Bush v. Gore's long-term impact. This book will be useful as a classroom text in both survey courses on elections and the courts and for advanced courses that consider the impact of judicial rulings on the government and political process.

Federal judges, legal scholars, pundits, and reporters frequently describe the Supreme Court as the final word on the meaning of the Constitution. The historical record presents an entirely different picture. A close and revealing reading of that record, from 1789 to the present day, Reconsidering Judicial Finality reminds us of the “unalterable fact,” as Chief Justice Rehnquist once remarked, “that our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is fallible.” And a Court inevitably prone to miscalculation and error, as this book clearly demonstrates, cannot have the incontrovertible last word on constitutional questions. In this deeply researched, sharply reasoned work of legal myth-busting, constitutional scholar Louis Fisher explains how constitutional disputes are settled by all three branches of government, and by the general public, with the Supreme Court often playing a secondary role. The Court’s decisions have, of course, been challenged and reversed in numerous cases—involving slavery, civil rights, child labor legislation, Japanese internment during World War II, abortion, and religious liberty. What Fisher shows us on a case-by-case basis is how the elected branches, scholars, and American public regularly press policies contrary to Court rulings—and regularly prevail, although the process might sometimes take decades. From the common misreading of Marbury v. Madison, to the mistaken understanding of the Supreme Court as the trusted guardian of individual rights, to the questionable assumptions of the Court’s decision in Citizens United, Fisher’s work charts the distance and the difference between the Court as the ultimate arbiter in constitutional matters and the judgment of history. The verdict of Reconsidering Judicial Finality is clear: to treat the Supreme Court’s nine justices as democracy’s last hope or as dangerous activists undermining democracy is to vest them with undue significance. The Constitution belongs to all three branches of government—and, finally, to the American people.

This accessible guide to the U.S. Supreme Court explains the Court's history and authority, its structure and processes, its most important and enduring legal decisions, and its place in the U.S. political system. A 2018 Pew Research Center poll found that while 78 percent of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents believed that the Supreme Court should base its decisions on the "modern" meaning of the Constitution, 67 percent of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents asserted that Justices should rely on the Constitution's "original meaning." The Court often is the final arbiter of polarizing battles that originate in other branches of government. At the same time, however, its structural insulation from Congress, the Presidency, and electoral politics make the Supreme Court-at least in theory-well positioned to rise above the rough-and-tumble of politics. This book examines the power of the Supreme Court in America's system of democratic governance in several ways. These include: reviewing debates over whether justices should interpret the Constitution in line with its "original meaning" or in accordance with present-day understandings; exploring the processes and factors that shape how cases are chosen and decided; considering contentious battles over the selection of justices; and examining the impact of the Court on American culture and society.

Examines the Supreme Court of the United States from its foundation, organization, and methods, as a distinctly American concept and function.

Is judicial review constitutionally required or even authorized? Can it be said whether the federal courts exercise this power with the consent of the electorate? Sosin addresses these challenging questions in the broad context of the Anglo-American historical experience. He examines the evolution of courts of judicature and legislatures and the contests for power that were waged from the seventeenth to eighteenth century. The origins of the English court system and the establishment of common law are first described. The author traces the rise in judicial and parliamentary power that occurred with the erosion of the royal prerogative and discusses the constitutional and legal heritage that provided the framework for law, courts, and legislatures in colonial America. Following an examination of political, legislative, and legal development during the colonial period, Sosin looks at the philosophical and ideological controversies that influenced the framing of the Constitution, particulary the conflicting views of the proper relationship between the legislature and judiciary. Despite the emphatic opposition voiced by some framers to giving judges the power to overturn legislative action by ruling on the constitutionality of federal laws, the Supreme Court was able to declare itself the final arbiter and ultimate interpreter of the Constitution as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century. The author's analysis indicates that the Court's assumption of the power of judicial review was neither inevitable politically nor the logical result of the founders desire to limit government and protect the rights of individuals against interferences by public authority. Echoing early English and American political figures, Sosin asks whether this expanded, arbitrary judicial power can be considered appropriate in a representative democracy. The product of meticulous research and careful historical analysis, this provocative study will be relevant reading for a variety of courses in American government, political science, and history.